THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY

F. J. WRIGHT

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An Introduction to Social and Political Science

BY

F. J. WRIGHT, M.Sc. (Econ.)

LECTURER IN SOCIOLOGY, CARDIFF TECHNICAL COLLEGE

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PREFACE

Although this book has been designed to meet the needs of those students approaching the study of Sociology for the first time and intending to read Sociology, Political and Social Theory and kindred subjects for the B.Sc. (Econ.) Examination of the University of London and for similar examinations, it is at the same time intended for the general reader who is interested in the social and political problems of the modern world and who is anxious to approach them with some knowledge of social and political theory and of the sources to which he can go for more detailed discussion.

This aim has necessitated a considerable compression of subject-matter, since the scope of each of the subjects dealt with is so wide. Nevertheless, the author hopes that he has been successful in preparing a work which is worthy of its title.

The meetings of the International Science Conference held in London in 1941 were convened by the Division for the Social and International Relations of the British Association in the middle of a war carried on with unparalleled ferocity in a world whose farthest corners now enjoy no immunity against the evils of war; they are evidence of the gathering conviction of men and women of science that the world's greatest need is now the practical application of the principles of a Science of Mankind, a science whose functions it will be to investigate the conditions under which the maximum happiness of human beings living in societies can be attained and to suggest the means by which these conditions may be realised. It is the author's view that the young science of Sociology is best fitted to fulfil this rôle. The lives of vast numbers of folk are being affected to an increasing degree as means of transport and communication expand, and as Man's material and

psychological powers not only of construction but also of destruction increase, by social movements whose real significance in Man's history are not often generally appreciated; such a position has come about because the education of the ordinary man and woman has not generally included the study of sociological science. Only when the study of the principles of Sociology becomes part of the general educational system in modern civilisation is the individual given the opportunity of acquiring knowledge which will help him not only to realise his own individuality but also to take his full and responsible part in the development of his civilisation. This book is offered as a contribution to the efforts of those writers who urge the claims of Sociology to rank as a science of first importance in the modern world.

The first draft of this work was submitted to Professor Morris Ginsberg, D.Lit., M.A., Professor Harold J. Laski, M.A. (Oxon.), and Mr. T. H. Marshall, M.A. (Cantab.), all of the London School of Economics and Political Science. These gentlemen were kind enough to read the manuscript, and to offer various suggestions and criticisms. The author desires to express his gratitude for their help, but he would like to make it quite clear that he accepts full responsibility for the whole of the subject-matter of the book. He can, of course, but inadequately express his debt to the writers on sociological subjects whose works he has studied; a selection of the titles of these works is given in the Bibliography. In particular, he wishes to thank:

(1) Messrs. Macmillan & Co. Ltd. for permission to make use of extracts from the works of Dr. Westermarck, from whose books he has freely quoted; acknowledgments as to the source of the various quotations will be found in the text.

(2) Messrs. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. for permission to use Figure 5; this Chart is based upon data given in F. Müller-Lyer's book, *The Family,* published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

(3) Messrs. Victor Gollancz Ltd. and Dr. R. R. Marett for permission to use Figure 2; the author is indebted to Dr. Marett for permission to use, in this diagram, his classification of Anthropology given in his article, " The Beginnings of Morals and Culture: An Introduction to Social Anthropology," in *An Outline of Modern Knowledge,* edited by Dr. William Rose (1931, Gollancz, 8/6).

(4) Professor R. M. MacIver of Columbia University, New York, for his permission to use Figure 6; this diagram has been constructed according to the system of Interests which Professor MacIver has set out in his work, *The Elements of Social Science* (1931, Methuen & Co. Ltd.).

He wishes also to express his thanks to his wife for her help in typing the manuscript.

F. J. WRIGHT.

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CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE 5

PART ONE

PRINCIPLES

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBJECT

SECTION PAGE

1. MAN IN SOCIETY 13
2. THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 18
3. ASSOCIATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 25
4. THE MEANING OF SOCIOLOGY 29

Chapter II

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

1. APPROACHES TO SOCIOLOGY 37
2. SOCIOLOGY AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE 41
3. THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 47
4. SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY 52
5. SOCIOLOGY AND BIOLOGY 56
6. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 67

Chapter III

MAN IN SOCIETY

1. THE STAGES OF SOCIETY 76
2. THE STRUCTURE OF MODERN WESTERN SOCIETY 84
3. THEORIES OF SOCIETY AND OF A GROUP MIND 90
4. ENVIRONMENT 97

Chapter IV

SOCIETY AS A SYSTEM OF REGULATED SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

SECTION
1. THE BASIS OF SOCIETY IN ASSOCIATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 102
2. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIETY 108

Chapter V

THE BASIS OF THE SYSTEM OF MORAL IDEAS

1. LAW AND JUSTICE 116
2. PUNISHMENT AND ITS ORIGIN 119
3. THE MORAL EMOTIONS 123
4. PUNISHMENT AND THE MORAL EMOTIONS 127

PART TWO

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter VI

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

1. THE FAMILY AS A SYSTEM OF REGULATED SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 133
2. THE STUDY OF MARRIAGE AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 141
3. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN THE MODERN WESTERN WORLD 152

Chapter VII

THE STATE

SECTION PAGE
1. WHAT IS THE STATE? 157
2. CONCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF THE STATE 159
3. THE STATE AND JUSTICE 164
4. THE STATE IN THE MODERN WESTERN WORLD 166

Chapter VIII

THE CHURCH

1. THE NATURE OF EARLY BELIEFS 173
2. MAGIC AND RELIGION 177
3. THE ECCLESIASTICAL INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 188

CONCLUSION 196

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 203

BIBLIOGRAPHY 209

INDEX 213

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LIST OF DIAGRAMS

PAGE

1. STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANKIND 17
2. THE STUDY OF ANTHROPOLOGY (AFTER MARETT) 55
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS REGARDING HUMAN EVOLUTION 58
4. THE STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 77
5. THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF MAN (AFTER TYLOR, FOURIER AND MORGAN, AND MÜLLER-LYER) 82–83
6. PROFESSOR MACIVER'S SYSTEM OF INTERESTS 86
7. CLASSIFICATION OF THE RULES RELATING TO MARRIAGE 134
8. THE POLITICAL STAGES OF SOCIETY IN WESTERN CIVILISATION 158
9. CLASSIFICATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE 164
10. THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF SAVAGES 174
11. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL INFLUENCE IN WESTERN CIVILISATION 187

PART ONE

PRINCIPLES

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBJECT

SECTION 1.—MAN IN SOCIETY

Some thousands of years ago, a creature called Man developed from a state closely resembling animal savagery into that of a more or less sapient being. We do not know how long ago this was; no definite date can be assigned to Man's emergence, the evidence being as yet too meagre for serious students of Man's history to presume accuracy in the matter of dates. Some put the event of Man's becoming Man, as distinct from the animal creature, as far back as 500,000 years ago; others think it is nearer 50,000 years.

Nor was his appearance any sudden event. It is not the way of Life as we know it on this planet to proceed by fits and starts; we do not know how many attempts there were on the part of this being, Man, to emerge from the pre-dawn stage, how many false starts and failures were swept away into oblivion as his predecessors, the giant reptiles, had been swept away. All we know is that some being closely resembling Man as we know him became slowly differentiated into more than a mere resemblance—in other words, *we* arrived.

Though this coming into being of ourselves was, as has been said, no sudden event, yet on the scale of world history it can at least be said to have been comparatively recent. The period between the time of the dawn-man and the men of this present generation is but a very small fraction of the total period of the history of the

earth. Man is a very recent newcomer to the earth. He is in a very primitive stage of development still—so primitive indeed, that only during comparatively recent years has he been able to exercise the faculty of viewing himself in relation to his world dispassionately, without reference, as far as possible, to his own feelings and emotions. Perhaps it is this last feature which distinguishes Man from the rest of creation. Courage, love, devotion, cleverness, leadership, the power of reasoning—these and many other virtues can be discerned among animals, and it is useless to enquire whether they should be described as " inherent " qualities, or due to " reflexes " or " reactions," since we could use precisely the same terms with equal lack of meaning in the case of many of Man's actions. Our knowledge of Psychology and Physiology, and of their relationship, is as yet too rudimentary to enable one to speak with any definiteness on such points as these. But it does seem to be a faculty peculiar to Man to be able to take a detached view of himself, and to look upon himself as part of the scheme of creation.

But this faculty is not common to all individuals. Like his animal relations—for all Life is related—Man varies enormously not only in physique but in intelligence and mental vision. Not only is there variation as between individuals, but there is variation as between times and places. We are not as individuals always using our intelligence to the full—there are very few people who have not done something silly at various periods of their lives, and our moments of vision are but moments, and rare. Now and again, in anger or hatred, some of the best of us hark back to the state of a ruder being. Now and again a vast concourse of people, in many countries and of all nations, experience a vision of a world in which the disease of war has been stamped out and the energies of Man devoted to making human life happier, fuller and freer.

Here we come to the meaning of the study of Mankind. Life for every individual on this earth is a search

for happiness, for a rich, full life, for a life that is satisfactory to the liver. But Man is not a solitary creature. Men live in communities, in cities, in towns, in villages, within some definite framework involving the co-operation of other men. Even the " solitary " individual who is content to live alone, as far as social intercourse with his fellows is concerned, is dependent on them for his existence. He is dependent on them in the very act of living in a house built by others, to say nothing of how dependent on Mankind as a whole he is when he steps out into the street, paved and made by other men. The hermit who lives alone in the woods is more dependent on other men than he thinks—his ancestors have cleared the wood of fierce animals, or have planted it, and a police system enables him to live in it without too great a fear of murder.

But we in this book are not concerned with freaks or seeming exceptions. Our study is with the ordinary man in the ordinary business of life, the ordinary man in his relations with other ordinary men, with ourselves.

Let us make the point perfectly clear to ourselves. We do not propose to study Man in isolation; we do not propose to study him zoologically, as an animal. Man belongs to the class of animals—the highest class—known as the mammals, the distinguishing features of which are warm blood and the suckling of the young after birth. We are not interested in Man from this angle except in so far as the discoveries of Physiology and Medicine throw light on Man's nature and conduct—that is to say, we are not interested in Man as an animal or a physical machine, but as Man, and when we use the word *Man* in this way, we mean the whole tissue of manner of life and the system of various relationships that constitute the life of Mankind; we do not separate any man from his fellows, postulate a Representative Man, or strike an Average type, but deal with Man in his relation to others. We cannot study Mankind without reference to *all* men.

It will not be necessary to labour the point that,

equally, we do not study Man from a psychological standpoint alone. A knowledge of Psychology will help us; indeed, it is essential to our study, but it will not be the abstract science of Mind, but the study of those mental aspects of Man in his relations with his fellows.

The exact significance of the distinction will be apparent later. Meanwhile, the highly important point has been made that our study is concerned with Man in relation to his fellows; a man cannot be studied in isolation, because he does not exist in isolation. From the moment he is born until the moment he dies he is surrounded by his fellow-men, or by evidences of their influence. He trades with them, sells things to them, buys things from them; he cannot get away from them.

Man at one time may have been gregarious only, like the horse; perhaps he associated with his fellows for the sake of company or mutual protection. But with increase of his intelligence and the use of his intelligence he became much more than a gregarious animal; he became a social being. It therefore becomes necessary now to study the terms "social" and "society," for on a proper understanding of their significance depends the understanding of the whole of this book.

The whole web of relationships which constitutes Man's life is known as Society. There are the narrower societies of the village or town, and the wider society of the nation and the empire. There is the widest society of the world, which exists by virtue of the fact that the activities of men are not confined within the limits of their own particular nation but are spread by commerce and other forms of intercourse over the surface of the whole planet. No longer are such nations as Japan and China shut off from all intercourse with the rest of Mankind.

A society is not the mere sum of the individuals that compose it. To take, as an example, a village society: the individual members enjoy a much richer and fuller life as members of the village than they

would as a mere collection of individuals living in close proximity. They have their church, their inn, their organised functions, their cricket matches, their foot-

Fig 1.—Stages in the Development of Mankind



ball team, their literary and dramatic societies. When such questions as the supply of water, gas and electricity, protection by a police force and the making of roads are considered, the advantages of the formation of wider societies than the village become apparent.

We have thus arrived at a conception of human beings living in societies by what may seem to the reader to be a somewhat circumlocutory attempt to describe the obvious. Nevertheless, it is essential to commence our study by some such detailed view of Man in Society, for millions of men living in this great society of human beings inhabiting the earth have never taken such a detailed view of their own existence, that view which is the first step in the science of Sociology, and which is the first step, too, to an understanding of the opportunities that lie before the human race and the powers that are Man's to use in enriching and fulfilling his life.

SECTION 2.—THE STUDY OF SOCIETY

Having arrived at the basic idea inherent in the term Society, it is now necessary to give greater definiteness to our ideas in the use of terms, for one cannot proceed far in any study without arriving at the necessity for definition of terms on which all are agreed and from which one can proceed. A definition does not assume or presume anything; it is merely a statement of fact, and though there can be differences of opinion as to the conclusions to be derived from a study of the facts, there can be no question as to the facts themselves.

If the reader is inclined to think that there is a good deal of unnecessary labouring of points, he must remember two things. Firstly, the science of Society is very new; secondly, Society is a matter which touches us all very closely; it is difficult for many people to view it in the cool, detached way in which they would view a problem in Chemistry or Physics.

As regards the newness of the science of Society, it is still disputed whether the term "science" can be used in this connection at all. It is not proposed to discuss this question at this stage; the reader will be in a better position to judge when aims and methods have been fully explained. For the present, it will be sufficient

to point out that a science is a body of systematised knowledge, and in order to build up such a system, it is necessary to define our terms carefully. For whether we call our study a science or not, it is necessary from the nature of our aim to follow the methods of Science, the first essential in which is the accurate definition of terms, so that when certain conclusions are arrived at by reasoning or investigation, it cannot be objected that certain "assumptions" were made at the beginning.

For there is likely to be considerable dispute if one's steps are not trodden carefully. The "human factor" becomes a tremendous problem in our study, for the very reason that what we are studying *is* mainly the "human factor." There are still a number of people who are chary of discussing such matters as religious institutions, the relation of the sexes, patriotism towards one's country. Their minds have been fixed and set by training, environment and other influences which we shall have to examine later on, and it is very difficult indeed for them to look on their own kind, the human species, from a detached viewpoint. Since such a detached viewpoint is essential for our purpose, it is obvious that no help can be expected from the type whose beliefs are not to be touched at all costs. Happily, this attitude is becoming less common; it is a sign of the coming of age or at least of the adolescence of the race that in modern times the structure of Society and the relations between human beings are undergoing a more thorough examination, a more constructively critical and comprehensive consideration, than has fallen to these matters in the past. There is a tendency to replace mere theory and abstract idealism by cold, dispassionate examination of reality.

To the discussion of the question of mental resistance we shall return later; let us note now that there is a tendency to-day for students of Society to arrive at and adhere to a definite terminology; there is coming into use a terminology for the science of Society just as there has come to be a necessary terminology for

Physiology, for Physics; for all the sciences, a terminology involving agreement on the part of scientific men, necessary for the fuller pursuit of knowledge.

Let us first concentrate our attention on the term *Society* itself. MacIver (*Elements of Social Science*, 1931, p. 8) states that the term Society includes " every kind and degree of relationship entered into by men—and any other social creatures—with one another." The term, then, means a relationship. A society is not merely a number of people leading a common life; it is, as MacIver says, in the first place a state or quality of mind. There is implied the consciousness of the relation of oneself to other people. We are all conscious of belonging to the human race, which has learned, as a whole, to obey certain laws peculiar to humanity; which has learned, to some extent, the differences between right and wrong; which has come to hold a certain regard for a human being as such. This consciousness is stronger among the civilised peoples than it is among uncivilised races; it is stronger among the more stable elements of the American people than among the members of the gangster class. It is diffused throughout the world, stronger here, as in civilised countries, weaker there, as in the depths of the African jungle. This consciousness of one's obligations towards the demands of the highest good varies also among individuals living under the conditions of the same civilisation. We speak of an " enemy to Society; " there appears to be implicit in the term Society as used here a recognition that its interests are the best interests of all. When used without qualification, we can define Society as " the whole system of social relationships " (MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 8). By spelling the word with a capital letter, using it in this way without qualification, we can distinguish it from other uses of the term, as in the phrase " the British society," which means a system of social relationships peculiar to the British people—social relationships necessarily different in some way, because of tradition, environment, climate and other

factors, from the German society or the French society or the American society.[1]

An important point to notice is that though Society is a real thing, it means in essence a state or condition, a relationship, and is therefore necessarily an abstraction. It is not a group of people; it is the system of relationships that exists between the individuals of the group, including the consciousness of belonging to the group and forming part of it, though some sociologists deny that this consciousness of belonging to the group need be present for a society to exist.

When we speak of the actual persons forming a society, we use the word *community*. We follow MacIver again in defining a community as " any whole area of social life, such as a village, or town, or country " (*ibid.*). It is, says MacIver, " any circle in which a common life is lived, within which people more or less freely relate themselves to one another in the various aspects of life, and thus exhibit common social characteristics." The same idea is expressed by Ginsberg (*The Psychology of Society*, 1933): " By community is to be understood a group of social beings leading a common life, including all the infinite variety and complexity of relations which result from that common life or constitute it " (*op. cit.*, p. 120).

A community is a group of social beings, and it is perhaps necessary to note, in passing, that the word *social* has nothing to do with the word *sociable*. An extremely unsociable man may yet be social in the highest degree. A research worker fighting a solitary battle against cancer for the sake of humanity is a being in the highest degree social; a gangster thinking little of taking human life for the sake of monetary remuneration may be the life and soul of the party among his circle of friends, but his activities are most certainly anti-social.

[1] This is a usage which I have adopted for the purposes of this book, and in order to clarify the use of terms; I do not know whether this point has received any consideration in other works. My own view is that some such usage has become necessary.

Between these two extreme types lie the innumerable grades and shades of sociality—a term which may be defined as consciousness of and participation in the social life of the Community, using this term Community in a general sense just as we used the word Society.

Apparently, sociality does not depend upon intelligence or ability. Many criminals are both intelligent and able. Perhaps it would be truer to say that a certain amount of intelligence is necessary to enable a person to conceive the idea of sociality, but intelligence does not necessarily involve the desire to act socially. Tradition plays a part—the narrowly patriotic family educated on strictly traditional lines may be social enough as far as its own country is concerned but anti-social in the case of the wider society. Contact with the wider world, with strange places, with people of other lands, is apt to impress the idea of the oneness of the human race upon the traveller so long as he does not obstinately take his own country with him wherever he goes. Circumstances are a powerful moulding force. Poverty, when unaccompanied by sufficient strength of character and energy to rise above it when opportunity arises, or that crippling, devastating restriction of life and opportunity resulting from unemployment at a time in life when it becomes difficult to learn another trade or occupation—poverty such as this is a powerful cramping influence on the intellect and on the growth of a social sense; it is, indeed, a force making for bitterness, rancour and anti-social tendencies.

A humdrum existence and that somewhat colourless way of life in which petty things occupy the main attention lead to a mental attitude where there is no inner urge or curiosity to probe the meaning of life, an attitude of ignorance of and of indifference to Society. Where there are no problems, there is often no questioning, no attempt to explain life; life and environment are simply accepted. Mental energy is spent in

sociability, and sociable functions become a tradition of the family circle and tend to acquire an air of sacredness. Indeed, sociability is to some extent the enemy of sociality, since energies which could be used in enriching social relations are expended in the petty aspects of personal intercourse; and such pettiness, sanctified by constant use and custom, and gradually becoming traditional, acquires an air of importance which is by no means justified from the wider viewpoint.

This is not to say that such sociable activities are essentially wrong—obviously a certain amount of sociability is essential to our daily happiness—but sociability becomes inimical to the development of Society when it replaces sociality entirely, becomes intense and narrow, and thus shuts out a wider view from the mental range.

We are now in a position to discuss to some degree the meaning of the study of Society. It would be as well to give our study a name; it is called *Sociology*, and it is defined by Ginsberg (*Studies in Sociology*, 1932, p. 23) as being in the broadest sense "the study of human interactions and interrelations, their conditions and consequences"—a definition which should present no difficulty to those readers who have read carefully to this point.

The term Sociology is no new one; it was coined by Auguste Comte (1798–1857). But the comprehensive study of Society did not begin with Comte. Plato, in his *Republic*, engaged in an analysis of the city community, and since Plato's time a number of philosophers have been busy examining the texture of which human relationships are made up. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, all had something to say of Man's relation to his own creation, the State. In the latter half of the nineteenth century there began a conscious application of psychological principles to the study of Society. But it is in our own time that the study of Man has crystallised out into something that is neither

philosophy only nor barren classification of forms and analysis of definitions of terms, but a science.

It has been noted that there is still some discussion as to whether Sociology can be called a science or not. But a science is something more than an arrangement of facts; it is the method of study which makes a science, not the subject-matter. The object of every science is to state the facts with which it is concerned, to analyse these facts, and explain them. It is essential for the scientist to approach his facts with an unprejudiced mind. Complete impartiality is not to be expected, since a perfectly "open" mind has yet to be found in the world; new knowledge is apt to be coloured by what already exists in the mind. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish general principles or laws, relating to the type of thing studied, upon which scientists are agreed. Any knowledge acquired by a scientist is systematic—it is part of a system.

The social scientist approaches his problem in exactly the same way. It is his business to discover facts relating to the relations between human beings, to analyse and explain them. So successful has he been that already certain tendencies or laws have emerged. But the social scientist is extremely wary of putting the same interpretation upon his laws as the physicist or the chemist. An important difference between a physical law and a sociological one is that the former may be regarded as permanent, while the latter is temporary and subject to modification; human beings themselves alter Society, while in Physics Man is the observer, not the observed. These social laws which have emerged as the result of research are laws subject to so much modification—more modification, in fact, than obtains as the result of research in Physics, where new discoveries often mean merely a new interpretation—that the term *tendencies* is a better one than laws. The question of sociological laws will be referred to again later; the point to which attention is specially drawn here is that Sociology is entitled to be called a science

by virtue of its methods and only so far as those methods are followed.

It is to be noted particularly that Sociology is not merely a specialism among other social sciences, like Ethics or Criminology or Anthropology. It not only deals with those broader features of social life which do not come within the scope of the special social sciences by reason of their generality, but it aims at a synthetic view of social life as a whole. As a specialism it would deal with forms only; as a science it builds up a systematic view of human relationships, bringing together the results of the special social sciences—Ethnology, Anthropology and the like—so that they form a part of the system. Sociology draws its facts from Society, analyses these facts and formulates tendencies which explain these facts or result from them. That is the meaning of the study of Society, told in an abstract manner. It becomes necessary now to explain these matters in terms more concrete, to show what Sociology actually does, how its study is pursued and what its ultimate object is.

Section 3.—Associations and Institutions

Sociology is the science which deals with men in their relationships with one another. The great common factor in men's relationships is the fact of their humanity and the consciousness of that common relationship. But within the human family itself there are various social groupings—the nation, the tribe, the city. Within these larger social groupings there are readily recognisable smaller groupings; there is the Family, the Church, and there are various organisations which have been deliberately formed for the collective pursuit of some interest, such as an association of traders or manufacturers. Any organisation (following a definition by Professor MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 9) deliberately formed for the collective pursuit of some interest or set of interests which the members of it share is

termed an *association.* A limited company designed to enrich its members by commerce is an association. A city council is an association having for its object the government of the city. A church and a college are associations. A family group is an association. The degree of deliberateness on the part of the individuals concerned may vary, as in the latter case: after all, the parties to a marriage may not be thinking in as deliberate terms as a commercial organisation of the specific ends of their association. Nevertheless, the specific ends, the living of a joint life, the procreation and upbringing of children, are there.

An association is, then, "a group of social beings related to one another by the fact that they possess or have instituted in common an organisation with a view to securing a specific end or specific ends" (Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society,* p. 121). It will be noted at once that there are certain vital differences which prevent a comparison of the nature of a community and of an association. The purposes of an association, though common to all its members, do not exhaust the purposes of its members. The shareholder of a company has other purposes in life than the purposes of the company. The objects of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals do not embrace the whole objects of any individual member of that association. Even the father of a family has other interests in life than being a husband and a father. He may, indeed, and usually does, belong to other associations —for example, the Ratepayers' Association, the Bowling Club, the National Union of Teachers, or the Commercial Travellers' Union. In contrast to the association, the community is integral. It does not exist for the pursuit of special interests, nor was it deliberately created. As MacIver points out, all associations rest on a specific covenant, whether expressed or implied, of its adult members.

A corporate body, such as a limited company, is an association. A limited company exists in law as a

" person," a " legal person," and members of the company can sue it or be sued by it. An association possesses something of the nature of a corporate body; there need not necessarily be legal form. In this example, the fact of the partial nature of an association is brought out clearly. There may not be " sanctions " in respect of the enforcement of rights and duties as in the case of a legally constituted body, but it will usually be found that there are certain "unwritten" rules belonging to an association which are more binding than the force of law itself and to offend against which entails consequences which may go beyond the sphere proper of the association. An exclusive literary and dramatic society, for example, might effect the resignation of a member whose acting ability was unquestioned but whose morals were known to be bad.

The State is an association—one formed for the purpose of governing the community—which is in the unique position of being able to employ the forces of the law to achieve its ends. We shall consider particular associations in detail later; the present purpose is to make perfectly clear the definition of the terms we are using.

It is necessary to distinguish between an association and an *institution*. The distinction is similar to that between Community and Society. An association is a group, an institution is a form: " Institutions are established and recognised forms of relationship between social beings " (MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 11). Here again there is abstraction, but none the less institutions are very real. Marriage is an institution; it is a very real thing.

Institutions may be established by particular associations; baptism, for example, is an institution which has been established or at least taken over by the Church. Institutions may be established by the community in general, in which case they are called *customs*. Wundt defines a custom as "a form of voluntary action that has developed in a national or tribal community "

(quoted by Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society,* p. 106). Customs, to MacIver, are " accepted ways in accordance with which the members of a group perform familiar acts, eat and drink, dress and play, and generally behave themselves " (*op. cit.,* p. 60).

Little reflection is needed to recognise that customs are not merely accepted ways of behaving; they imply sanctions, forces used in their fulfilment. Such sanctions lose nothing in effectiveness by not being legal. There is no law to state that a man must not eat peas by shovelling them on his knife, holding the knife at at an angle downwards to his mouth and allowing the peas to slide into the cavity, nor are legal sanctions employed to see that he does not do so. But any man carrying out this method in practice would find himself debarred from dinner parties and generally regarded as of low breeding by polite people.

It is this element of sanctions that is at the basis of Ginsberg's brief definition of a custom as " sanctioned usage " (*op. cit.,* p. 107), and he defines institutions as " definite and sanctioned forms or modes of relationship between social beings, in respect to one another or to some external object " (*op. cit.,* p. 122).

The idea of sanctions is therefore present in the conception of both institutions and customs. Customs, indeed, may shade off into institutions when they are established by the Community in general. Monogamy was a custom before it became an institution; it is this fact of the common ground of the ideas of custom and institution which is the justification for MacIver's statement that " customs are but the raw material of institutions." But institutions may also be established by particular associations; one has only to turn to the Church to discover how and in what ways institutions may be developed and established in richness and variety by one association.

But Society is more than the sum total of its institutions and associations. Some members of Society do not recognise the justification of the importance of certain

institutions and are prepared to suffer the minor sanctions which result from their point of view. Again, as has been pointed out, membership of associations does not exhaust the activity of the individual, however numerous those relationships may be; in the last resort, a man is still a member of Society, and Society is more than the sum of its associations and institutions, though its structure may be rich in these features, and though, indeed, Society would be much different and much poorer without them.

We have now defined the terms which we shall be using in beginning the study of Society; it now becomes necessary to relate these to the scheme of our discussion and to enquire more closely into the aims and methods which direct our approach to the study of Society.

SECTION 4.—THE MEANING OF SOCIOLOGY

The science of Society deals with the relationships between human beings. If we are dealing with Society as a whole, then the relationships studied are those which exist between members of the human race as a whole. But these relationships are so numerous and diverse that it is found that generalisations which can apply equally to the African Bushman and to the product of a British "public school" are very vague and wide as compared with those generalisations which relate to members of one particular society only. The readers of this book will in general be members of a civilised society of a type usually called "Western" and including the peoples of Europe, North America, some parts of South America, and the White portions of the British Empire. These peoples possess a civilisation and culture to which the term "Western" can be applied, and in general the term "Society" will be applied to that Western civilisation throughout this book. Where other societies are concerned, the text will make the position clear.

This is not to state that the Western Society is supe-

rior to, say, the Chinese Society. The distinction is made purely on the ground of the distinguishing features possessed by the Western Society, viz., certain industrial standards, a certain type of education, a similar type of religion, all of which factors vary considerably among the parts of the society, but the whole bearing a sufficiently common background to justify the conception of Western Society as a whole as distinct from Chinese Society as a whole.

In practice, therefore, we members of Western Society, living in Europe, or North America, or South Africa, or Australia, are interested mainly in the structure of Western Society. The science of Society is, of course, much more than that—it is concerned with the whole of the human race, but many, many works would have to be written in order to cover, however cursorily and unsatisfactorily, the relationships between the members of the human race as a whole, and our work would become very complex and difficult in tracing and following the threads of relationship; indeed, it would be extremely difficult for the man with a mind moulded by centuries of Western tradition and heredity to present an unbiased and scientific survey of those relationships. We may study the religions of the East, but we can do no more than study; we have no knowledge of the Ultimate Truth, and such a knowledge of Ultimate Truth and of the meaning of life as a whole on this planet is a necessary qualification of the man who would succeed in viewing Society in its truthful entirety. To postulate less for such a man would be to make the fundamental mistake of the missionary who sets out with the impression that his own particular brand of religion is better than his neighbour's; at his best, he is a social reformer only.

The reader has been told that he will be asked to consider the structure of the Western Society of which he is a member, to examine the motives and purposes that determine the relationships between human beings as they are worked out in that structure. He is en-

titled at this stage to ask "Why?" In other words, "What is the object of the study of Society? How will it benefit the individuals concerned? How can it benefit a man to take this detached viewpoint on which you lay so much emphasis, and worry out the whys and wherefores of this particular association, that particular institution? Can the study of Society help Society itself to a happier way of life?"

It is possible here for the sociologist to adopt a superior attitude and answer that it isn't his business what good or bad comes from his study. Just so may a chemical investigator reply that it isn't his business whether his gases are used to burn up the lungs of women and children in war; he is a scientist, primarily interested in gases for their own sakes. The scientist, he will say, works for the sake of Science; he is conscious of an urge which forces him onward in the search to new knowledge. What the industrialists do with the knowledge he provides is not his business. A similar reply is given by some economists. Their job, they say, is not concerned with the actual adjustment and transformation of economic life in any practical sense; theirs is but to observe and classify.

Now, there may be some justification for the chemist and physicist in their attitude to the practical issues of life. After all, life is short and time is fleeting, and men have the time and perhaps the ability to do only one job well. The more time the chemist gives to administration, clumsily and toilsomely, because of inexperience and distaste, the less time and energy is there available for Chemistry, and one cannot expect the chemist to refuse to conduct a research on poison gases which may lead to direct benefit to Mankind as a whole because some members of Society may seize upon the results of his researches as an admirable means of inflicting pain and torture upon fellow-members, and because Society has not yet evolved methods of dealing with those who live to destroy it; it is not the chemist's job to run Society. If the intelligence and ability of

Mankind in living life as a whole have not evolved to the same degree as Mankind's intelligence and ability in material power, that is not the chemist's affair, *qua* chemist.

Whether the economist is similarly justified in holding himself aloof from practical affairs is a point open to discussion. Apparently the opinion is held that as soon as the economist ceases merely to observe and classify and begins to interest himself in doing practical things in economic life, he ceases to be an economist, a scientist, and becomes an administrator; his work ceases to be a science and becomes an art. Therefore the "economist" must leave the administration of economic affairs in the hands of others who may often have little or no knowledge of theoretical Economics.

Now, the economists are perfectly right in limiting the scope of their study to the relations between human beings in one aspect only—that which deals with the "wealth" of Mankind, just as the chemists are perfectly right in limiting the scope of their study to relations between substances. But there is a difference. The economic organisation of Mankind is far below the level of Mankind's material achievement. It may be agreed that there is infinite scope for the development of the physical, chemical and medical sciences. But even at their present stage of development, the world could be a marvellously happy place for the huge majority of Western Mankind if its economic life had reached a proportionate stage. At the present time the world is a well of misery for thousands of stunted lives; the earth bears her bounty in vain for them. There is nothing comparable in Physics or Chemistry to the spectacle of the destruction of wheat while thousands of decent people starve. Economic anarchy has its effects on scientific research—the dread disease of cancer flourishes while material resources are denied to the investigator because they are wanted elsewhere; national budgets require a huge sum of money put aside for armaments.

The point still remains that Economics is a study of one aspect only of human life. The economist, if he will permit himself to go so far, can point out the economic effects of wars on the life of the nation. It is hardly his business to examine the whole subject of war and offer his conclusions to Mankind. And when we move to such a subject as religion, the economist is quite out of his depth.

It is the function of the sociologist to show how the results of the physicist, the chemist, the economist, the medical scientist, and of all those men and women who are contributing to the material and mental wealth of the world can be co-ordinated. The physicist may work as an individual; perhaps he achieves his best results in solitude. If he discovers that radium possesses properties which are of considerable curative effect in the cure of cancer, it is the sociologist whose function it is to show by what organisation of resources the doctors and hospitals can be equipped with apparatus and materials to fight against this scourge. Mankind cannot expect the physicist or the doctor to do the job —they are too busy doing their own. If hospitals are poor and understaffed, it is the sociologist whose task it is to enquire why these conditions obtain and to suggest means for a remedy. It is he who studies the relations between men in Society, the relations between men and women working together for the sake of Society as a whole.

It is true that the sociologist can only *give* advice; he cannot compel Society to take it. At the present time, Society takes very little notice of what the sociologist says. That is because Sociology is even less known to the " man in the street " than Numismatics or Archæology, and it is just with the " man in the street " that Sociology has most concern. It has been pointed out already in this work that it is only within recent years that a science of Sociology has claimed intensive attention from men of science themselves. Schools in Great Britain have paid practically no attention whatsoever

to Sociology; Physics, Chemistry and the Classics are still considered of far greater importance in the secondary-school syllabus than Economics or that somewhat weak and localised study of the national society known as "Civics," a recent addition regarded with suspicion by the conservative and with hostility by the reactionary. The mind of the child has not been given any constructive training in the science which relates his own life to the world around him and to the greater life of which his own is a part. People grow up without a realisation of their own place in Society, often without any kind of conscious realisation that there is any such thing as Society, with the result that they fall an easy prey to dictators, opportunists, pedagogues and bullies. The cases of Germany and Italy are all too obvious. But education for the people is as yet a very young growth and there are signs that the position is changing. In Great Britain, History as a subject for the schools is becoming something more than a mere catalogue of the doings of various British sovereigns; it is becoming a history of the world, and appears to be gradually evolving into a study of the history of movements and peoples and not of individual lives and careers.

Science and the application of Science can no longer be divorced. The distinction between "pure" and "applied" Science can now be held only when one is distinguishing between the results of the pursuit of a particular science and their application in practice, but as far as Science as a whole is concerned there is no such distinction. Sociology is the science of the *use of Science* in the service of Mankind. There can be no question of the study of "pure" Sociology; "pure" Sociology is a term which has no meaning. The physicist may study Physics "for the sake of pure Science"; it is the function of the sociologist to relate the discoveries of the physicist to Society. The sociologist cannot study his subject "for the sake of Science." "For the sake of Science" must mean in his case "for the sake of a science of using Science in the service

of Mankind." His studies must therefore possess an object other than the mere gaining of knowledge. The sociologist does not study the habits of some remote tribe of savages for the mere sake of these habits, nor even for curiosity. If he discovers that some of their religious customs and beliefs have fear as their foundation, he cannot allow the matter to rest there. Otherwise he is acting merely as a psychologist. As a sociologist he must relate his discoveries to, in our own case, the structure of Western Society, in an effort to determine whether there is ground for the attributing of similar customs and beliefs in Western Society to the underlying motive of fear, and it is his part to suggest means by which Western Society can be freed from such savage survivals which hamper the development of the personality of some of its members. It is not enough merely to describe and discuss. If research is left at this point the sociologist has no right to call himself a sociologist. Unless he can relate his work to the needs and problems of modern Western Society his work is not Sociology. Often the failure to realise what the real needs and problems of Mankind are has led to the undertaking of work involving a considerable amount of personal danger and hardship, to say nothing of mental labour, the net result of which has been something of mere academic interest. Anything which is of mere academic interest only is as much use to the sociologist as a crossword puzzle. It is true that it is difficult sometimes to know where to draw the line in one's investigations. An enquiry into the sexual life of certain obscure savage tribes may appear to have little connection with the needs of modern Western Society, but correlation and comparison of facts and conditions may bring to light some primitive fear or repression general among individuals of Western Society and wreaking a considerable amount of mental and moral damage. Nevertheless, it remains true that there are plenty of problems bulking far greater in importance than many of those chosen for research.

Poverty, unemployment, lack of education, international hatred—problems such as these are crying out for solution. They are of appalling magnitude—which may help to explain why research on them is avoided; it is easier to choose something on a small scale which can be dealt with in detail. The solution of them depends, to a large extent, on the education of the peoples of Western Society. Until these evils have been abolished, the finer points of individual behaviour can await attention. But it is again true that their abolition depends in the last resort upon the attitude of the individual, and that attitude is determined by environment, tradition, heredity and personal education. The individual, rather than Society, must be reached, for Society is composed of individuals. If the individual's attitude to sex or religion or patriotism is puerile or perverted, it is practically certain that his attitude to international relations and to Society as a whole will also be puerile and perverted. The student will see that it is not easy sometimes to determine where practical interest leaves off and time-wasting "academic" interest begins.

Having arrived at a realisation of the meaning of the science of Society, we are now in a position to discuss the aims of this science and the methods adopted to realise those aims. We can discuss also the general characteristics of Western Society and the nature of the problems that present themselves to the sociologist from a consideration of those characteristics.

Chapter II

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

SECTION 1.—APPROACHES TO SOCIOLOGY

Although Sociology, young as it is, has justified its claims to be regarded as a science, and although there is a desire among sociologists to consolidate their position and find a common ground for discussion and for the development of Sociology, there is still a difference of opinion as to aims and methods; the field still remains to some extent somewhat vague. An attempt has been made in the foregoing pages to state the position of Sociology as exactly as the scope and general nature of the science will allow. This attempt, however, to some extent represents the personal views of the writer; it becomes necessary to examine the claims of various sociological writers and to determine the extent of the conflict that has arisen and to discover how far reconciliation is legitimately possible so as to effect a general conclusion which will define the aims and methods of the science sufficiently satisfactorily to enable the student to proceed without an inner conflict and confusion of ideas.

The trends of thought regarding the objects and methods of Sociology may be resolved into two main schools.[1] The first view of the relation between Sociology and the other social sciences regards Sociology as a specialism among other specialisms; the science is thus considered purely as the study of forms. In Germany this view goes back to Simmel, who distinguished between form and content, and studied as relations such forms as leadership and obedience, subordination and superordination, and competition. It is evident that

[1] This account follows the lines of Ginsberg's article, "Recent Tendencies in Sociology," in *Economica*, February 1933.

such discussions are highly abstract and are a view of sociological phenomena in isolation; they neglect, therefore, the practical issues of life which are of the highest importance to the student who desires to get an idea of these phenomena related to life as it is. A similar remark may be made regarding the discussions of Vierkandt, who attempted to arrive at the ultimate or irreducible forms of social life or experience, e.g. contagion of feeling and suggestion. Isolated facts or theorising regarding facts in isolation may be of use to the psychologist, but in Sociology, of all the sciences, finality is never so far away as when isolation is reached; the essence of social study is that all possible relevant facts and relations should be considered and a view of their totality found as far as possible.

Von Wiese attempted a more ambitious "formal" Sociology in what he has described as "*Beziehungslehre.*" He seeks to systematise the whole tissue of human relationships, his fundamental concepts being social process, social relation and social structure. Of these, the first is the really fundamental category; the properties studied are the degree and direction of association and dissociation; the Sociology of von Wiese provides an analysis and classification of social processes and social structure. He arrives at a formula which relates social process to an interaction between the individual's native aptitudes moulded by his history and the physical and social environment; his attempts at a formal classification of relationships are a basis of theoretical Sociology, but the main criticism of his work must lie in the use of the word "theoretical" to describe it; he defines his fundamental terms vaguely, and while there is considerable ingenuity shown in the compilation of formulæ, table and classifications, yet, in accordance with the principle insisted on throughout this work, there can be little value in generalisations so abstract as to obscure the real nature of the problems that lie before Mankind, the problems that deal with Man's loves and hates, his desires and

aversions, his happiness and his misery. As Psychology, such theoretical discussions may be of value, but Sociology is more than a study; to be anything more than another form of abstract reasoning somewhat akin to Mathematics, it must deal with human beings as human beings and not as emotionless terms in a formula. This is the fundamental criticism of the treatment of Sociology as a study of forms—that forms can have no meaning apart from the human beings whose relationships they try to express; men and women are reduced to vaguely flitting abstractions. Such variables in the formulæ as " physical environment " and " experience " are so complex and indefinite that the relationships expressed are at their best not very helpful. There are a million varieties of " physical environment " and " experience " for a million human beings, and these factors themselves change for the individual from year to year, even from day to day: the world is grey for a millionaire with indigestion. A study of pure forms results in the formulation of abstractions which are either so general as to provoke the thought that they could have been arrived at without such a parade of chains of reasoning and manipulation of terms and simply by the exercise of ordinary common sense, or else so vague as to irritate the reader into wondering whether they mean anything at all.

A broader view of Sociology, it is evident, is necessitated, and the transition to a more synthetic view of social life is illustrated by the work of Max Weber, whose work is the most important contribution of the German school to modern Sociology. Weber worked out in detail a scheme of social relationships; he considered historical fact, and he used his definitions to study the main trends of social development. He worked on the notion of " ideal types "; social behaviour is defined as action which has reference to the behaviour of others in the intention of the agent; this action is determined by their behaviour either purposefully, or emotionally, or through established habit. His

"ideal type" is a mode of behaviour in the abstract, i.e., behaviour consciously determined when unaffected by such deviatory factors as emotion. By this method of definition in terms of the probability of types of social behaviour, he defines such entities as the Church or marriage. He traces social process by a consideration of the successive appearances of "typical" social structures. Weber's Sociology gains by its historical-mindedness, but it is apt to be considerably abstract and puzzling to the general reader, the unfortunate "layman" who above all things needs guidance in broad and concrete issues, and who has been completely ignored—except in the abstract—by the academic worker intent upon satisfactory scientific definitions and terminological exactitude at all costs.

Professor MacIver's Sociology is more concrete and closer to everyday life in its tendency towards empirical observation and comparative study. He recognises the central fact that social relationships are based upon mutual awareness and recognition of a common life. In his classification of the trends of human social relationships he distinguishes, as basic factors, between attitudes, interests and motivations, and makes use of the findings of Social Psychology rather than subordinates his theme to this science. By "attitude" he means a quality or state of consciousness which involves a tendency to act in a certain way upon appropriate stimulation. "Interests" are objects which determine activity. "The interests of men are the source of all social activity, and the changes in their interests are the source of all social evolution" (*Community*, Ch. II). In his analysis of social structure, Professor MacIver distinguishes three broad forms of groupings: (1) communities, which we have already defined and which in the light of his psychological approach he describes as circles of people sharing a whole set of interests; (2) looser groupings, such as social classes, where the organisation is not formal but arises from common attitudes in response to common interests, and

(3) formal associations established for definite purposes. The student will readily see that this is an approach to the subject promising to be fruitful of results which will be both worthy to be ranked as scientific conclusions and at the same time really useful to our understanding of the forces underlying social movements and relations, as well as being something not too far removed from the capacity of the ordinary man and woman to comprehend without an equipment of scientific jargon. We shall be dealing later in greater detail with Professor MacIver's work; for the moment we shall leave this discussion of treatments of Sociology as a science at this point and turn to a consideration of the relation between Sociology and those sciences which, because their business is to deal with some aspect of social life as a whole, are called the social sciences.

SECTION 2.—SOCIOLOGY AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

The sciences whose field of study is Mankind as a whole are known as the social sciences, and those which deal with one aspect only of Men's relationships with one another are called the special social sciences. The essential difference between these sciences and the science of Sociology itself is that they deal with one aspect only of the relations between men and often may relate to an Average Man or Representative Man or individual Man abstracted, while Sociology takes cognisance of the individual members of Society as members of Society, giving this latter word its full meaning as we have defined it.

This is very far from saying that to the sociologist the individual is of no importance. As will appear later, and as has already been hinted, Society has no meaning apart from the individuals comprising it, and it is always the individual that the sociologist has in mind when he speaks in such phrases as "the welfare of Society." The point is that Sociology has to do with any and every relation-

ship between human beings constituting a society, while each of the other social sciences deals with a certain relationship only, and does not enter into the field of any other social science; the consequence is that the work of the special social scientist in his particular field involves a certain amount of abstraction.

The student must beware of imagining that Sociology studies the totality of the world of reality around us and in us, the world of reality of which we ourselves are a part. That is entirely impossible, since we ourselves are part of the world of reality. Even when we concentrate on one aspect only of men's relationships, we are apt to fall into all kinds of errors because of the limited abilities of our minds to comprehend reality and especially because of the bias given to them by training, environment, heredity and experience. Sociology cannot attempt to probe the nature of Ultimate Truth. It can deal only with the general relationships existing between men when they live in societies, not with those relationships as possible aspects of the Deity or anything else which may be possible but is in fact vague and unknown. To thinking men and women the Universe is a riddle which is insoluble because they themselves are part of the terms of the riddle. The simpler minds are content with a solution of faith and self-sufficiency which is of no value to the scientist as a scientist, except as subject-matter for observation and comparison. Sociology has its limitations. It is not a religion; religion is one of its objects of study.

Science is the systematic study of an aspect of reality. The scientist studies things as types of a class, and endeavours to discover the general principles or laws relating to that class. The chemist studies matter as a fact of inanimate nature and derives his laws from a study of matter from that aspect only—he abstracts. He can tell us of what chemical substance our bodies are composed but he does not dream of going beyond that. He cannot relate the facts of our bodies to the

Universe as a whole; he does not attempt to discover the why and wherefore.

The success attending the study of the natural sciences is well known. Mathematics is based upon exact definitions, and its conclusions are exact. The triumph of the human mind has been pronounced in the discovery of uniform tendencies in the mechanical sciences. Even where there is added the complication of life, the science of Biology has proved itself equal to the task of formulating tendencies which are accepted as scientific.

The social sciences have this central fact in common, that they deal with Man. Economics studies Man from the point of view of his getting a living, Ethics from the point of view of right conduct, Psychology from the point of view of mental experience. Students of social phenomena attempt to follow the physical scientists in formulating "laws" or tendencies, but the important difference between the "laws" of the social scientist and those of the physical scientist is that the physical laws may be regarded as holding permanently while the social tendencies are subject to modification. So long as certain conditions hold, so long will the action following physical law take place. A ball dropped from a height will fall towards the earth in a manner according to the terms of the law of gravitation. The student will observe that the "law" does not make it fall; "gravitation" may be just another name for "a curvature in space." The law is a statement of what happens under certain conditions, and existed long before the scientists discovered it. Subsequent research may explain the nature of the law more exactly; the law or tendency itself is permanent, whatever may be the explanation.

In just the same way is the social scientist concerned with discovering tendencies or laws; it is his business to relate facts to one another. But his tendencies are never more than tendencies. He can say that as a result of his observations he has discovered that under

certain circumstances men will tend to do such and such a thing; but he knows that not only may external circumstances modify their conduct, but, even if one disallows the possibility of these circumstances not having been taken into account, that men may themselves modify their conduct of their own volition. This makes his work extremely difficult, but it also makes for hope on the part of Mankind. Given certain circumstances, there will be a tendency on the part of certain nations to go to war, but the individuals of those nations may modify their conduct of their own will and, refusing to acknowledge that this tendency is a law of nature, decide that it is not good that war should occur. For example, a volume appeared recently discussing practically the means of war-resistance which could be adopted by the people (*The Citizen Faces War*: Robert and Barbara Donington). It is the fact of such complications that causes the sociologist to tread very warily in his formulation of tendencies.

Is it possible, then, that Sociology can claim rank as one of the sciences? The claims of the " special " social sciences themselves have long been acknowledged, for in all of them the process of abstraction has taken place. As for Sociology itself, it is felt by many social scientists that so long as Sociology concerns itself only with the systematic arrangement of the observations of the relations of social beings with one another, and thus confines itself to the determination of generalisations regarding such relationships, together with the formulation of tendencies from such generalisations, to that extent only it may be regarded as a science.

But Sociology has no meaning apart from its applications. Sociology is Applied Sociology. The generalisations of the sociologist differ from the generalisations of the physicist and of the mathematician in this—that they apply only in particular cases and must be modified in accordance with the particular circumstances of the case considered; there is a " law " or tendency to be worked out for every case. In the case of war and its

causes, when the German nation is under review, the absence of any such definite movement for war-resistance as occurred in Great Britain is a factor that must be taken into consideration. Although the new factor of increasing intelligence and will of men is an important one when the whole of Western civilisation is considered, when the special cases of Germany and Italy are considered as these countries are at the present day, this factor would necessarily have to be given less weight—though it is very difficult to judge precisely how much weight, since we do not know how deep or how superficial are the prevailing militaristic tendencies in these countries, although it may be possible by intensive study to gauge their extent.

There is nothing comparable with these new and fluctuating factors in the natural sciences. There is no new factor involved in the statement that what was known as gravitation is a curvature in space—in fact, there is no new factor at all. Gravitation has always been and still is, whatever it may be called. But in Sociology the human factor is one which is changing, and at the same time it is the most important factor. The result is that the sociologist has to concentrate his attention on particular cases, and his work is made so much the more difficult.

The writer has suggested that Sociology may be regarded as the science which studies Science and its application in relation to human life; the student may agree that here we have a conception of Sociology which disposes of the conflict raging round the question of its scope. Sociology differs essentially from all other sciences because its essence is that it is fundamentally a "practical" science. It cannot pretend to take a wholly abstract view of the relations between human beings, because such a view succeeds only in de-humanising them, thereby robbing the science of any pretensions to true conclusions as far as real flesh-and-blood human beings are concerned. It must study Man as he is in Society, and not Man in Society as something different

from Man in the ordinary business of life. It abstracts only to the extent that Man is studied from the point of view of his living in Society or in societies; it follows every other science in thus studying one aspect only of reality. It differs from every other science only because its subject-matter is different, but it follows every other science in employing the scientific method of observation, comparison, classification and the formulation of tendencies or "laws," and these tendencies as formulated are as acceptable as the tendencies formulated by every other science; they differ from those of the natural sciences only in that they are temporary and subject to modification, and become more complex and difficult of formulation as more and more factors are considered as coming into play.

Sociology follows other sciences in using the results of other related sciences, and especially those of the special social sciences, just as Engineering uses the results of Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry. It accepts the results of Psychology and Ethics. Just as Economics has to take into account the physical laws which affect agriculture, so Sociology has to take into account the findings of Economics in the economic sphere. The sociologist is not concerned with first principles; that is the business of Philosophy. He has to take certain things for granted. He takes for granted, for example, the economic law of Diminishing Return. He does not go back and work it out for himself for the purposes of Sociology, any more than the engineer has to go back to make sure that nobody is misleading him by working out for himself the mathematical formulæ which he uses. Time, opportunity and aptitude would in most cases be insufficient for this procedure, even if it were desirable.

Not only does Sociology accept the conclusions of the social sciences, but it " brings together the results of the specialisms making the adjustments which are required, in view of the fact that the parts of the social life with which they severally deal are of varying importance in

determining the life of society as viewed as a whole" (Ginsberg: *Studies in Sociology*, p. 7).

The student will realise that Sociology is not a specialism among other specialisms, as some critics believe. It "deals with the broader conditions of social life which because of their generality do not come within the scope of the special social sciences" (Ginsberg, *ibid.*). It thus aims at a synthetic view of social life as a whole, and the following of this conception of Sociology has resulted in such valuable studies as those of Westermarck on the Family.

Stress has been laid on the conception of Sociology as the science which studies Science in its relation to human life, the science which observes and classifies the various ways in which human beings have studied and used Science in their daily life. It is a legitimate object of research for the sociologist to study how such a result of scientific research as the manufacture of poison gas has affected the lives of human beings, and how far men have made use of scientific research in such social sciences as Psychology and Ethics in dealing with this new factor of their ability to cause immense material destruction and human suffering. The object of life is happiness; is there yet such a science in being as the Science of Life whose findings will lead Mankind to that goal? The science of Sociology comes nearest to that conception; it is, in fact, the only approach to the problem.

In treating Sociology as the science which uses Science it will be found that the sciences which are most nearly concerned in the process are those which deal with Mankind as a whole, for it is the results of these specialisms which it is the task of Sociology to bring together. These are the special social sciences, and it is to these that it is now necessary to direct attention.

Section 3.—The Special Social Sciences

The special social sciences are those sciences which deal with the relations between human beings, each from

a particular aspect. Thus, Economics is the study of Mankind from the point of view of Man's getting a living—the study of Wealth. As Marshall points out, it is on the one side a study of wealth and on the other and more important side a part of the study of Man. The implications of taking this partial view of Mankind's activities have already been investigated; from our considerations, the conclusion has emerged that Economics is a specialism involving a considerable amount of abstraction; so that for its conclusions to be valuable to us they must be related to the conclusions of the other sciences dealing with the relations between men, and its abstractions must be corrected in the light of such correlation.

A good deal of the abstraction arises because of the delimitation of the meaning of the term "wealth" in Economics. "Wealth" has not the meaning of "well-being" in a general sense. Although modern economists include what may be called personal wealth, such as the skill of the professional man, in the definition of wealth, yet the economist deals only with those items which are desired by men, which are limited in supply, and which can be transferred, so that Economics confines itself to the conditions relating to the production, exchange and distribution of those things—"economic goods"—included in the above definition. It is concerned with the preferences of the individual for one thing of limited supply over another, but it is no concern of the economist to enquire into the reason for such preference. He is concerned with the conditions of the actual exchange of things, and with the conditions of production and distribution attendant upon the desire for exchange; it is no part of the science to enquire why an individual should desire a dose of opium in preference to hearing a symphony; still less does it enquire which of these two desires is the better in ultimate value with reference to the highest good; it accepts the fact of preference. Such psychological facts as the desire of a man for a greater gain in preference to a

smaller one, the desire for a profit of ten pounds in preference to one of five pounds, the economist takes for granted. He cannot attempt to estimate such factors as ignorance, fear or stupidity on the part of the individual or of crowds in relation to the ideal of the highest good, though he cannot afford to neglect the economic effects of these factors. But he accepts these effects as effects to be taken into consideration for the purposes of economic analysis, not as material for a consideration of proposals for the improvement of men's lives.

It will readily be seen that Psychology is a specialism of corresponding degree; it deals with the facts of mental experience. A Social Psychology would have to be wider in its scope and less abstract than a science of pure mental processes, for not only would it have to take into account the psychical elements involved in the relationships of individual minds with one another, but also the psychical environment and the tradition of material and spiritual culture which are so important a part of environment in its wider sense. Social Psychology "seeks to determine the nature of the psychological conditions of social life. Thus it deals with the means and methods of intersubjective intercourse. . In its more special aspects it deals with the psychological characteristics of social groups with the effects of these social formations upon the mentality of the individuals constituting them, and with the results of contact between groups" (Ginsberg, *Studies in Sociology*, pp. 19–20). It therefore embraces the study of the psychological factors involved in the formation of communities, associations and institutions, the study of the psychology of crowds and of human organisation and of democracy and other forms of political grouping; it contemplates the nature of national and social characteristics, of tradition; it examines the theories of a "group mind" or "social mind," and it studies the mental relations between the individual and the society in which he finds himself. In brief, it is the part of

Social Psychology to examine the facts of the mental life of the individual in Society, and here again it is not incumbent on the sociologist to work from first principles but to accept such facts from the psychologist as the latter has established.

It requires no great leap of the imagination to connect Psychology with Ethics, which is concerned with ends to be achieved—the antithesis of Economics, which deals with means. The ethical scientist is intimately concerned with standards of conduct, not merely historically and comparatively, but with the question as to what constitutes the highest good, perhaps with what *ought* to be regarded as good; though some people would regard the latter end as the special province of Philosophy. Those who concentrate merely on historical facts and the comparison of standards of conduct, and avoid the fundamental question of what ought to be good for Mankind, are in the same position as the sociologists who pursue similar paths—their work is of value as a basis for further investigation but of none in itself.

This problem of the highest good for Mankind is a much greater one than is generally admitted, for it is not easy to disentangle oneself from the effect of one's training and environment. Everyone who is a member of Western Society will agree that it is an evil custom to kill one's aged mother when she becomes too old to work, and there is something more to this than mere custom on the part of Western civilisation. There is obviously something wrong here with the thesis " that there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so." Custom or no custom, tradition or no tradition, there seems to be something inherently evil about the thought of killing a loved one. But not everyone is agreed upon issues which are just as fundamental, though they are not generally regarded in this light. From the tangled web of superstition, ignorance, tradition, training and environment, the social scientist must extract an ideal which should be Man-

kind's ultimate aim in his search for happiness.

The study of the relations between a legal system and those who have come into conflict with the standards of conduct laid down by that legal system is known as Criminology. The criminologist (far removed from the popular character of fiction in the public mind) must study statistics of crime; he must possess such knowledge of Psychology as will enable him to relate the fact of offending against the law to the mind of the offender; the findings of his researches he turns over to the sociologist, so that the latter can relate them to his study of Society as a whole.

Such considerations lead inevitably to the question of the control of the qualities of future generations. To " the science of the agencies under social control which may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations " (Galton) is given the name of Eugenics. It is the science concerned with human stock, and it is one which has received a considerable amount of attention of late years. The sociologist is as intimately concerned with the future as with the past, for Science is not limited by the time dimension. Applied Eugenics requires Sociology, just as Sociology requires Eugenics; indeed, Applied Eugenics, like Applied Economics, is part of the Sociology which has been defined in this book. The social sciences in their practical application are interrelated and are necessary the one to the other.

It is unnecessary to point out the similar connections that exist between Sociology and Ethnology, the science of Race, Anthropology, the study of the origins of Man, and Politics, which is concerned with the problems of Government.

These are the special social sciences. They each deal with one particular aspect of the relations between men living in societies. It remains to relate Sociology to those other branches of social knowledge which, although not regarded as social sciences to the extent that they deal especially with the present world and

Man's relation to it and to Society, are nevertheless intimately connected with Sociology by virtue of the nature and scope of their subject-matter.

SECTION 4.—SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY

Sociology and History do not differ fundamentally in the kind of knowledge they seek to attain. The difference between them is one of emphasis rather than one of content. History deals with the reconstruction of the way in which events have actually occurred, and seeks to estimate the importance of those events in the story of Mankind. It is a record rather than a discussion. The sociologist seeks to discover the general tendencies which determine the social movements of Mankind at the present day, and endeavours to point to the consequence of such tendencies if they are allowed to continue, and to indicate the possibilities attendant upon Man's use of the resources, material, physical and mental, at his disposal. It is obvious that neither the sociologist nor the historian can exclude references to values. In estimating the importance of the events he is studying, the historian must adopt the effects of his own judgment—there must be some background as to the scale of historical events in his mind, and that background of valuation must be very similar to the background of the sociologist. Indeed, to some extent, the fields of the historian and of the sociologist are identical. History deals with the movements of Mankind in the past. The sociologist continues the work of the historian by relating the knowledge thus gained to the elucidation of the problems of the present and of the future. The sociologist should be able to take over the results of the historian, as he takes over the findings of the psychologist and the anthropologist, and relate them to the study of Society.

It is due to the haziness of ideas that has prevailed regarding the scope of Sociology, and the lack of crystallisation of the ideas and methods of the science, that a

conflict has arisen in connection with the question of the relation between Sociology and History. Suspicion of the claims of the new science and too narrow views of its scope and subject-matter have resulted in what amounts to a defence on the part of some historians against the encroachment of their field. Professor Bury, for example, defends the independence of History. M. Berr claims that Sociology deals only with the social element in History. The French historians are in general sympathetic to the claims of Sociology, but the school represented by Troeltsch asserts that there is a radical difference in the type of knowledge of the two sciences, History in Troeltsch's view being the "concrete and intuitive representation of individual wholes" (Ginsberg, *Studies in Sociology*, p. 31), while the central fact that emerges from Troeltsch's discussion of humanity is the insistence upon "culture-phases" as opposed to a concept of humanity as a whole or to human evolution.

But social theory and social history cannot be dissociated. The studies of Sombart on the common elements in European capitalism, or Vinogradoff on historical jurisprudence, of Sée on agrarian conditions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, provide abundant evidence of this fact. To students who have followed the exposition of the aims and methods of Sociology so far given in this work the intrinsic relatedness of Sociology and History will be more than apparent.

Perhaps the newness of the science of Sociology itself as distinct from the various studies in Anthropology, Criminology and so on, which have been classified under the convenient general name of Sociology instead of being regarded as contributions to the special social or related sciences, has had much to do with the attitude regarding the differences between Sociology and History as fundamental. Certainly the fact that for so many years "History" has been so important a subject in the educational curriculum while Sociology has been

practically unheard-of outside the walls of the university is a factor which has had its effects on mental training, psychic environment and tradition. It is only quite recently that "History," right up to the upper forms of secondary schools, has meant anything else but the recounting of an accumulated fund of national tradition and folk-lore. The demands of the State, made more often subconsciously, but here and there deliberately, have meant that the kind of "History" taught had as its aims the inculcation of national patriotism. This policy is one which the Nazi system pursued with full knowledge and approval of its evil consequences. An event of importance in the historical field was the publication of that popular exposition of world history, the *Outline of History* by Mr. H. G. Wells.

Only by co-operation can Mankind progress. The fact itself is obvious, but the means by which such co-operation may be established are disputed. Co-operation implies a knowledge on the part of men of the facts of Society, implies sociality, a term which has already been defined. The teaching of History must make clear to men what the conditions of such co-operation are, and what sociality means. It must show in what respects Mankind has failed in its search for happiness in the past, so that these errors may be avoided in the future. The study of Sociology should develop the idea of the common consciousness of social relations between men, and, taking up from the study of History the results which have been established, relate them to the story of Mankind in the present. History and Sociology cannot be divorced. The elucidation of sociological problems involves co-operation on the part of the historian in the presentation of an account of social forces and motives of the past, and the sociologist must aid the historian in the discovery of the social aspects of historical movements. Only by the sociological interpretation of historical facts can Mankind be brought to gain a clear idea of the meaning of the past and its significance for the future.

Fig. 2.—The Study of Anthropology
(after Marett)



Section 5.—Sociology and Biology

It is evident that to the sociologist the study of the science of life is of the utmost importance. " Our ideas of what sort of progress is possible or desirable for man must depend in part at least upon our views of his nature, his manner of origination, the methods by which changes have occurred and can occur in him, and the relation which he bears to the rest of nature" (Professor H. J. Muller, *Out of the Night*). In the last resort, the sort of job Man is going to make out of living on this earth depends upon his psychical and physical constitution and what he can make out of himself. He must know what sort of powers he has and is likely to develop for a full understanding of his own nature. He must realise his own shortcomings before he can take steps to overcome them.

The human race is still very young. The thousands of years that have passed since our ancestors first learnt to fashion sticks and stones into weapons are but a moment lost among the æons which have rolled on since life first appeared on this globe. The development of the stick-sharpening and stone-fashioning arts has proceeded rapidly with the exercise of Man's tool-using faculties, reaching its culminating point to-day in the aeroplane, the skyscraper, the ocean liner, the submarine; but his mental and moral development has proceeded at a much slower rate, and it is not surprising to find him still in the grip of repressions and taboos similar to those which confine and torture the life of the savage.

The breaking of the shackles of primitive superstitions, fears, hates and beliefs is one of the most important aims of the study of Sociology, and it is here that the central science of Sociology asks most of its sister sciences, Psychology and Biology. For Sociology seeks to study the effects of the mental and physical differences between human beings on their groupings and institutions, and, conversely, the effects of the action of

social institutions and groupings on human beings themselves. It seeks to learn the effects of contact between groups, of mixtures. It seeks to learn what selective forces are at work in the world producing the "kinds" of men and women that exist, how great these forces are, what changes they undergo and the conditions which produce such changes. It seeks to determine what course of evolution, if any, the human race as a whole, or groups, or institutions, or societies are following. It seeks to know what part heredity plays in the moulding of individual physical and mental differences, and how far heredity modifies and is modified by environment and experience. It enquires into the claims of Eugenics and seeks to determine what part is played by the quality of the stock in human associations and the factors that govern the quality of the stock. It faces the tremendous problem of how far and in what ways the human stock may be improved. Already investigations have borne fruit, and it is becoming clearer that an equitable social system is the best remedy for many existing defects in human stock. It is true that evidence of serious hereditary defect, as in certain cases of feeble-mindedness, may require actions directed towards the elimination of stock, but the relative importance of such problems must not be exaggerated. Sociologists are the first to recognise the present lack of data and of careful, dispassionate, detailed enquiry into biological problems affecting their study of Mankind. Their complaint is that so little opportunity is as yet afforded for the pursuit of such studies. Nevertheless, the proportion of those who take a serious interest in sociological problems is increasing, and when greater resources, both material and mental, are placed at the disposal of the social scientists, it is evident that the help of Biology will prove immeasurably valuable to the sociologist.

The biological factor of the hereditary differences in mental and bodily capacity between individuals of the same race has obviously a very great importance. En-

FIG. 3.—THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS REGARDING HUMAN EVOLUTION

MYTHS OF
ANCIENT
PEOPLES

LUCRETIUS (98–55 B.C.)
(Origin of Man from an animal form)

MYTHS AND SUPERSTITIONS
OF BARBARIC AGE

MIDDLE AGES—DECLINE OF SCIENCE

COPERNICUS (1473–1543)
(True relation of earth to sun and planets)

15th, 16th and 17th Centuries
(Knowledge of number and kinds of animals and plants)

LINNÆUS (1707–1778)
(Botanical classification)

BUFFON (1707–1788)
(First scientific theory of organic evolution)

EARLY PART OF XIXth CENTURY
UNFAVOURABLE TO SCIENCE

LAMARCK (1744–1829)
(Theory of Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics)

LYELL—*Principles of Geology*, 1830

CHARLES DARWIN AND ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE
—*The Origin of Species*, 1859

DARWIN—*The Descent of Man*, 1871
(Theory of Natural Selection)

vironment is non-creative; it cannot of itself implant tendencies or capacities in Man; the tendencies or capacities must first be there, inborn in Man, before environment can play upon them and either develop them or suppress them. Environment can help only to develop or retard, and cannot effect the progress of the race.

The factor of selection is now recognised to have played an important part in the evolution of Man from a lower organism. After the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species,* biological conceptions came into social science. Until a century or so ago it was a common belief that the world as we know it had a very sudden origin, but it has now become evident that the existing forms of life were not all the forms of life that had ever existed; there have been a great variety of beings which have had their being and then ceased to be. Geology has traced the development of a past which was far longer than had ever been suspected.

The theory of organic evolution suggested that these ancient forms had been evolved from some previous simpler forms; that, indeed, this evolution is part of the cosmic evolution by which the universe has reached its present organisation.

The Greeks were first among European people to encourage any critical speculation concerning the origin of the Cosmos. The Greek philosophers sought for a permanent element to account for the visible changes taking place around them. But they did not suggest a theory of organic evolution; they conceived the idea of fundamental forms such as water, air, etc., from which other forms developed. The fossils were recognised as remains of plants and animals, but they did not suggest to the Greek mind a general process of organic evolution. There was a persistent belief that living beings generated spontaneously from non-living matter, and this belief was probably largely responsible for the failure of the Greeks to pursue their speculations regarding the origins of plant and animal life.

Lucretius (98–55 B.C.), the Roman philosopher, came near to a comprehension of evolution in certain aspects; his writings rest upon a basis of knowledge of animals and of the primitive races of Mankind.

In the Middle Ages there was a decline of science. Copernicus (1473–1543) showed the true relation of the earth to the sun and planets, but he was reluctant to publish his whole work—it was dangerous in those times to dispute orthodoxy; there was stagnation in the field of evolution as in other branches of science, though the concept of evolution was longer delayed than any other scientific generalisation of equal importance.

The first scientific formulation of organic evolution occurred during the middle of the eighteenth century. During the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries knowledge of the number and kinds of animals and plants became cumulative, and in the eighteenth century there appeared the botanical classification of Linnæus (1707–1778). But to Buffon (1707–1788), more than to any other individual, belongs the credit of having formulated the first scientific theory of organic evolution. He stressed the idea that particular types, very different one from the other, might have descended from a common ancestor. He went so far as to suggest that all living things may have arisen from one identical source.

Buffon suffered from the disadvantage of living in an atmosphere of orthodox tradition; otherwise, he would doubtless have pursued his researches further. His fears of persecution were not unfounded; for he was forced to conceal his scientific beliefs. During the later half of the eighteenth century, there were many other advocates of this doctrine of modification put forward by Buffon—there were, for example, the Transmutationists, who believed in the transmutation of species.

Diderot (1713–1784) revealed further evidence of descent in his investigations in anatomy and embryology. He was one of a band of free-thinking philosophers who battled against the tyranny of the Church.

During the latter half of the eighteenth century, the theory of the transmutability of species was commonly discussed on the Continent, but it was not a subject of scientific discussion in England until the nineteenth century, when Darwin (1809–1882) conducted his researches.

Those who were connected with early theories of evolution were not orthodox scientists; and the early part of the nineteenth century was unfavourable to science.

The ideas of Lamarck (1744–1829) were a natural development of the theories of Buffon. Lamarck was a man of science rather than a philosopher. Historically the importance of his theory of causes is to be found in the fact that his was the first comprehensive account of the causes of the evolutionary process, though it is opposed to that of Darwin. Lamarck accepted evolution as a fact; he suggested as an explanation of its causes his theory of the inherited effect of use and disuse of faculties and of the impress of environment. The gist of the Lamarckian theory is that the individual is modified by the use or disuse of his organs and faculties, and that these are transmitted by the ordinary processes of reproduction to his descendants. The details of structure and function acquired by an organism during its own lifetime are inherited by the next generation; his hypothesis is, therefore, called the theory of the Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics. Lamarck's formulation of his own doctrine was complicated by mystical ideas and his views have never been widely accepted—certainly not in Great Britain and America; they have found more favour in France. Of late years the failure to find conclusive evidence in favour of the theory has told against it.

In 1830 there appeared the first volume of Lyell's *Principles of Geology;* in this work the principle of geological evolution was formulated, giving an explanation of the present rock structure of the earth. It was also about this time that Charles Darwin set out on his voyage in H.M.S. *Beagle.*

During the early decades of the nineteenth century it came to be recognised that the farther we went back in time the greater was the diversity in types of living things which were unaccounted for. The evidences of violent geological disturbances in the past were interpreted as indications of new creations, and in this way it was thought possible to save the Bible story of Creation; the story of the Flood could be regarded as the history of one such cataclysm. But Lyell, in his *Principles of Geology,* showed that in spite of violent disturbances there had been orderly development.

In 1859 appeared Darwin's *Origin of Species*; the simultaneous formulation of the thesis of this work by Alfred Russel Wallace and Charles Darwin marked a new stage in the development of evolutionary theory. Darwin's work established the theory of organic evolution as an account of the past history of living things, and offered in the theory of natural selection what then appeared to be an adequate explanation of the origin of species and hence of the causes of evolution. The scientific world was convinced of the truth of evolutionary causation, and most people to-day have at least a fair acquaintance with its main principles.

The importance of these biological studies to the sociologist lies in the application of biological conceptions to sociological study. It is of interest to consider, for example, a letter written by Lord Dawson of Penn which appeared in *The Times* dated November 4th, 1936. In his first paragraph Lord Dawson points out that a campaign for the bettering of national physique "must comprehend the whole field of health and fitness if it is to avoid the danger of being obscured by a façade of playing-fields and swimming-pools." He indicates the distinction that exists between physical education and physical recreation, and points out the fact that "a young man or woman may be excellent at games and yet possess defects of structure boding ill for his or her future fitness."

Social services, the letter goes on to state, have nulli-

fied the operation of the elimination of the unfit by natural selection (e.g. the mortality from tuberculosis has been halved in the past twenty-five years), and the necessity of thinking out an alternative policy has not been realised. Lord Dawson suggests that an alternative policy would comprise:

" (*a*) Plans to promote fitness during the period of rearing and development.

" (*b*) Plans to secure that the most fit among the youth, from wherever they derive, have every opportunity to get to the forefront of the community as exemplars and leaders.

" (*c*) Plans to devise special and kindly measures for dealing with the residue inherently unfit."

Under (*b*), he foretells that if the best in body and mind reach the front, they will determine standards and values to the advantage of the nation; " from these standards and values and the tastes deriving therefrom will result a process of unconscious selective mating which will make for fit progeny." It may be suggested that the process of selective mating should be, above all, a conscious one, it being necessary that the fit should not mate with the unfit or mentally inferior. " At the other end of the scale, the fundamentally unfit youth should be given kindly though economical shepherding and elemental training; no attempt should be made to raise them above their biological level "—and in the next paragraph Lord Dawson asks the potent question, " Is it not a duty of each generation to hand down fit children to posterity? "

After a consideration of the decline of the birth-rate and the effects of contraception—in connection with which Lord Dawson suggests that " contraception can be misused and in some instances families are too small for the health of the mother, the happiness of the family, and the vitality of the nation "—he stresses the need for " motherhood clinics " where instruction could be given to young women " on sex relations, hygiene, pregnancy,

if and when and how contraception should be practised, infant care, etc." He suggests that the burden of taxation is a deterrent of parenthood; the vastness of the sum required for social services leads to the reflection that it would be more profitable to build up a fit race by classification and selective handling rather than by adopting a policy of "treating the wheat and the tares in the field of life as if they were the same."

This leads him to his last heading (*c*), "the measures for dealing with the *inherently* unfit part of the population." Those whose defects render them undesirable as parents should be "actively discouraged from reproduction." He points to the glaring fact that "to-day there are some 250,000 mental defectives in this country who are free to marry," and sums up his arguments in the significant sentence, "The fact remains that good nurture cannot be a make-weight against bad breeding."

The prospect of breeding a race of supermen is one which is superficially attractive, but it is extremely doubtful whether the method of advance in human communities has been the same as that in the animal world. The struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest may have had some part in producing the strongest animals, those best fitted to survive *in their particular environment*. But Man is a spirit; he is part of the physical world, but it is not his whole world. Whatever may be one's personal interpretation of the terms, nearly every human being has some perception of the existence of and a dim yearning towards those values which he describes as Truth, Beauty, Justice, Right. Even the most whole-hearted individualist cannot believe completely in the principle of "Each for himself and the devil take the hindmost." If evolution had proceeded entirely on these lines, it would be difficult to account for the existence and growth of any sentiments of sympathy and self-sacrifice, of any feelings of solidarity and brotherhood; in short, it would be difficult to account for any social life at all except that based only

on self-interest or upon rudimentary combination for the sake of food and defence. What may be called the quality of sociality cannot be regarded merely as a development of the parental instinct, considered by many psychologists as the source of the tender emotions. Sociality is a term which may be defined as consciousness of and willing participation in the social life of a community; and it may manifest itself in a person without his experiencing the tender emotions arising from the parental instinct, for we do not hesitate to go to the assistance of any person in trouble, whether he be friend or foe; stranger or acquaintance. Such an impulse, it has been suggested, arises from a general desire for the welfare of other members of one's species in general.

As a matter of fact, the struggle for existence has not been as fierce as many people generally suppose. In his *Origin of Species,* Darwin urged that the term "struggle for existence" should not be understood in the narrow sense as a stark struggle between individuals for the means of existence. In the *Descent of Man,* Darwin pointed out that among numerous species of animals the struggle between individual members of the same group gives place to co-operation, so that survival is not always of the strongest but of those who combine and support one another, for the enemies of one individual are the enemies of all other individuals of the same species, and while these foes are ordinarily of such strength as to be capable of annihilating the single individual, the united strength of a number of individuals may be capable of holding them in check for all and each. Similarly, an individual who is in rebellion against the order of things in any community does not proceed to wage a lone struggle against Society. He seeks other individuals who feel as he feels; and these individuals form themselves into a group to struggle collectively. Thus there arise within a community numerous associations, the individual members of which contribute their small degree of power to the

whole. The women's franchise was gained in this way. Such a collective struggle against common foes has been carried on by many species of animals and by early Man. The small strength of Man, as Darwin observed in his *Descent of Man,* is more than counterbalanced by his intellectual power and by his social qualities, which led him to give aid to and receive aid from his fellow-men.

It is very important to realise that the fittest which will survive in the struggle for existence are not necessarily the best. Unfortunately, the phrase " survival of the fittest " has come to be regarded as the " survival of the best," so that many people believe that all we have to do is to sit still and let Nature weed out those who cannot adapt themselves to the given conditions of their lives. But conditions may be such that cunning, brutality and greed can survive where honesty, gentleness and generosity cannot; in this case, the so-called " fit "—the cunning, brutal and avaricious—will survive, whilst the " unfit "—the honest, gentle and generous—will be eliminated. We cannot, therefore, be content to leave selection to the conditions of life as they happen to be. Conditions must be created which will favour the survival of the best, and these conditions need not tend towards hardness of physical environment. Apart from the fact that the " tough " person is not necessarily of the best type, it should be realised that hard physical conditions do not necessarily make for fitness, but often the reverse. The Siberian horse, for example, can survive under conditions which would exterminate the European horse, but its strength and performance are inferior. In any case, Man's position at the summit of organic life is due to his mental achievement, and the story of the growth of his mental achievement is largely the story of his triumph over his physical environment. So far has this triumph extended, indeed, that we may well be satisfied for the time being with the extent of Man's command over his physical resources and turn our attention to the develop-

ment of the spiritual life. Greed, brutality, lust, have so often in the last few years of Man's existence nullified the fruits of his victories over Nature and, indeed, turned them into means for the destruction of his fellow-men and of himself. So efficient have his powers of destruction become that a crisis in his history has been reached—it seems that he must develop spiritually or perish. Fortunately, a comparison of his former state of extreme brutality with his present state, in which there is at least a desire for culture on the part of millions of human beings, must give grounds for regarding the latter development as being at least extremely improbable.

SECTION 6.—SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to show that Sociology can have no meaning apart from its application to the problems that confront Mankind. That is to say, the element of value is emphasised, and by this word *value* is meant the construction which is put upon Man's ideas of his place in the Universe.

Even if it were part of the job of the sociologist to reason upon the actual place of Mankind in the Universe, he would have to confess that his work would be singularly free from anything in the nature of results. Nobody has yet succeeded in specifying that place; nobody can tell us why we are in this world, what we are supposed to be doing here, and the relation of our acts to the universal scheme. We know that Man is as much spirit as matter, or more spirit than matter; we are beginning to realise something of the wonderful powers with which he is endowed—research into the subconscious world has taught us that—and there appears to be some sort of scientific justification for a belief in a continued existence after the death of his body. But here we tread on dangerous ground; psychic research has not advanced to the same degree as research in the material sciences. Beyond such frag-

mentary knowledge, we know nothing, and continued searching after knowledge on the lines of verbal argument can lead only to the state of mind described in the *Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám*:

> " Myself when young did eagerly frequent
> Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument
> About it and about: but evermore
> Came out by the same Door as in I went."

What, then, is Social Philosophy? It has been said above that Sociology lays stress on the element of value, and throughout this work there is the constant recurrence of the theme that the ultimate use of Sociology is the pointing out to Mankind the way that leads to the living of a rich, full life, the attainment of as complete a happiness as possible. There may be some discussion, some divergence of opinion, as to how this end may be best attained, but there can be no doubt as to the full meaning of the end itself, when once this meaning has been scientifically demonstrated. There can be no question of opinion; the object of sociological science is to shift men from the clogging bog of opinion to the firm ground of scientific certainty. The scientist has no concern with opinions as to whether an equal income for everybody is one means of making people happy; that sort of thing has been, is being and will be thrashed out by the public-house orators. His job is the far more difficult one of comprehending the implications of possibilities and weighing their effects on all aspects of social life, as far as lies in his power.

When we wander into the realms of Philosophy, we often get perilously near to empty verbiage, since it is impossible for human beings to attain knowledge of the Absolute. But Social Philosophy need not concern itself with the Absolute. It confines itself for all practical purposes to an endeavour to arrive at some conception of Man in relation to the rest of the Universe, not necessarily from that completely detached view-

point impossible of attainment in practice. Just as Sociology takes up the results of the social sciences and relates them to one another, so Social Philosophy takes up the results of Sociology and relates them to the life of Man. It constantly relates these results to the conception of value, to what, for want of a better phrase, we may call the conception of the Highest Good. If, for example, the researches of the sociologist indicate that the following of certain lines of conduct will lead to war among the nations of Europe, while the following of another set of lines of conduct will lead to peace and a widening of the activities of Man and a greater fulfilment of the powers that Man possesses, it is Social Philosophy which endeavours to weigh the relative merits of both these lines of conduct. Thus—and we cannot avoid this issue—standards of right and wrong are involved, and we are left with the query as to who or what is to determine what is right and what is wrong. The aid of Ethics must be sought, but it can be an aid only, for here we are not concerned merely with what men at various periods of history, or in various societies, past and present, have considered, or now consider to be right and wrong, but what *is* right and wrong. It may be easy for a modern Westerner to agree that it is wrong for a man to kill his aged mother when she ceases to be of material use to him and requires support, but it is by no means easy to obtain agreement on what should be done with our criminals—whether it is best that they should be clapped into prison or sent to a mental hospital to be psycho-analysed and treated as sufferers from mental disease.

The general development of Mankind must see the solving of such problems in the comparatively near future. It is the part of Social Philosophy to observe and guide such development. As men's mental powers develop by constant striving to obtain knowledge by means of scientific research, so does Social Philosophy fit each piece of new knowledge into place in relation to the whole. To take an example—let us suppose that

the biologists at length discover the factors which lead to mental deficiency. The sociologists would take up their results and relate them to the economic, political, psychological and other conditions which affect or are affected by mental deficiency and endeavour to present a true picture of mental deficiency in relation of the life of Mankind as a whole—what mental deficiency means to the race, how it arose and by what means it is to be eradicated.

It has been intimated in this book that it is the task of Sociology itself to relate the results of the social sciences and the material sciences to the highest good of Mankind, and therefore the student will take it that there is a certain amount of overlapping of the fields of Sociology and Social Philosophy. In a sense this is true. Sociology and Social Philosophy are complementary to one another. But he must never forget that Sociology itself, Sociology proper, is a science, and the implications of this statement we have already examined. Social Philosophy must take the results of Sociology for granted, because whatever conclusions are reached by Sociology must necessarily be accepted as scientific truth. But Sociology takes Social Philosophy as a guide for its investigations and accepts its conclusions as to the value of the results of Sociology. As a science, it is not the business of Sociology to enquire what is the highest good of Mankind, but, working for the highest good, it accepts the ruling of Social Philosophy as to what *is* the highest good; in a sense, Social Philosophy is the "religion" of Sociology. Sociology is applied social science, Social Philosophy is the consideration of the right and wrong of such application. To take another simple example to illustrate the point, it would be the part of Sociology to determine the social effects of strangling fifty per cent. of the girl babies of a society at birth; it would be the part of Social Philosophy to consider those effects in relation to the highest good of the society and of Mankind.

Nevertheless, it will be seen that one cannot separate

Sociology and Social Philosophy into watertight compartments. Sociology cannot exclude references to values, by virtue of its very nature. And the connection between Sociology and Social Philosophy is most intimate when one gets away from abstract theorising about things which do not seriously concern the happiness on this earth of the ordinary man, and concentrates on such urgent matters as the equitable distribution of wealth. Here Sociology and Social Philosophy walk hand in hand, for Social Philosophy shows how far this end is desirable and to what extent it may be satisfactorily pursued, indicating the methods of study, while Sociology, co-ordinating the results of the special social sciences, indicates to what extent and by what means the aim is attainable. It is then for Social Philosophy to correct any abstractions that may have crept into the discussion and to present the problem as a complete whole, stating the desiderata and indicating the means by which the desired results may be obtained. It is then for men themselves, by means of the organisation of Society, to set in motion the political, economic and administrative machinery necessary to produce the end desired.

It is because there is as yet no clear statement of the goal that Mankind has set itself that Social Philosophy has not crystallised into something clear and definite. People have been too intent on their own personal affairs to think about the larger field of Society as a whole. A Social Philosophy which is representative of Mankind must come from men themselves, and until sociality is widespread among men it is inevitable that what Social Philosophy there is must spring from the brains of secluded scholars who are often far removed from the stress and toil, the loves and hates and miseries and joys and heat of everyday life. Only when the science of Sociology itself is part of the education of every young man and woman will there begin to crystallise out a Social Philosophy which will be representative of the hopes and ambitions of Mankind as a whole.

When Man realises his true place in Society, when he has realised what Society means and is capable of understanding the implications of the brotherhood of men and the unity of all life on this planet, when he begins to have some knowledge of the tremendous psychological forces at his command and of the power which will enable him to gain all the material wealth he needs without inflicting suffering on others, when he has discovered how to arrange his way of living so that an equitable distribution of the resources of the globe will result in plenty for everybody, then, and only then, can he hope to formulate a goal that will be the goal of all Mankind.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the way to happiness for Mankind does not lie along the path of selfish individualism, whether of persons or of nations. The "ordinary" man is already dimly aware of this, and he gropes blindly towards international co-operation, a League of Nations, an international law. It is his lack of education in the facts of sociological science which is responsible for his continued blindness. He does not know what to do about his desire for international peace and co-operation; he leaves the fulfilment of his ideals in the hands of those whose aims are sometimes in opposition to his own, who often betray him either deliberately or through ignorance and incompetence. And, generally, it is the apathy of the "ordinary" man which is in a large measure responsible for this state of affairs. A small, narrow life leads to small, narrow views, so that often his energies are frittered away in interest in and huge enthusiasm for small things, such as the contemplation of ball games, which offer some form of recreation for his tired mind and body, and some form of release for his repressed emotions, but which effectively lead into a desert of nullity the energy and enthusiasm which could so profitably be spent in ameliorating his own state. There is no such thing as Social Philosophy for him, for there is no foundation of social knowledge,

understanding and science on which to build a Social Philosophy, so that there is an ever-present danger of Social Philosophy's becoming the useless and abstract study of a few intellectuals instead of the expression of a way of life formulated by Mankind for Mankind. Such a philosophy may be built only on the foundation of a sound sociological science.

Not that it is necessary for every man and woman to be an expert sociologist in order that life may be full and rich. But just as a knowledge of one's own body and its working, a knowledge of the elementary principles of Biology and Physiology, is necessary in order that one may get the best out of the body machine, so a knowledge of the elementary principles of the science of Society is necessary for every man and woman so that a full part in the life of Society may be played and a first approach to the problems of Society made. Only with this knowledge may the movements of Mankind be directed along healthy and forceful lines. It is only by thinking along lines such as these that we get to the heart of the question of what Social Philosophy means in itself and what it means both to the sociologist himself and to the "man in the street" whom it most affects.

It is seen that Social Philosophy lays particular stress upon the consideration of value in connection with Mankind's ideas as to its place in the Universe. It becomes, therefore, an urgent task that it should correct the abstractions which the special sciences are compelled to make in order that it may present a synoptic interpretation of reality—that is to say, an interpretation of reality viewed as a whole, without undue emphasis on one or another aspect, so that the findings of the special sciences are displayed in their true importance; a correlation must be effected that results in as close an approximation to the truth as possible. This is a task of no mean order; the specialist is notoriously apt to attach too great an importance to his own study. A particular kind of brain is required—one that is

master of all the social trades and servant to none. Failing the occurrence of many such brains, the social scientists have to fall back on discussion and mutual correction, but if it is a fact that Truth will out, there is some hope of the eventual crystallisation of a result approximating to what might be achieved by an Ideal Social Philosopher.

But before this synthesis of the results of the special sciences can take place, it is necessary for the social philosopher to enquire into their fundamental principles. It is the very essence of Philosophy to enquire into concepts regarded as fundamental; a Social Philosophy must enquire into the foundation on which the special sciences have built. " It seeks to disentangle the fundamental categories which they employ, the assumptions, postulates, or pre-suppositions upon which they rest, and to subject them to critical scrutiny and constructive reinterpetation " (Ginsberg, *Studies in Sociology*, Ch. I, " The Scope of Sociology," p. 20).

It is evident that the successful performance of this particular job calls for the employment of mental power of the very highest order, and able indeed is the philosopher who can avoid the morass of word-juggling into which Man's dependence on spoken or written speech for the communication of ideas is liable to plunge him.

It is because this three-fold nature of Social Philosophy is so difficult that its study is perforce confined to the " intellectuals "; it would appear that in order that an effective Social Philosophy may be built up by Mankind in general, all men must become " intellectual." But " intellectuality " is sometimes little more than the ability to express oneself that is given by a careful education in language. It falls to the lot of the social philosopher to provide concrete and accurate expression; but in the blind attempts of the ordinary man to seek peace and self-fulfilment in a world of stress and strain and petty hatreds and unwisdom and threats of war, there is some evidence of a dim concep-

tion of a Social Philosophy being worked out, however vaguely and inarticulately, in practice. It is the part of the sociologist to render it more articulate, more comprehensible, more aware of itself. It will remain the task of the social philosopher to perform what Ginsberg regards as perhaps his most important function: " to apply his criteria of value to the facts of social life and change, to enquire into the ethical validity of social and political ideals as distinguished from their sociological possibility " (*op. cit.*, p. 21). As far as words will take us, it will be his task to see that those words which he uses express the truth. No one realises more fully than the social philosopher himself that this task is one of the most difficult of all.

After this consideration of the broad outlines of the social sciences and of the meaning of a true Social Philosophy, we can now turn our attention to a closer view of the elements of Sociology itself.

COLLEGE

Chapter III

MAN IN SOCIETY

Section 1.—The Stages of Society

We have now made clear to ourselves what Society means, what is meant by the study of Society and what the object of the study of Society is.

We have examined the scope of the social sciences and related them to the science of Sociology itself, and we are now in a position to apply this knowledge to the world around us and to examine Western Society as it is, noting its general characteristics. We shall, that is to say, examine in outline the characteristics of Man in Society as it exists to-day.

The unit of social life in Western civilisation is the Family. In general, people live in families, either as husband and wife, or parents and children, or children alone. This is the first and obvious fact to the student of Society, but he will also note the facts of the city and nation. The family in the civilised world does not exist in isolation. In the savage world there are approximations to it. The Veddahs of Ceylon are a handful of scattered families. They number approximately two thousand, and their dwellings are trees, caves and primitive huts. In the wet season, sometimes two or three families will live for a time in one cave, but there is scarcely any organised life outside the family. The earlier life of Mankind must have been lived somewhat in this fashion; it is only with the formation of large groups and a corresponding division of functions that any kind of wider life could be developed, any progress made from a brutish and savage existence.

The Family to-day is a unit of social life, not the whole of it.

In this section we shall trace the stages by which

FIG. 4.—THE STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY



Society developed from a collection of primitive families into the complex structure it is to-day, and by comparison with the conditions of long ago, or with the less advanced societies of to-day, bring our minds to some sort of proper perspective of present-day social organisation, and to a realisation that Society is something which is developing even to-day; for Mankind as a whole has not completely grown out of its primitive youth, just as we ourselves have not grown out of all the ways and methods of thinking of childhood.

The Family as the only social grouping is, as has been said, a very primitive form of organisation. The two or three families living together in a cave in the case of the Veddahs form a clan, but this is small, and most clans have but a dim idea of the existence of other clans. Consequently there are no class distinctions, and no organised war, though there may be fighting over the boundaries of hunting-grounds. The isolation of the family leads to marriage within the family circle —marriage with the younger sister is common. The strict monogamy of the Veddahs may be attributed to the same factor and to the deficiency in the number of women, but looseness of morals is very rare. Their intelligence is very limited in scope and there appears to be no evidence of a belief in a creative God, but there are traces of belief in witchcraft. The Veddahs respect the property of others.

The Yahgans of Tierra del Fuego are slightly more highly developed. The family is less isolated, and it may be a consequence that the Yahgans do not exhibit the monogamy and fidelity of the Veddahs. The population, numbering less than a thousand, lives in small groups of three and four families, but there is no regular clan organisation. Self-redress is the method of justice, and though quarrels may take place between families, there is no war organisation. There are no ranks, no chiefs, no slaves; property is not held in common. A belief in and fear of ghosts or phantoms is the limit of their religion. Cannibalism does not

occur among them, but they allow infanticide, though holding human life sacred.

Though we cannot assume that the early life of Mankind must have been very closely similar to that of these Veddahs and Yahgans, yet they do provide some idea of what social life is like when it is bounded within the narrow field of the Family. The indefiniteness of their social organisation, of their means of enforcing order, of maintaining customs, of their beliefs, is the indefiniteness of Man who has hardly begun to think; the trend of advancing civilisation is towards definiteness. First comes the definiteness of beliefs and then the definiteness founded on scientific certainty. As Hobhouse points out, it is an alternative at least equally possible as that which regards the less definite forms of institutions as " survivals," that they are in reality incomplete developments. Rather than that such institutions are survivals of an original form broken up, it is at least reasonable, in a case where there are strongly marked institutions, often elaborate, to regard these institutions as in their most distinct and characteristic form, while the least distinct are partial developments. The strongly developed Totem system of the North American Indians is one which has developed along a special line of evolution. There is no reason to assume it is necessarily a " primitive " line. Institutions which contrast strongly with our own have been too naturally regarded as " primitive "—a point well brought out by Steinmetz. Alternatively, they may be strongly marked and definite institutions along a line of evolution different from our own. An increasing definiteness is a mark of advancing civilisation—definiteness of organisation, of provision for law and justice, of the web of relations that exist between individuals, such as the laws governing the holding of property. The dim fears and terrors of the savage peoples—the Yahgans suffer from recurring panics on account of cannibal ghosts—are the indefinite wonderings of simple childish minds awaking to the world

of thought, different from the agnosticism of the scientific mind because they are not based on thought but on the negation of it. The apparent indefiniteness may be due to some extent to the difficulties experienced by the modern mind in understanding that of the savage, but there seems to be no doubt that much of it exists in itself; and this fact gives us a clue to the point we have made—viz. that indefiniteness in organisation and beliefs goes with a low degree of civilisation.

A stage which a large portion of Mankind must have passed is that of the village community. The characteristics of the village community are the permanent settlement of human beings on a definite area of land which is owned in common and parcelled out for cultivation. A wandering tribe of a number of families would settle down into a number of separate villages or would remain partly nomad while partly settled, as in the case of the Hebridean Isle of Heisgeir (Gomme, *The Village Community*). The increasing definiteness of Society is shown in the possession by the family of a homestead, the heads of households forming a village council under a village head or chief under the authority of a tribal chief. The village community is self-sufficing, self-governing, self-contained. An examination of the characteristics of a village community of the twelfth century in England will indicate the narrowness of life resultant upon an organisation, social or economic, which is self-sufficient. In the Western world it has endured up till modern times—the Russian "mir" lasted to 1861.

There is increasing definiteness, but the utmost importance is attached to the homestead. In the Hindoo community the homestead is sacred, and it was the homestead in the village community stage of development which gave rights to men.

The North American Indians have developed along the lines of the village community to a clan organisation tracing ties of descent through the female and comprising a totemism which cuts across the clans, the

members of the totem being bound to mutual defence. A study of the Iroquois indicates that this dual relationship is a means of achieving a higher political union. Their law and justice are undeveloped; the blood feud still exists; self-redress predominates; the position of women is low, the marriage tie unstable; animism, or a belief in spirits, prevails; and religion is non-moral.

The advance of Western civilisation from the village-community stage came about through the breaking down of exclusiveness through the growth of cities—which were centres for the radiation of culture and for the lines of trade—and the slow national integration of the country as a whole under the control of a developing State. These two movements advanced together, but one case, the city community, developed out of relation to the nation as a whole. This was in Greece, where narrow ranges divided the country into almost isolated valleys. A sea-girt country with a long coast-line, Greece was enabled to admit the civilising influence of commerce, and the climate encouraged open-air life. The economic basis of the Greek city community was slavery, an unsound basis for communities almost continuously within and without at strife. The city Greeks were deficient in their control of Nature, and the open-air life and the slave basis bred a contempt for the mechanical arts which forbade advance. Rights rested on citizenship; kinship was less than citizenship. Rights did not lie in humanity, but in the virtue of belonging to a particular class; the slave to Aristotle was a "living tool."

The first union of the ideas of justice and liberty came with the feudal system, though in a very elementary form. The basis of rights and property was land. Rights were assigned to the owners of land, in contrast to the principle of the Teutonic village, where land was assigned to those possessing rights as heads of households. The feudal system was a hierarchy based upon personal relationships in which political and social

Fig. 5.—The Economic Evolution of Man
(after Tylor, Fourier and Morgan, and Müller-Lyer)

Cultural Grades	Phases	Characteristics	Examples
III CIVILISATION	Higher Civilisations	Large-scale private Capitalist organisation of industry. Large-scale use of machinery. Beginnings of State control of industry.	Nations of modern Western civilisation; Japan.
	Middle Civilisations	Beginning of large-scale economic organisation; differentiation of labour.	Roman Empire; Latin and Teutonic nations before 18th century.
	Lower Civilisations	Trades and handicrafts. Towns.	Ancient cultures of Mexico and Peru; Greeks before Solon; Romans till Punic Wars; Medieval Europe.

II BARBARISM	Upper Grade — Plough Culture and Nomad Herdsmen	Division of labour among men; metals.	Homeric Greeks; pre-Republican Romans; Oceanian and African agriculturalists.
	Early Soil Tillers and Herdsmen	Division of labour between the sexes; stone, polished weapons.	Neolithic Man; Red Indian hunters and maize-growers, Nomads of Asian and African deserts.
I SAVAGERY	Higher Hunters	Spinning, weaving, pottery, canoes; domestic animals. Fixed dwellings.	The North American Indians, e.g., Sioux, Apaches, Fisher-peoples of British Columbia.
	Lower Hunters	Gathering of fruits, etc.; hunting of small animals. Caves or temporary dwellings.	Australian aborigines; African pygmies and bushmen; Veddahs; Yahgans; Andamanese; Eskimos.
	Human Origins	Development of articulate speech; construction of primitive tools; discovery of use of fire.	None surviving.

(This chart is based upon data given in F. Müller-Lyer's book *The Family*, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd.)

rights could be sold, bought and exchanged. It was, too, a military system. It had no unity, because it was not based upon willing co-operation. With the rise of cities, the idea of citizenship, the weaving of the threads of a *nation* economy, it disappeared to make way for the nation community as we know it to-day, with authority unified in the territorial sovereign State, which arose all over Europe.

The spread of communications and commerce, the need for a unified system of jurisdiction and an integrated authority, called for a greater scheme of organisation than had hitherto obtained. With the development of trade and commerce and the growth of capital, the importance of the principle of land ownership as the basis of social structure declined within the State, while the increased facilities of transport and communications strengthened the sense of common nationality. To-day the nation community is an established fact. It will be our business later on to examine the new conception of the State which arose from this fact.

For the present, we will note that within the framework of the State there has developed a rich growth of associations and institutions. Within the circle of Western civilisation are found a number of sovereign national states, and within each state is a multitude of associations which have been formed by men for the fulfilment of their activities—that is, the picture in broad outline of contemporary Western civilisation.

We now turn to the consideration of this social structure within the State.

Section 2.—The Structure of Modern Western Society

Upon what basis are we to classify this complex mass of associations and institutions which make up the structure of Western Society?

We have already seen that Society is the whole web of relationships between individuals living in communi-

ties. We have noted, also, that the relationships entered into by an individual do not exhaust his purposes. He remains an individual, and is in himself a single whole; he is a personality. He does not exist for Society. Our present purpose is to examine objectively the results of the relationships entered into by the individual.

Here we cannot do better than follow Professor MacIver, who has, in *The Elements of Social Science*, Ch. IV, worked out a scheme of social relationships which, as has been pointed out, is concrete and related to the world as it is, resting on a scientific foundation of analysis; "every association," he says in *Community*, 1924, Ch. III, "is an organ of community." We have already seen that a community is a group of beings leading a common life. For the better living of this common life men form associations, which are organisations deliberately formed for the collective pursuit of some interests or set of interests shared by the members of each association. It will be noted that the collective nature of the pursuit may not be uppermost in importance in the minds of each individual. The individuals comprising the associations are seeking their own interests; the association is the most convenient method of doing so. Nevertheless, there may be a consciousness of social life, there may be sociality as we have defined it, and this sociality in associations is the beginning of a social sense which may develop or be developed by education and experience into sociality in Community, which, as we have seen, is the highest form of social consciousness.

Professor MacIver's system rests upon *interests*; an interest he defines as any aim or object which stimulates activity towards its attainment (*The Elements of Social Science*, p. 64), and it is any object of the will. Society, he points out, exists because of these common interests; some of them are by their nature common, others are attained more easily when they are pursued in common. Every association (we still follow MacIver) represents some particular interest or else some particular way of pursuing a group of interests.

Fig. 6.—Professor MacIver's System of Interests



MacIver, in his *Elements of Social Science,* divides his interests into two main classes, ultimate and derivative. The former he defines as those which are not in general pursued mainly for the sake of interests beyond themselves. The latter are those which are in general pursued for the sake of interests beyond themselves. Ultimate interests he divides into general and specific. The general ultimate interests are those which depend on general like-mindedness and give rise to such associations as social clubs, societies for mutual aid, and philanthropic associations; specific interests he divides into those which reveal primarily the physical nature and those which reveal primarily the psychical nature. The former class embraces sexual and non-sexual interests. The sexual interests give rise to the association of the family and marriage and kinship associations; the non-sexual to agricultural and industrial and commercial associations, and to hygienic, medical and surgical associations. The interests which reveal primarily the psychical nature are (*a*) scientific, educational and philosophical interests, giving rise to such associations as schools, colleges and universities; (*b*) artistic and religious interests, giving rise to the Church and missionary and religious associations, the Theatre and associations for the promotion of art, music and literature; (*c*) interests in power and prestige, which are active in determining classes and reveal themselves within all associations; these give rise to national and imperialistic associations, and exclusive clubs maintaining standards of fashion or the sense of distinction or power.

The derivative interests are divided into two main classes—economic and political; the former result in the formation of banks and trust (trading) companies, co-operative associations and so on, trade unions and occupational associations.

Political interests are divided into three kinds: (*a*) communal interests, giving rise to the State and the sub-divisions of the State, the Municipality, the County, etc.; (*b*) group interests, giving rise to political parties,

and (*c*) specific political interests, which result in associations for the promotion or maintenance of some particular forms of legislation, e.g. the Proportional Representation League; other examples are the United Committee for the Taxation of Land Values, Ltd., and the various Ratepayers' Associations.

This is a brief summary of the scheme of interests dealt with by Professor MacIver, and as a broad classification introductory to scientific consideration of the structure of Society it can hardly be bettered.

Professor MacIver points out that the correspondence between interests and associations given in his table is summarily shown. An association set against any particular interest may not limit itself to the pursuit of that interest. The Church, for example, has important activities outside the religious interests proper; it may even cater for the amusement of parishioners, by dances and cinema shows; in the Middle Ages it was the great reliever of poverty. Again, many of the associations formed for the pursuit of non-sexual specific interests, such as the agricultural and industrial associations, may have economic interests as well. The nature of each association will vary with the character and evolution of Society. To-day, economic associations are a principal force in human affairs; in the Middle Ages the important associations were essentially religious. In the Bolshevik Revolution the political unit was based openly upon economic interests for the first time in history. Nevertheless, Professor MacIver's scheme does appear to have a considerable correspondence with reality, the complex nature of Society necessitating only the filling-in of the blanks and the tracing of the lines by which interests cut across one another, resulting in the pursuit of main interests and secondary ones, as in the case of the industrial and commercial organisations we have noted above. It is interesting to compare with Professor MacIver's system Professor Hobhouse's " Root Interests " (*Social Development*).

Hobhouse distinguished several root interests which

dominate the departments of human behaviour. There is the interest in *self*, including the body and all its appetites, the interest in *others* or the social interest, and the interest in the *order and structure* of things. Hobhouse attempts a more psychological approach to the problem of social structure. We have noted a similar psychological approach used by MacIver when he adopts a classification of human sources of movement based on a distinction between attitudes, interests and motivations (Ch. II, Section I). Ginsberg ("Recent Tendencies in Sociology," *Economica*, Feb. 1933) suggests that it would be more helpful to use the distinction made by English psychologists between instinct, emotion and sentiment, but we do not intend in this work to plunge the student into the middle of the psychological battle going on about instinct and kindred matters. After all, we are concerned here mainly with the necessity to obtain clear ideas which will be broadly correct as far as the world of reality is presented to us.

The interests and corresponding associations are by no means to be regarded as clearly defined entities. We have already referred to Professor MacIver's analysis of social structure into three broad groupings—community, looser configurations such as social classes, arising out of common attitudes with no formal associations to represent them, and formal associations established for definite ends. On the basis of this grouping, the position of the Family is somewhat indefinite. It is evident that no formal classification will serve rigidly to define social groupings which are, as Ginsberg points out, historical entities undergoing great changes. Ends and means tend to intermingle, interests overlap and combine. Nevertheless, the difficulty of rigid classification is one merely of convenience, and while Professor MacIver's scheme is useful for the purpose of giving a direction to study, the lack of ability to define entities clearly and exactly is a useful reminder to the sociological student that Society is a thing of life and movement and change, and

cannot be analysed with the strict objective regard to general structure which obtains in the material sciences.

Section 3.—Theories of Society and of a Group Mind

It is now necessary to consider some conceptions of Society and of Community which have occupied the minds of some social scientists. The problem of what Community is has been a source of speculation fruitful of a considerable number of analogies and metaphors. When men are unable to determine what a thing is, because of their inability to determine the nature of the Absolute, they turn their attention to stating what a thing is like, and are liable to fall into the error of imagining that they have solved the problem. Society we have already defined as a social relationship which is in the first place a condition or state of mind, and a society is a system of social relationships in existence between the members of a community, which is a group of social beings leading a common life, while Community is the general term corresponding to Society, a group of social beings in the abstract, and referring to no particular group.

Now, it is important to remember that though Society is in the first place a relationship, and a society a system of relationships, one cannot separate these relationships from the human beings related. Society cannot exist without Community nor Community without Society. It is, therefore, impossible to consider either of these two facts in isolation. Society cannot exist as a type, any more than Community can exist as a mere abstract term. The word "Community" is an abstract term in just the same way as honesty and vice are abstract terms; nevertheless, honesty and vice and Community are very real things.

Nor can one separate a community from the individuals comprising it; we can deal with the individual in Society, which is very different. Society exists for

the individual, not the individual for Society. There can be no happiness of the community apart from the happiness of the individuals comprising it.

So that when we are considering any of the theories which deal with Society or Community as a unitary thing, we have to look first to see whether this fundamental error has been committed of treating Society or Community as independent of the individual human beings with whom they are concerned. This error is particularly liable to occur when one seeks refuge from limitation of conception in analogies. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) applied the analogy of an organism to Community. But this must remain an analogy only. Community is *not* an organism, and in point of fact the analogy is not even a good one. The cells of an organism cannot be likened to the individuals of a community, for the cells of an organism have of themselves no conscious purposes, no interests which sometimes cut across the interests of other cells, and sometimes act in unison with them, nor can the separate organs of a body be compared with the associations within a modern state, with purposes of their own to serve, associations sometimes with purposes working in co-operation with the general purposes of the whole community, sometimes in opposition, conscious or otherwise, to them.

The idea of Society as a contract between the individuals of a community swings to the opposite extreme. There is, of course, nothing in the nature of a conscious defined contract for their mutual or common benefit between men living in societies; modern Society is a thing which has grown. But even if we seek enlightenment by a consideration of "subconscious" motives, the idea of contract must involve some measure of isolation and choice of association on the part of the individual, and, as was pointed out in the first chapter of this book, men do not exist in isolation. Men are social creatures by nature, even if their sociality is confined only to the limits of family life. There may be some truth in the analogy of a contract under the

conditions of the present-day Society—we all surrender certain aspects of our liberty for the good of the community and in return for the benefits conferred by the community—but this is a consequence rather than a cause of Society; it may be described as a feature of Society rather than an explanation of Society.

When we turn to the idea of Community as a mind or soul, we come to a psychological discussion in which it is very important to keep our heads and make sure that we realise the extent of the exactness and the implications of the statements we are making. There are various kinds of views which have been or are held, from that which regards Society as actually a " collective consciousness," to that in which the individual is regarded as owing so much to Society in the way of the moulding of his ideas and beliefs that Society emerges as the important fact, the individual forming merely a unit of Society, which thinks and acts as a whole. Espinas (*Des Sociétés Animales*) frankly supports the idea of a collective consciousness or *" conscious multiple,"* and in this collective consciousness the mental processes of the individual are fused. Durkheim's theory also involves the absorption of the individual into the social mind. The German idealists stress the influence of Society on the individual, the latter owing his very being to Society, and Dr. McDougall comes near to this view, for, while rejecting the theory of a collective consciousness, he does consider Society to possess a collective mind. The actions of Society may be and often are different from the mere sum of the actions of its several members reacting severally to a situation.

Now, the very fact that Sociology is a new science, the very fact of this present work, are sufficient indication of the absence of a determined and clearly understood general consciousness of Society. If there is any such thing as a " common mind " at all, it is not conscious of itself. It is, in fact, a most difficult thing to get men to realise at all the fact of Society and its implications—

wars and the rumours of wars worry and confuse men and provide sufficient evidence against the theory of a general consciousness of Society. And it is but a spurious simplification to grant a collective mind to the smaller societies of the nation or even the crowd. It is true that a man's actions when he is a unit in a crowd differ from his normal actions as an individual. This is because of the peculiar characteristics of crowd psychology—the heightening of the social instincts, producing an exaltation which urges people to lead or follow the lead of others, the increase of suggestibility, the loss of the sense of personal responsibility, the narrowing of consciousness and the lowering of the intellectual level, because only qualities common to everybody in the crowd can be appealed to. But the conditions of crowd phenomena are not the normal, continuing conditions of everyday life. There are continuing conditions of common tradition, common sentiments of loyalty and emotion around particular objects or institutions, common elements due to heredity and racial characteristics. But there are, too, numerous discussions and distinctly individual modes of thought in regard to purposes and aims and methods in common life, especially in regard to those which relate to particular associations. It seems that the conception of a common mind is an over-simplification of something which is complex and not at all capable of description except by analysis into common elements which do not in themselves form anything in the nature of a social or group mind.

The conception of a "general will" is, too, subject to the same criticisms. Dr. McDougall considers that a general will is coming to be when every individual in a group or society has a conception of the group as a whole and identifies his own good with the good of the group. Professor Mackenzie is more cautious in defining a general will as one arrived at by deliberate discussion in which the contribution of every member of the group is utilised and the differences integrated

But Professor Bosanquet is frank in claiming that the system of dispositions of an individual imply the will of a " true " individual self which is essentially social in character and identical in all individuals, this one will being embodied in the State as a " real " or " general " will. This rests upon an identification of an ideal will corresponding to an ideal of the ultimate good of all with a general will. But the object willed is not the same thing as the act of willing, and in any case the will itself is individual. As has been pointed out, there is no will in every individual to maintain the social structure, and even if there were, the will of each individual is his own will, separate and distinct from the wills of all other individuals. But the will of one individual is different from the will of another. There are conflicting ideas of what part the State should play in Society, of the functions of the Church, of the Family. Can the whole of these diverse and sometimes opposing ideas and consequent wills merge into one " general will "? There might conceivably be something which could be described as a general will if all the individuals of a group are fully agreed as to the particular aims of the group and the methods by which those aims might be carried out. But even this would be to detach from that sum total all the individual hopes and aspirations and personal likes and dislikes or desires and repulsions which are part of each individual's psychological make-up. So to detach these things would be to place the group before the individual, to say that the individual exists for Society, not Society for the individual, and that is to pervert the whole purpose of Society. Once again, the example of Nazi Germany springs to mind.

Very much the same kind of problem is involved in the consideration of racial and national characteristics. It is obvious that there are national types; the members of one nation have definite mental and physical characteristics which differentiate them from members of another. Racial factors may make these differences very marked; the yellow races possess physical charac-

teristics different from the white races. But even in the case of the Western peoples with whom this book is most intimately concerned, there are differences which need no hard searching. A Frenchman is different from an Englishman, and even within the boundaries of the British Isles it needs no great discernment to discover that a man is a Welshman or a Scotsman. Sidney Herbert (*Nationality,* p. 37) defines a nation as " a social group bound together by a consciousness of kind which springs from the traditions evoked by the group's historic past and is directly related to a definite home country " (quoted by Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society,* p. 97). So that we have, as a thread running through the nation and binding its members together, common traditions and a common history. Traditions are defined by MacIver as the " broad, age-old modes of thought or action expressive of the historic spirit or ideal of the group to which they belong." Ginsberg has it that " by tradition is meant the sum of all the ideas, habits and customs that belong to a people and are transmitted from generation to generation (*The Psychology of Society*). Geographical factors have their influence—the British Isles are a case in point. It is evident that it is not essential for the formation of nationhood that all the members should be of one race. Again, the British Isles are an example of this. Nor is a common language essential—Switzerland is a land of more than one language, and so is Belgium. Such factors as these and a common religion and a common political allegiance may be contributory factors in forming a nation, but there does not appear to be any evidence for presuming the existence of a national mind or soul. The national character is the result of many forces in operation—the history of a people, their systems of institutions, of governments, of education.

Observation leads us to suspect that national characteristics which are not specifically racial are individual and are not transmitted by heredity. The complex forces acting on any English child taken at an early

age to France or Germany would in all probability produce an adult predominantly French or German, and in the course of a few generations such differences as remained would be submerged by the effects of environment, education, training and the experience of the country's way of life. But there is little in the way of inherent difference among the Western peoples. Perhaps it is this fact, so evident after reflection, that is responsible for the creation of a special race-myth applied so thoroughly by the aid of the weapons of mass-suggestion and the threat of personal violence to the German people. The power of mass-suggestion and the practical use of mob-psychology are powerful forces in the hands of those who wield them, and when these forces are in operation men may very well lose their individuality and become units in a crowd. But men cannot permanently be part of a crowd. The personality must assert itself or perish.

It is the fundamental error of all theories of "group" or "social" or "national" minds to neglect this fact, the fact that men and women are individuals, that Society and Community exist for the development of individual personality; happiness for the group must mean the happiness of individuals, and this is not attained when the individual personality is sunk in an amorphous indistinct group "personality" which takes no account of individuals, which, indeed, destroys the foundation of Society, for it leads to the glorification and deification of the group and substitutes a false god for the personality of the individual. Such figures as "Britannia" and "John Bull" and "Uncle Sam" are useful personifications to the "leader" desirous of power and to the forces wishing to make use of the power of sacrifice and self-abnegation of men beguiled by mass-suggestion. Men have died and been tortured and have lost limbs and sight for the sake of such mythical personalities. But with social education and the increase of sociality, the influence of such annihilating forces will

tend to disappear, and with them all justification for theories of a "group-mind" or social or national "soul" which take account of individual racial or national difference but neglect the greater issues of the fact of human similarities and the dominating feature of human personality.

Section 4.—Environment

All life is dependent upon environment. The nature of life on this earth takes its characteristics from its environment. It is environment that results in Man's being an air-breathing mammal, that has made him a two-legged being. This is to do no more than state a truism, but it is well to remember that environment is inextricably bound up with life as a whole as with Man in particular. All our associations and institutions, the complex machinery and framework of social structure, take their original inspiration and form from environment. There is no inner force that makes a man English or German. He suffers a mere accident of birth; his environment, his general surroundings, the customs and traditions, the dispositions which have been impressed upon him by his parents and associates make him what he is. Environment is a force more powerful than nationality, for nationality takes its characteristics from environment.

But this force must not be regarded as a simple drive acting one way. Living things modify their environment. That seems to be an important feature of life. Environment acts upon life, but life everywhere acts upon environment, selecting it, changing it. Man comes into a wilderness and throws up cities. He is separated from his fellows by miles of distance and he makes machines and apparatus wherewith to effect communication with them.

What is the nature of this environment which is part of Man's life? There is, first, the physical environment. Physical environment influences the movement and

growth of population. In all probability the fertile valleys of the East first saw the growth of dense populations in cities and villages. The rivers came to be channels of communication. Climate influences human activities—e.g., great heat has an enervating influence, and the rigours of the Arctic and Antarctic prevent the exercise of any faculties save those used in maintaining life and in finding food, clothing and shelter. Climate influences the nature of the food supply and commodities—e.g., some plants of great importance to modern life, such as rubber, flourish only in tropical countries. Man has modified his physical environment by his methods of transport. Dwellers in the temperate lands can obtain their rubber, their tropical products, by means of a complex system of production and distribution. Physical environment becomes of less importance in the material welfare of Man with the increase of the arts of civilisation; and even under similar conditions of physical environment different groups show great differences in institutions and character. One has but to compare the adjacent countries of France and Germany to see the force of this. There are environments other than the physical which determine what sort of civilisation there is going to be.

The principle of the division of labour is one which has affected Mankind very strongly in the past and affects him even more strongly to-day. Very early in their history men discovered that by allowing an individual to devote himself to one occupation and to exchange the fruits of his labours for those of others, they could modify the economic environment so as to permit of great advances in civilisation—there is evidence of the existence of implement "factories" in the Stone Age. Men did not think of this operation in these precise terms, but that is what the principle meant. An individual became a specialist at one job. He could do certain things better by concentrating on them. In the industrial age this principle has been followed to such an extent that the personal happiness of many

members of the community has been subordinated to the economic environment. A man may spend his working life in hammering nails on boxes or tightening a nut on a part of a machine. The following to an extreme degree of the principle of division of labour has led to the congregation of men in cities, often very black and ugly cities. Coupled with a lack of sociality and pure selfishness of those in control of economic power, it has led to the horrors of the factory system, of the Industrial Revolution. The economic environment has so subordinated Man that he is in danger of losing all sense of perspective in his new-found power of control over material things. The struggle for economic power is one of the major causes of modern wars. The present age sees Man concentrating on his modifications of the economic environment and suffering wars, poverty and all the horrors of social distress and disorder because he has not learned how to fit the economic environment into its right place in his scheme of values.

It is seen that changes in the economic environment induce changes in the social life or the social environment. In addition to the extension of collective material benefits, such as the provision of water supply and drainage, the customs, traditions, manners and way of life which are the social environment undergo reactive changes with changes in the economic environment. City life sees an increase in the number of associations —or, rather, the number and importance of specific associations develop with the conglomeration of men in cities, for these two movements are concurrent developments, rather than cause and effect. With the facilities for personal investigation of all sorts of subjects, and with the interchange of ideas and points of view, the importance of custom diminishes. Old sanctions lose their power, subtle changes are produced in the ways of thought and of life of the members of the community living in great towns.

This complex legacy from the past is becoming less

important in the minds of men—the social environment is being modified. But with this disentanglement of men's minds from the shackles of the past there is an increase in the psychological influences that attend the crowd. Suggestibility is heightened, old-established customs may not retain their former hold on men, but passing fashions will intrigue and blind them. There is a tendency for every man to think as his neighbour thinks, and when the common man, with no knowledge of self-protection, is subjected to a continuous bombardment of suggestions from radio stations, newspapers, pulpits and all the other means of getting at men's minds in the mass—the means known collectively as propaganda—what little increase of knowledge of the world and increase in resources are given to him by city life are offset by a deadening of his individual faculties in the mechanical mass tendencies of the city and town.

The social environment is more a mental or psychical than a physical thing. MacIver aptly describes it as "the means, the vehicle, of life; it alone grants or denies actuality to each of the seemingly infinite potentialities of life" (*The Elements of Social Science,* p. 63). In this Western civilisation of ours, advantage has been taken of the physical environment. The climate is suitable for the maximum exercise of the faculties; its natural wealth is sufficient for Man's material and mental needs—Western Europe is a very fair land. The economic environment has been modified so that more than enough for all men's needs can be produced. Yet something has so far upset the machinery—or efficient machinery has not yet been devised—that in the midst of plenty, people starve. Children cry for want of bread and go barefoot in mud and rain and snow. An increase in production is looked on as a calamity rather than a triumph. It is clear that the economic machinery of life must be modified to enable Western Mankind to enjoy a full happiness which means happiness for all, and this involves changes in the social structure, in

men's ideas, in men's minds. The structure of Western Society is far from being perfectly fitted to its needs. Man has not yet attained that control over his economic environment which will enable him to develop his potentialities, those potentialities which seem infinite in scope and variety. Part of these potentialities is the ability so to control his social life that he can work in harmony with his fellows, and by co-operation and mutual help and understanding strive in the best way to reach that ideal of which most men have some dim conception in moments of quiet vision. Man's feet are on the earth, but his face is turned towards the stars. As his social life develops in perfection of structure, so his individual potentialities are released from the effort of living in some sort of strained harmony with his fellows, to seek goals which are now hidden from him but which are nevertheless there—what else is the meaning of life? It is the part of Sociology to examine the social structure and determine how it can be improved for that end.

After this broad survey, it is now our business to come to closer quarters with our problem, and obtain a closer view of the instruments which men have constructed to enable them to work and live together; we have to examine some of the more important of the associations and institutions of Western Society.

Chapter IV

SOCIETY AS A SYSTEM OF REGULATED SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Section 1.—The Basis of Society in Associations and Institutions

We have established our picture in general outline—a community of men and women whose complex relations are part of the whole structure of Society, here and there forming associations for the pursuit of some common object, whether that pursuit is consciously undertaken or a subconscious one tacitly agreed to as forming one of the conditions of social life. The Community, indeed, is itself an association established for the purpose of living a life in common.

It is the Great Association, but it does no more than outline the way of life for a group of people. Its social structure is merely Society in outline, but it is an outline which is also a framework, an essential one on which to build the various important associations. Community alone is not a satisfactory instrument for the purposes of the individual life. It is the vehicle of life only. We have seen that Mankind has established various great associations for the carrying on of its purposes—purposes which result from its urge to seek expression for its desires, its questionings, its attempts and achievements—and there are, too, definite and sanctioned institutions. We have noted that there are also looser methods of grouping which do not arise from definite and specific pursuits and do not give rise to formal associations; these include social classes such as the " public school " and the " county " classes. Sometimes a social class is very closely related to a formal association, e.g., the officer military class is very closely related to the association of the Army. The military

class itself is a part of a large class which used, until recent times, to be fairly described in Great Britain as the "ruling class." The people who belong to these classes have characteristics sufficiently marked to enable us to adopt some such sort of classification, but classification is a dangerous process in Sociology unless its limitations are fully realised—it must always be remembered that the fact of association does not exhaust the purposes of an individual; a man is always a man and an individual. His being, for example, a Communist does not fully complete his life; Communism may be a man's most important interest in his life, but it is more than likely that Communism represents but a part of his interests—the political one—and even then the term may only vaguely describe his methods of thought and his political conclusions. He may intensely dislike some part of the communistic programme of which other communists approve. That is why the tendency to tie labels on people is very misleading, though very convenient to the lazy. It is much easier to describe a man as a Socialist or a Conservative or a Liberal or an Atheist or a Freethinker than to determine the exact extent to which his interests and thought and reasonings lead him in certain directions. That is one of the drawbacks of language; words can sometimes be very poor and inadequate representations of a small part of the truth, but they are so often accepted as representing the whole truth.

Interests is a term which has been taken to represent the springs of Man's activities, the cause of the setting in motion of the motive-power which leads him to form these various associations and other groupings in the pursuit of those interests. We have already considered Professor MacIver's classification of interests and found it to be a reasonably accurate treatment for our purposes. In *Society: Its Structure and Changes,* he divides interests into two broad classes: those which are pursued for their own sake, such as health, sex and reproduction, religion, science and philosophy, and those

which are pursued for the sake of other interests, such as economic and political interests. The former are called primary and the latter secondary interests. Intermediate interests partake of the nature of both of these, and are described by MacIver as utilitarian and cultural. The scheme is closely similar to that already considered in some detail (Ch. III, Sect. 2), but is more psychological in treatment. We do not intend for the time being to spend more time on schemes of classification except to note that Ginsberg, following up Hobhouse's thought, suggests a somewhat similar classification of the various "Root Interests" of men, as follows:

(1) The supply of bodily needs;

(2) Needs arising out of man's relation to the physical world and out of his mind making itself at home in the world, giving rise to the specific forms of avoidance of injury, investigation and construction; and

(3) Needs arising out of relations to other life and the needs of others, the specific forms of which are dependence, protection and the sex relation (*Studies in Sociology*, Ch. VII: "The Place of Instincts in Social Theory").

We have seen (Ch. III, Sect. 2) that Professor MacIver has drawn up a scheme of relationships which is useful as a general picture of the main interests at work in Society and of the associations which have been formed in pursuit of these interests. These associations are groups of people pursuing a common end; when the form of relationship existing between them has reached such a stage of importance that it is an established and recognised form of social relationship it is spoken of as an institution. Thus the simplest, most primitive and most fundamental group in Society is the family group. From the very beginning of Man's history, the family association must have been something more than a solution to the problem of satisfying the sex urge. The long period of helplessness of the young human being necessitated the close association of mother and child for a long period, and the presence of the adult

male as protector and provider was also a necessity for the very survival of the human race. Thus the Family as a particular form of relationship in Society has come to be regarded as an institution, and similarly the State and the Church are spoken of as human institutions. These three—the Family, the State and the Church—are the major institutions of Society; they are the fundamental forms of human relationship, and act and react upon one another in various ways, as we shall see later. They are not merely particular groups of people pursuing a common end—these would be spoken of as associations—but they are social relationships which are regulated by the Society as a whole; they are modes of relationship sanctioned by Society. The relationships between wife and husband, parents and children, have been and are subject to the overriding rules which have been imposed upon the members of a community by Society itself.

Society first of all regulated the relationships between its members by custom. The idea that it is only in a savage state that Man lives in a state of perfect freedom and that civilisation has imposed restraint is entirely incorrect. "In the lower stages of civilisation, especially," says Dr. Westermarck (*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* Vol. I, pp 119–120), "custom is a tyrant who binds man in iron fetters." Custom may prove itself stronger than the law, as it still does in South India to-day. The Ameer of Afghanistan lost his throne when he attempted to change the customs of his people by trying to "Westernise" the country. Even the law must conform with the customs of a community or it will fail to exact obedience.

Thus we arrive at a conception of the community as a collection of groups pursuing the common end of living in harmony in a country, with Society as the complex of relationships between the whole of the individuals in the community. The modes of relationship which have been established in Society are multifarious; they are all regulated by Society and are subject to

various sanctions which are in many cases the crystallised result of long experience of living together in the community. The fundamental relation of the sexes has developed into the institution of marriage, and this relationship is subject to sanctions of great force and strength, the rules which have been built up in connection with the family group having hardened into strict customs and legal enactments; the wider organisation regulating the lives of the members of a community has developed into the State, and the system of religious beliefs and practices which have always played such an important part in shaping the forms of relationships has become the Church of the group holding these beliefs and following these practices. Thus the Family, the State and the Church have developed into institutions. It is easy to conceive of the Family and the State as definite institutions, but the Church is a vaguer entity; there are several denominational groups in Western Society, the three main groups in England being the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England and the group of Free Churches. Nevertheless, the general features in respect of an attitude towards a Deity and worship of that Deity are common to all, and it is permissible to speak of the Church as an institution, though it is necessary to indicate which of the three main groups is meant when dealing with specific areas of community. The reader will note once more that in order to distinguish the institution from the association, the capital initial is used, e.g., the Family is the institution, while a family refers to a specific group or association.[1]

The looseness of terminology of which social writers have been guilty has resulted in some confusion of thought on the part of those not acquainted with the main teachings of Sociology, and the use of these terms

[1] The author must again state that this is his own personal usage. Such a practice is not universal in sociological writings. The reader must be on his guard against this variation of practice in sociological literature.

in common speech has further tended to confuse the issues involved. The term " institution," for example, is often used of a building, such as one used for scientific research, and of a system of administrative machinery used for furthering the ends of an association or group of associations, such as the banking system. One can, of course, refer to the banking system and to a bank itself as an institution, and this use of the word is often made, but it is suggested that it is time a definite terminology was arrived at; the term " institution " should be restricted to those forms of social relationship which affect all the members of a community. Again, the word " society " is often used of an association, e.g., a Friendly Society.

The major institutions are, as we have seen, the Family, the State and the Church, and thus it will be our task to examine these institutions, using the comparative method, i.e., the method which compares similar institutions in other stages of Western Society and among other races; by this means conclusions may be drawn regarding the places which these institutions hold in present-day Society, and it may be possible to formulate tendencies which may be at work in modern Society—tendencies which may result in the changing of various features of Society as we know it to-day, tendencies which may be responsible for a great deal of the unhappiness and conflict which often arise as a result of change and stress. In order to do this, it will first of all be necessary to make a preliminary survey of these major institutions and then to examine the moral ideas which form the basis on which such relationships have been built up, for Man has worked out his whole progress under the motivating force of his ideas. We can then proceed to a more thorough study of the major institutions of Society, and so arrive at conclusions which may be of value to the individual seeking to gain an idea of the social forces at work in the world in which he finds himself. The whole discussion will illustrate the use of the comparative method as it is applied in

social science and so be of use to the student who is coming to the subject without that preparation which Western education so far has not provided for the children of the Western world, but which is seen to be so sorely needed if Mankind is to build a world which will be free from the destructive wars, the stresses, the frustration, disappointments and bitterness which have ruled men's lives for so many years in the past.

SECTION 2.—A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIETY

No doubt the Family had its roots in the satisfaction of the sex instinct, but, as has been noted almost from the very beginning of Man's history, it must have been something more than that. The need for the protection of the young kept the family group together with the adult male as the head of the household, a *paterfamilias*—a form of social organisation at a very primitive stage. Then, with the need of protection and the greater command of food resources, several families banded together under the stimulus of that impulse in Man which is something more than a mere herd instinct, that instinct towards sociality whose origins appear to be lost in the mists of Man's emergence. The division of labour which developed shattered the economic self-sufficiency of the Family and rendered possible advance in the material arts and some initial climb towards a civilising organisation. But there was no simple process exhibiting these broad tendencies.

In the modern world, at least in democratic states like Great Britain, the Family is to a very great degree a personal relationship in the sense that it is a personal affair and needs little regulation by the State. But in the savage world it is often closely bound up with the social organisation in general. In the case of the Red Indians of North America, for example, ties of descent are traced through the female, with a close union of families forming a clan. The system of totemism cuts

across this clan division, with exogamy grafting a son or brother of one clan on to another as a husband or father. There is a joint family system by which a clan occupies a Long House. The student must go to works on comparative social institutions for information on the details of primitive family life (e.g., *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, —Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg). Here it is desired only to point out the close connection that exists in savage and primitive tribes between the Family and the social organisation, and it is of special interest to note the movement back to this conception of the strongly marked inter-relatedness of the Family and the State in the case of the new dictatorships in Europe.

The necessity for distinguishing between what was custom and what had the force of law was an essential step in the evolution of the State. The fact gradually emerged that it was necessary to create some highest authority which could lay down rules for the general conduct of a community.

The State takes its present characteristics from the fact that it possesses the unique power of coercion over the lives of men. It could not have been endowed with those characteristics without the growth of a national spirit to weld a group of people into a consciousness of being a group united in loyalty to the idea of a central authority. In England, the idea of the State began to emerge at the close of the period which was ended by the Wars of the Roses. The reign of Henry VIII saw the close of the Middle Ages with its feudal hierarchy, and the Tudor monarchs, especially Elizabeth, were instrumental in uniting the loyalties of the English people to one central idea—the Crown. From this time on, the State reacted on the national spirit, increasing its intensity, until to-day, in the minds of most people, the State and the Nation are practically synonymous terms.

But for our purpose it is necessary to distinguish very carefully between these two ideas. One can speak of " the Nation " as representing a group of people living

in a country and united by common ideas of allegiance to a central authority and with common traditions and ideals. But when we refer to "the State," the term represents nothing so concrete. The State is a means of regulating the conduct of a people, or group of persons or peoples. As Professor Laski (*Introduction to Politics*, 1931, p. 16) points out: "Every state, in short, is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, the government being a body of persons within the state who supply the legal imperatives upon which the state rests, and, differently from any other body of persons within the territorial society, they are entitled to use coercion to see that their imperatives are obeyed." Therefore, the State is created by men and for their purposes. The reader will readily realise the force of Professor MacIver's definition (*The Modern State*, 1926): "The State is an association which, acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated the universal external conditions of social order." A state is an organisation deliberately formed for the collective pursuit of a specific interest of the members of a community, viz. the maintenance of government and order. There is therefore no justification for speaking of "the State" as though it possessed some inherent virtue of its own by reason of its existence, a kind of manifestation of the Divine Will, unalterable, all-powerful, all-seeing, all-knowing, all-just. It is permissible to use the term "the State" as an abstract term, meaning no particular State, but merely a term for that system of government organised by communities in general, and in this sense it is used in this book, just as we have used the terms Society, the Family, and the Church.

Like the State, the Church is essentially an association, and has been formed for the specific purpose of relating men's conduct to the conception of the highest good. But even less than in the case of the State has this nature been clearly realised. This is because whilst

the conception of the State is a comparatively new thing in history and has evolved through the necessity of forming some kind of governmental organ, religion has always been a potent force in men's psychic lives. The problem of his existence has bothered Man ever since he began to think, and the fear and perplexity of primitive man caused him to translate his wondering thoughts, his dreams, his astonishment at the storm and tempest, the drought and sickness and birth and death, into a world of gods and spirits which haunted him and needed propitiation. He imagined spirits in sticks and stones, in the rivers and in the sky. The great mysteries of life—sex and reproduction, birth and death—needed gods to make them in any way comprehensible to him. His gods were intimate to his tribe or family. Sometimes there were votaries of rival gods within the community, as in the case of Baal and Jehovah. Sometimes there was identification of gods amongst different peoples, as in the case of Zeus and Jupiter.

The study of Comparative Religion is one of the most interesting parts of the studies of the anthropologist. The rich store of folklore and mythology to be found in such a work as Sir James Frazer's *Golden Bough* is of intense interest as enabling us to get somewhere near the mind of Man in its dealings with the spirit world.

Throughout the primitive world there was little that was love for good gods and much that was fear of bad ones. The ancient Egyptians had an elaborate code of propitiations for the multifarious deities which obsessed their lives. Even so late in the history of Western civilisation as the time of Greece and Rome, polytheistic religion resulted in a multitude of gods and demi-gods, many of whom possessed characteristics which differentiated them very little from their votaries; in fact, it is probable that the way of life of the array of Greek and Roman gods and heroes was to some extent the translation of the wishes of their

votaries—the life of the gods was free, irresponsible and gay, apparently just the kind of life which would appeal to their worshippers.

It was the Hebrew race which gave to Mankind the idea of a single universal Deity; it is probable that the more intelligent members of the Greek and Roman communities arrived at a similar conception independently; but in the case of the Hebrews, the whole people turned to monotheism and conceived a God with universal attributes. Their Jehovah was a God indeed. Nevertheless, He still possessed some of the characteristics of the bad old gods—He was jealous of His Godhood, and inclined to rather vindictive assaults upon those who disobeyed His will. It was only with the coming of Christianity to the Western world that love began to displace fear as the great motive force in Man's religious life, and that the ethical conceptions of men began to be related to a code of human conduct which would be regarded as valuable for its own sake. God did not disappear, but became less formidable. He was less of a powerful, ever-present and anthropomorphic Deity, quick to take offence against imagined slights on His dignity and on the look-out for misdeeds to punish, and more a Father whose creation was His constant solicitude. And He became, too, more mysterious and distant, yet subtly close and permeating. Men were His earthly children; they were a part of God rather than separated from Him by a mass of wickedness and sin which it was God's job to punish and remove.

Men have always clung to the idea of a personal, living God. They have put the responsibility of life on a God, because without a faith in their own race and a love for one another to sustain them, they cannot do without Him. Their lives would become meaningless without Him, and because death is so near, and because it is a terrible thing to feel that the end of one's personal life is the end of everything that has made one's life dear, men have sacrificed their mental free-

dom to a promise of life hereafter. They cling to an anthropomorphic conception of God, a being like themselves, feeling and willing and desiring as they do, all-powerful, and therefore able to carry them to their conception of everlasting bliss, because without this comforting assurance life becomes a terrible and apparently insoluble mystery; and, further, men are thrown upon their own resources—life becomes what they choose to make it, a heaven or hell. The way to heaven on earth is hard and difficult. It demands hard thinking, co-operation amongst peoples of different races and outlook, the sinking of personal and social prejudices for the sake of the common good, a rejection of selfish desires on the part of those in power. It is easier to believe than to do. Christ's teaching was concerned very little with believing but much with doing. It is no wonder that he came into conflict with those whose power and authority he threatened; it is no wonder that those who had so much to lose materially by an adoption of his teaching shrank from the jettisoning of their precious beliefs and habits and customs; that they were appalled by the idea that belief and an observance of rites and ceremonies alone would not guarantee them a place in Heaven; that their worth depended upon what they made of themselves by their own efforts; that their felicity was entirely their own to make or mar. Only when Christianity began to organise itself into the Church could the average man come back to the comforting and less difficult world of ceremonies and observances that satisfied his gregarious tendencies and gave him a tangible, visible religion he could cope with in the world of every-day. Within the fold of the Church he could worship and pray comfortingly and call upon a God who would avenge his injuries and fight for his cause.

The beginnings of an organised Church and priesthood are seen in the veneration by primitive peoples of medicine-men and sorcerers. The taboos and rites and ceremonies connected with the practice of an organised

religion very soon became the close preserve of a priestly class. The conflict between the priesthood and the King was one which was bound to develop and which has persisted throughout the history of civilisation; Church and State battled furiously for the control of men's loyalties. In England Henry VIII tried characteristically to settle the matter by pronouncing himself Head of the Church as he was Head of the State—he became Chief Priest as well as King, and this embarrassing complement to his functions is still part of the prerogative of the British monarch. In Nazi Germany, a State fiercely intolerant of all interference with its power tried to stamp out the Church as an effective force in the life of the German nation—indeed, to substitute gods of its own designing. In Russia, the reaction against ecclesiastical corruption was bitterly violent. In recent years in the Western world, State and Church bowed at length to practical issues and demarcated their territories on the basis of a distinction between the "sacred" and the "secular," and thus relieved men from taking part in a conflict to which, in fact, there is no solution, and which but for the unwisdom of the Church in demanding absolute power over the souls of men need not have arisen. For the interests of the Church are not those of the State, at least as far as the demarcation of function is concerned. It was a consequence of the refusal of both the Church and the State to recognise their true place in Society that the conflict arose. It is a great law of Society that only by devoting themselves to the specific purposes for which they were formed do associations find their true value and place in Society. The fundamental trouble was that neither State nor Church recognised that they were merely institutionalised associations, and therefore organs of Community, and not Community itself.

These three—the Family, the State and the Church—are the major institutions of Society, but it is important to recognise that the conditions of modern life have

seen the rise of associations which are becoming more and more powerful as the problems connected with industrial life become more urgent. With the decay of the importance of landed property as determining the fact and relation of classes, there is a corresponding rise in the significance of economic factors.

The present tendency of all classes of the community, from the lowest-paid class of industrial worker to the professions, to safeguard their economic interests by means of economic associations is tending to elevate the Trade Union to the virtual status of an institution in modern Western Society. We are too near the press of current events to do more than state the possibility of this tendency, but the rise of great industrial and professional associations appears to be assuming a significance in modern times equal to that of the Industrial Revolution itself.

Whether or not the socialisation of such services as Banking and Transport would justify the conception of the Banking system and the Transport system also as institutions is a point which need not concern us, since such problems are for the consideration of future generations and do not enter into a discussion of Western Society as it is at present constituted. It is upon the Family, the State and the Church that our attention must be concentrated, since these are the three major institutions functioning in present Society.

But first we must examine the basis on which rests the system of moral ideas of Society.

Chapter V

THE BASIS OF THE SYSTEM OF MORAL IDEAS

Section 1.—Law and Justice

We have noted that as social life developed beyond the Family, its widening complexity gave rise to the creation of associations which took over the essential functions of government and justice. One of these associations, the State, developed into an organisation which sought to take over the reins of direction of every activity which had to do with the regulation of collective action among the members of the community.

This universal control could have been achieved only where there was a strong national spirit already uniting men with the common idea of loyalty to a central authority. In Western Europe, long before the State made its appearance in the guise of national power, local units for government and for the administration of justice arose out of the necessities of the environment.

The process can be traced by reference to parallel cases of the savage peoples of to-day and by the information afforded by historical research. Whereas in the lowest form of societies there is generally no organised government at all, as the degree of civilisation advances so is there an increasingly effective attempt to realise some measure of government and administration of justice; thus, while the Veddahs have no organised government at all, when we come to the North American Indians we find a hierarchy of chiefs and a pronouncing of sentence for offences by the chiefs in council. Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg find (*The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (1930), Ch. II) that both in extent and in internal quality the development of social order is roughly correlated with advance in economic culture.

When we come to the beginning of recorded history, we find already a wealth of customs and institutions which derive their strength from the readiness of the members of the community to abide by the regulations laid down by the community in general—we have noted that Society is a system of regulated social relationships. The sanctions at work in Society derived their efficiency from custom and law.

Laws are defined by MacIver (*The Elements of Social Science*, p. 60) as " general regulations enacted and enforced by some constituted authority." A law involves the existence of such force as will make the laws obeyed; for example, police courts, and the judges and judicial machinery.

For historical purposes the word " law " has to be defined as any social rule the breaking of which is usually followed by punishment. The first laws were no more than customs; in primitive society, as we have already seen, the influence of custom is enormous, and it is considerable with us to-day.

Before social constraint had taught men to develop self-control, their passions were liable to lead them into crimes against their neighbours. A man took the law into his own hands and did what he could to an individual offender—justice was a private matter. But when the Family grew into the Clan, a more systematic method of dealing with offenders developed. An injury to any member of a clan was an injury to the whole group. Every member became interested in retaliating and securing vengeance. Thus arose what is known as the Blood Feud, and if vengeance was sought by the group for a wrong done to its members, custom decreed that certain wrongs demanded a certain redress. There is some attempt to fit the punishment to the crime. The principle of " an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth " was embodied in custom long before laws and covenants were drawn up. Thus, in the Code of Hammurabi, which is the oldest of laws yet discovered, we find: " If a man has caused the loss of an eye, his eye

shall one cause to be lost. If a person's limb is lost, one shall destroy his limb."

At a fairly early stage in the Blood Feud an important step is taken to avoid its worst consequences. This is the introduction of a system of compensation for wrongs instead of retaliation. When the practice of compensation becomes customary it is the beginning of civilisation amongst a former barbarous tribe.

As the system of compensation develops a regular tariff is introduced stating the exact amount necessary to recompense the injured person by the wrongdoer, though murder and incest were considered too serious to be wiped out otherwise than by blood.[1] Distinctions were made according to sex, age and rank. A man was considered to be worth more than a woman, an adult worth more than a child, and a free man more than a slave (cf. Hobhouse: *Morals in Evolution,* I, p. 87).

In modern law the distinction between a civil and a criminal offence is the distinction between an act which injures the community and an act which injures an individual: the latter brings an action against the wrongdoer and he is compensated by the wrongdoer. But an injury to the community is a criminal offence; the State prosecutes the offender and executes punishment. It is interesting to note that amongst savages, there is a recognition of the distinction between offences against the individual and those against the community —civil offences are avenged by individuals, whilst the community punishes those who transgress a custom such as that concerned with marriage. Thus, a breach of the rules of exogamy is regarded as an act which endangers the welfare of the whole community, which claims the right to protect itself against anti-social acts.

The community thus begins to concern itself with the redress of individual grievances because, when left

[1] Cf. Robertson Smith: "Murder and incest or offences of like kind against the sacred law of blood are in primitive society the only crimes of which the community as such takes cognisance . . ." (*Religion of the Semites*). And see Freud: *Totem and Taboo,* Ch. IV.

to the individual, individual redress results in social chaos. Law and justice, then, may be said to have originated in common effort to control the actions of individuals for social ends.

SECTION 2.—PUNISHMENT AND ITS ORIGIN

It has been seen that law differs from custom in that it is a definite rule of conduct; law is a written rule laid down by a society, and this is its essential characteristic. When customs are codified they become laws.

What gives to custom and law their regulating force? Why are they rules of conduct? The answer is that they are sanctioned ultimately in emotion—the emotion of public assent, approval or indignation felt by the society in general whenever a custom or law is transgressed.

The most emphatic expression of this disapproval is punishment. Punishment is distinct from private revenge; it is inflicted in the name of a society. This is true whatever may be the opinion held about the final object of punishment. There are different opinions as to the ultimate object of punishment: some writers maintain that its object is retribution; others believe that its object is to deter people from committing crime; while others, again, think that the true object of punishment is the reformation of the criminal. But whatever the object of punishment is supposed to be, its immediate aim is always to cause suffering.

It is a mistake to think that punishment as a social act is an institution of comparatively modern origin which has sprung from and has gradually superseded the earlier custom of private revenge. Among the lower races there are many instances of the infliction of punishment by the society or in the name of a society even where the offence is one against an individual. For instance, homicide is not always regarded solely as a matter for private revenge. In general, it may be said that the offences which are harmful to a society as a whole are

those which are most commonly subject to punishment among the lower races.

Savage punishment differs in kind. Sometimes it consists simply in publicly shaming the offender, as, for example, among the primitive peoples of Greenland. In other instances expulsion from the tribe or outlawry is the punishment inflicted. There are also instances in which Society inflicts suffering of a more material kind upon the culprit; in certain Australian tribes the offender is compelled to stand with a shield at a fair distance whilst the members of the tribe hurl their spears at him.

More generally, punishment is imposed upon the culprit, not by the whole of the community, but by some person or persons invested with judicial authority; justice is frequently administered by a Council of Elders or by a chief. Even among the Australian tribes there are cases of offences which are dealt with by the elders and the Headmen—murder by evil magic, breaches of the exogamous law or of marriage customs, the betrayal of secrets of the initiation ceremonies (cf. Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg: *The Material and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*).

Although punishment and judicial organisation have therefore succeeded the previous system of revenge, the degree of judicial organisation does not correspond exactly with the general state of culture of any people. Even among low savages, as we have noted, there are instances of punishments which are inflicted by the community as a whole or by a judicial authority, whilst the system of private revenge sometimes occurs where there is a comparatively high degree of civilisation. The system of blood revenge prevailed in Europe in the Middle Ages and it still prevails in Montenegro and among the Southern Slavs. In a savage community an injury to one is felt by the whole because of the smallness of the group. Moreover, in a small society public resentment is more easily aroused.

The theory that punishment is an expression of the

emotional public resentment felt by the Society as a whole is opposed to that which suggests that punishment has sprung from an idea of social utility; this latter theory states that the chief object of punishment has been and still is to prevent crime by deterring people from committing crime. There are certain facts which help to support this view. Among various semi-civilised and civilised peoples the criminal law has assumed a severity which apparently passes the degree of public resentment which the acts are apt to arouse—a severity which must have originated in the desire of the legislators to deter people from committing crime. It was found among the Incas in Peru and in Japan before the revolution of 1871, where death was a common penalty. Increasing severity has been the characteristic of European legislation up to quite recent times. Up to the end of the thirteenth century the number of capital offences was small, but they grew rapidly and from 1660 to 1820 no fewer than 187 capital offences, very different in character and degree, were added to the legal Code, and when in 1837 the death penalty was removed from some two hundred crimes, it was left in the same number of offences as were capital at the end of the thirteenth century (Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, 1924, Vol. I, p. 187).

Not only was human life recklessly sacrificed, but the mode of execution was very cruel; every kind of torture was adopted. In modern times up to the end of the eighteenth century the idea that punishment should inspire fear was ever present in the minds of legislators. In England, in the Middle Ages, a gallows, or a tree with a man hanging upon it was a common sight; it is introduced as an ornament in many mediæval manuscripts (quoted by Westermarck, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–2).

These facts appear to contradict the proposition that punishment is and has always been an expression of public indignation. But in England, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the punishment of death was actually inflicted in only a small number of cases in

which the sentence was passed. Indeed, not more than one in twenty was carried into operation. This discrepancy between law and practice shows how the minds of the legislators were influenced by the desire to enforce the principle of deterrence, but shows also the unwillingness to proceed to extreme measures.

Another circumstance is that in early times the detection of criminals was much more uncertain than at the present time. When only one criminal out of twenty is caught, the indignation of the community is specially turned against him.

It has been seen that the punishment practised among the lower races is not conspicuous by its severity, although this cannot be said of peoples living under a despotic rule: where the ruler is despotic the punishment seems to increase in severity. Among the ancient Peruvians death was a common punishment. The criminal law in Rome was for a long time characterised by great moderation but gradually became more severe as absolutism became more supreme. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy provide examples to-day.

The influence of religion on the severity of punishment is to be noted. The ancient Hebrews held that men should avenge offences against God; hence crime was regarded as a breach of God's law and scarcely any punishment was too severe to be inflicted upon the ungodly. These ideas were adopted by the Christian Church and by Christian governments. The principle was laid down by Canute that it belongs rightly to a Christian King to avenge the anger of God against those who oppose His will, and this principle was followed until recent times.

It was therefore one of the most important steps towards a more humane legislation when in the eighteenth century the principle that men should avenge offences against God was superseded by the contrary doctrine laid down by Montesquieu that the Deity should be honoured rather than avenged. From the fact that wrongs are punished, not as wrongs against

individuals, but as wrongs against the State, it follows that excess of punishment may to a large extent represent manifestations of resentment.

Section 3.—The Moral Emotions

We have seen that punishment is a means by which Society controls the conduct of its members and is an expression of public indignation felt by a society. But punishment is not the only means by which a society regulates the conduct of its members. The emotion of public resentment expresses itself also in other ways. The relationships between the members of a society are regulated not only by punishment but also by other, less severe methods, such as those arising from public opinion—the obloquy and hostility of those around us, and all those innumerable acts by which people may have an influence upon other people's conduct and may compel them to conform to a certain standard. In order to understand the rules which are laid down by public opinion and also to understand the nature of the acts which Society punishes, it is necessary for us to examine briefly the nature and origin of the emotion of public resentment which is at the basis of both punishment and public opinion as regulating forces. Emotion is a certain state of mind which has a strong feeling element; but the mental state contains at the same time other elements, including a sensation or idea. This sensation or idea is the cause of the feeling of either pleasure or pain which is always a very strongly marked characteristic of an emotion, and this feeling of pleasure or pain gives rise to a conative element, or desire, which may be strong or weak. In an emotion like sorrow we do not find the conative element very marked, but even here there is an element of a conative nature, a desire to get rid of the state of suffering.

In his *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* Dr. Westermarck has analysed the nature of the moral

emotions, and his account has been followed in the following discussion.

The moral emotions are of two kinds—moral disapproval and moral approval. These emotions are each related to certain other non-moral emotions.

Moral disapproval resembles in many respects the emotion of anger and revenge, whilst moral approval resembles in many respects the emotion of gratitude. Moral disapproval, anger and revenge may be included under the common term of resentment, so that the classification would be:

Resentment

Anger | Revenge | Moral Disapproval

Resentment may be regarded as a reaction against the cause of pain.

No fine distinctions can be drawn between these three types of resentment—anger, revenge and moral disapproval. Anger is found very low in the animal kingdom. It is strikingly shown by the stickleback when his nest is threatened by other sticklebacks. As we proceed lower down the scale of animal life, we find at last that the conative element—the conscious impulse or desire—dwindles away until nothing is left but reflex action; that is, no emotional impulse is felt. Resentment, like the protective reflex action out of which it has gradually developed, has for its supreme object the removal of the cause of pain. An animal may protect itself by the feeling of fear and by the consequent action of running away, or it may protect itself by an aggressive attitude caused by anger. Both fear and anger may be regarded as elements in the animal's mental constitution which have been acquired by means of natural selection and the struggle for existence. Like anger and revenge, moral disapproval is also an attitude of mind directed towards the cause of the pain. When

we feel moral indignation at a certain act, the stimulus is the mental pain it causes us, and our indignation is a reaction against the offender or the cause of the pain, upon whom a desire to inflict suffering is felt.

While resentment is an attitude of mind towards a cause which inflicts pain, gratitude is a feeling of pleasure, and this we find among gregarious animals which take pleasure in each other's company; a kindly feeling is felt towards the cause of the pleasure. But social feeling presupposes reciprocity; it is not only a friendly sentiment, but it is a friendly sentiment towards an individual who is conceived of as a friend. At higher states of development the retributive friendly feeling contains not only an element of vague kindliness but a desire to give pleasure for pleasure received, and this is what characterises gratitude. Gratitude is only the highest form of that non-moral retributive emotion which is found among those animals which have social sentiments.

There is, therefore, in moral approval and gratitude the desire to reward the conduct of the persons approved, just as in resentment there is the desire to punish the persons of whom we disapprove.

These emotions can be regarded as belonging to one and the same large group known as retributive emotions, which are classified by Westermarck as follows:



In many essential points this way of regarding the moral emotions resembles Adam Smith's account of the moral sentiments in his work *The Theory of Moral*

Sentiments, which is a very important contribution to the psychology of the moral consciousness.

We may trace all sentiments which are useful to the species to the principle of natural selection. Just as resentment is a means of protection, being an attitude tending to remove a cause of pain, so retributive kindliness is a friendly endeavour to retain a cause of pleasure. Both these emotions are useful feelings, for by resentment evil is averted, and by retributive kindliness benefits are secured. But moral disapproval is not the same as anger and revenge, nor is moral approval the same as gratitude. What, then, characterises approval and disapproval as moral emotions?

Moral emotion is most definitely expressed in the moral judgment. The moral judgment will therefore naturally help us to discover the true nature of the moral emotions. Moral emotion always involves the notion of disinterestedness. When we pronounce an act to be good or bad we mean that it is so independently of any reference it may have to our own personal interests. Undoubtedly, a moral judgment may spring from a selfish motive, but it nevertheless pretends to be disinterested, and this indicates that disinterestedness is a characteristic of a moral concept as such. If moral judgments contain the notion of disinterestedness, we must conclude that the emotions from which these judgments sprang are also disinterested. An echo of this disinterestedness is seen in the utilitarian demand for the happiness of others; it is found in Kant's ethical theory. We also find an echo of the same psychological fact in the saying, " Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also unto them." Similar statements may be found among the writings of Confucius and the Indian philosophers.

Moral rules are, then, generally rules which it is hoped will be obeyed irrespective of any selfish considerations; the moral emotions are characterised by disinterestedness, which is a quality not characteristic of anger and revenge, nor of gratitude, for here there

are egoistic motives. This disinterestedness is indeed a form of a more comprehensive requisite which characterises moral motives, i.e. impartiality or assumed impartiality. If we pronounce an act done to a friend to be good or bad as the case may be, then we assume it to be good or bad independently of the fact that the person concerned is our friend. This shows that revenge and anger are moral emotions in so far as they are uninfluenced by the particular relationship in which the person who feels them stands to the cause. As soon as we admit that it is friendship which makes us feel resentment or kindliness towards another person, then we must admit we are not dealing with a moral emotion, since it is not characterised by that impartiality which is necessarily characteristic of moral emotions.

Thus, the moral emotions are:

(1) *Disinterested,* and

(2) At least apparently *impartial;* and both these characteristics distinguish them from all other kinds of retributive emotions.

There is yet a third factor which characterises a moral emotion as such. It is:

(3) A certain touch of *generality*. When a person pronounces an act to be good or bad he really gives expression to something more than a mere personal opinion. We are not quite willing to admit that our moral feelings are a matter merely of our own individual taste, whatever the taste may be. We assume that what is approved of or disapproved of by us is also approved of or disapproved of by others.

Section 4.—Punishment and the Moral Emotions

We are now in a position to follow Dr. Westermarck's application of his theory of the moral emotions to the problem of punishment (*op. cit.,* Ch. III). By calling punishment by some such name as reparation, people have given recognition to the fact that punishment is an expression of public moral indig-

nation. But the infliction of pain even on an offender is not an act which our moral consciousness regards with indifference, and retributive punishment has been condemned; punishment is now looked upon generally not as an end in itself but as a means to attaining an end.

In modern times the three theories of retribution, deterrence and reformation have had and have still their numerous adherents. During the nineteenth century the principle of deterrence was largely superseded by the principle of reformation, according to which the aim of punishment is to make a criminal a better man.

The advocates of the various theories defending punishment as a means to an end are unanimous in condemning retributive punishment as wrong. Westermarck believes that punishment can hardly be guided exclusively by utilitarian considerations; it always requires the sanction of emotional public resentment. Public conscience does not allow the criminal to be subjected to pain to no purpose. On the other hand, punishment in the ordinary sense of the word always involves an express intention to inflict pain on the criminal, even if his reformation is intended; the infliction of suffering in consequence of an offence is considered to be justified as a means of increasing public safety.

The reformer aims at removing the criminal disposition. Public resentment aims at removing the cause of pain inflicted on the community by bringing about repentance in the offender; and if the offender repents, resentment disappears. In fact, repentance is the only proper ground for forgiveness. Adam Smith truly observed that the object of resentment is not so much to make an enemy feel pain as to make him feel uneasy because of his past conduct. The origin of the idea of the reformation of criminals thus lies in resentment; the reformation of criminals has a retributive origin, and the correction which it has in view is to be effected by

the infliction of some pain, though not the degree or kind of pain inflicted by the offender. Resentment gives way to forgiveness only in the case of repentance, and not in the case of incorrigibility.

Thus the methods of deterrence and reformation are based on the same emotion which first induced men to inflict suffering on their fellow-creatures—the emotion of resentment. Resentment is preventive in its nature and operates by the infliction of punishment as a means rather than as an end.

But first of all public resentment wants to raise a protest against the transgression of a rule of conduct laid down by Society. It does so by the infliction of punishment upon the offender. It is the utility of this protest that justifies Society in expressing the emotion which it feels: such is the idea that lies at the basis of utilitarian theory, which protests against punishment with no object.

But the utilitarian theories ignore the fact that a punishment must not transcend the limits set down by public indignation; punishment must not be inflicted upon innocent persons. The principle of deterrence might permit us to inflict punishment on someone other than the criminal if it would prevent others from committing the crime. Again, these theories exaggerate the extent to which punishment acts in a reformatory way upon criminals; it is not proved that the punishment of an offender has the deterrent or reforming effect which these theories assume.

Punishment, however, serves a useful object apart from the deterring and reforming influences upon criminals; it has to some extent an educational and not merely a deterrent influence on Society, just as the punishment inflicted by parents on children has an educative effect.

But it must be remembered that the infliction of punishment on the perpetrator of a grave offence gratifies a very strong desire. If the criminal were left unpunished, Society would be ungratified and might find

some less discriminating mode of retaliation; public indignation might well result in lynching.

To sum up these arguments, it may be said that punishment is essentially an expression of the public indignation felt by the society which inflicts it. Certain modes of conduct are liable to be punished in so far as they have a tendency to arouse the general indignation of the public, and the punishment is, broadly speaking, proportional to the intensity of the emotion they evoke. But in the opinion of many people Society is justified in expressing its indignation by punishing the person who aroused the emotion of indignation only if the punishment serves as a useful end. It must be regulated by considerations of social utility only within the limits laid down by public indignation; that is, within the limits of what is recognised as legitimate by the moral feeling of the society. The utilitarian aim of punishment must always be regulated by considerations of what our feelings know to be just.[1]

[1] It is interesting in this connection to consider the provisions of the Criminal Justice Bill, which proposed certain reforms in the British Penal Code. The provisions of the Bill, which were first published in November 1938, contained the following proposals:

(1) *Probation.* The probation system is extended to offenders of all ages. The Bill requires the appointment of a woman probation officer for every Petty Sessional Divison.

(2) *Young People.* Courts of summary jurisdiction may no longer sentence young people to imprisonment. Restrictions on the use of sentence of imprisonment on young people are to be applied, and new methods of treatment provided.

Formerly, young offenders certified by the Court to be "of so unruly or depraved a character that they cannot be detained in a remand home" were liable to be sent to prison. The Bill provides for the setting up of new institutions known as "remand centres," serving not only the purpose of custody but enabling observation to be carried out by doctors and others to assist the Court in deciding how to deal with offenders. The remand centres will be available to persons between the ages of seventeen and twenty-three and persons between fourteen and seventeen certified as above. The Home Secretary is authorised to provide special remand homes for the "problem" children under seventeen.

Short terms of imprisonment for minor offences are to be avoided by requiring young offenders to attend at a compulsory attendance centre at times when they would otherwise be at leisure during a half-holiday or in the evenings after work; and continuous detention in police cells for periods up to four days is abolished; minor

offenders may now be detained in a police station for one night on not more than three occasions, with intervals between the nights.

(3) *Corporal Punishment*. Corporal punishment is abolished; this is the end of the degrading and detested "cat" for serious offences.

(4) *Penal Servitude*. The legal distinction between imprisonment and penal servitude is abolished. The term "hard labour" originally applied to such forms of labour as the crank and the tread-wheel, and has ceased to be applicable to modern conditions. All prisoners are now employed according to their capacity and the kind of work available; the Bill therefore abolishes the distinction between "convict" prisons and others—the convict prisons are abolished.

The abolition of penal servitude involves the abolition of the "ticket-of-leave" system. A method is provided of enabling track to be kept for a time after their discharge from prison of offenders who have been repeatedly convicted of serious crime, and if an offender avoids this, he will be liable to report to the police.

(5) *New Sentences*. Courts of Assize and Quarter Sessions are enabled to pass, in lieu of, and not in addition to, sentences of imprisonment or penal servitude, new types of sentences:

A. Sentences of "corrective training" of from two to four years on persons between twenty-one and thirty, where such a sentence is expedient for the training of the offender.

B. Sentence of "preventive detention" of from two to four years on persons over thirty, where a criminal's antecedents and mode of life render this expedient. Such sentences on certain types of offenders with records of repeated crime shall not exceed ten years.

Persons undergoing either class of punishment may be released on licence before the expiration of their sentences.

(6) *Mental Cases*. Offenders suffering from some form of mental illness or abnormality susceptible to treatment will be required to submit themselves to treatment. Courts of summary jurisdiction, formerly with no such power, are enabled to make an order for the treatment of an offender certifiable as insane as they did for the treatment of an offender who was mentally defective. Improved facilities are given to courts of summary jurisdiction to obtain a medical report on the mental condition of an offender. Formerly such a report could be obtained only if the offender were remanded to prison. The Bill enables the Court to remand an offender on bail for a medical examination to be made.

For the term "criminal lunatic" the term "State mental patient is substituted; and the State institutions at Broadmoor, Perth Prison and Lanarkshire are to be called "State mental hospitals." The responsibility for the control and management of Broadmoor is transferred to the Board of Control, which is responsible for the control and management of the State institutions in England and Wales.

(7) *Forfeited Rights*. The sections of the Forfeiture Act, 1870, which imposed certain disabilities upon persons sentenced to penal servitude (a sentence which, as has been explained, is abolished) are repealed. This Act also provided that a pension payable from public funds to a person convicted of felony and sentenced to more than twelve months' imprisonment should be forfeited. The new Bill gives the authority by whom the pension was granted a discretion to restore it, either in part or in whole.

Certain sections of the new Bill do not apply to Scotland.

It will be noted that though some of the worst features of a retributive system would be destroyed by the application of this measure, yet the problem, would remain of what was to happen to offenders discharged from prison. Such people usually find it very difficult to find work, and it seems to be asking too much of any general public to treat them like ordinary individuals. It seems to be a problem which must remain as long as crime remains, or until the economic and social system is such that no incentive to crime remains to anyone who is not mentally defective. No doubt the problem of punishment and the reform of the legal code will receive further consideration after the present war; certainly the whole fabric of the system of moral ideas prevalent in our civilisation is no longer accepted unquestioningly as being of divine origin, but is becoming increasingly the subject of scientific and philosophical research.

PART TWO

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter VI

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

SECTION 1.—THE FAMILY AS A SYSTEM OF REGULATED SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

The association of the mother and her offspring is the simplest and most fundamental form of Society; it is one which is universally prevalent among all mammalian species, for whose existence it is a necessary relationship in view of the helplessness of the young.

That the human race originally lived in a state of promiscuity and that there was no strong family group among our remote ancestors are propositions whose validity is extremely doubtful. There is no evidence to the effect that a single savage people to-day lives in an entirely promiscuous condition.

The family group consisting of parents and offspring, whether founded on monogamy or polygamy, is universal among savage peoples of whom any adequate knowledge is possessed. Of course, the mere prevalence of a custom among savage peoples does not entitle us to infer that the same custom always existed among the human race; the fact that existing peoples live in families does not entitle us to infer that their ancestors also lived in families.

In order to derive information from ethnographical facts regarding the relationships of Mankind, it is necessary to find out the causes of certain social phenomena; " then, from the prevalence of the causes, we may infer the prevalence of the phenomena themselves, if the

Fig. 7.—Classification of the Rules relating to Marriage



former must be assumed to have operated without being checked by other causes" (Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, 1891, p. 4). If we wish to form any hypothesis of the prevalence or non-prevalence of the Family among our ancestors, we must discover the causes or cause from which the Family has sprung.

We observe that the Family is found not only in Mankind but also among many of the lower animals, though not among invertebrates. Among the invertebrates, most fishes, amphibians and reptiles show no evidence of parental care—the jealous protection of the nest by the male stickleback is an exceptional case. In a few cases among the reptiles both parents join to take care of the offspring. This is the first beginning of the Family in the animal kingdom—it occurs among tortoises. Among birds parental affection has reached a high stage—male and female help to build the nest; usually, the male brings the food whilst the female broods. When the young are hatched, both parents help to defend them. The parents teach the young birds to fly, and only when the young are able to care for themselves are the parents relieved of their duties. In some cases birds pair for life. Among mammals the young are greatly dependent upon the mother. The relation between the sexes is, in most cases, restricted to the pairing season; but sometimes this relation is of a more durable character. The chimpanzee and gorilla live in families, several of which may associate to form a band under the leadership of a mature male. Among the smaller gregarious monkeys, the family association is said to be the nucleus of the society; the herds of the baboon consist of numerous families banded together. Recently, Professor Westermarck points out, Volz and Munnecke have proved the existence of family associations in the case of the orang-outang.

Among Mankind, the origin of the Family is probably due to the same causes as among the lower animals. The union of male and female which endures until after the birth of the offspring, and the care which the

father takes of his family, are habits which help to protect the young against destruction. It is evident that when the father helps to protect the offspring the species is given a survival advantage which it would not possess if the mother only did the protecting. Both paternal and maternal affection, besides the tendency towards a durable mating alliance, are useful mental dispositions which have been acquired through a process of natural selection (Westermarck, *op. cit.,* pp. 20–21).

It must be remembered that parental care is only one of many means by which a race is able to continue, and where parental care is not found to exist there are other factors which help the species to survive. Among the vast majority of fish, for example, both parents are indifferent to the fate of their progeny, their eggs being left to hatch without any care on their part. Hence a large proportion succumb before they reach maturity, and the number of eggs is enormous; in the case of the stickleback the eggs are relatively few in number.

In the case of the anthropoid apes the paternal spirit and the tendency towards a mating alliance are probably strengthened by the small number of offspring and the longer period of infancy. We may suspect that among primitive men the same causes have produced the same result as among the apes, and that in Mankind also the number of offspring has always been comparatively very small and the period of infancy very long, so that the need of protection has always been very great. We may therefore assume that the family group existed among our early human ancestors.

An objection will perhaps be raised against this deduction. Although it is true that the facts which among other animal species and more particularly among the higher apes have led to the Family—namely, the small number of the offspring and the long period of infancy—have been present in human life from the very beginning, yet it is possible that they did not lead to the same results. There might have been other circumstances which counteracted their influence. For

instance, it may be argued that the children would have been equally well or even better provided for if not the father only but also all the males of the tribe had been their guardians; in this case there would have been no need for the Family. The supporters of this theory believe that the tribe is the primary social unit of the human race and that the Family is a unit which has developed in later times. But the theory that children were the common property of the tribe has no foundation in present facts. Everywhere it is found that the members of the family group are more closely connected with one another than with the rest of the tribe; moreover, the Family, consisting of parents and children, is a universal institution among existing peoples, and it seems probable that among the earliest human ancestors the Family formed the nucleus of Society (Westermarck, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–42).

Savages who know neither cattle-rearing nor agriculture, but subsist simply upon fish, roots and herbs, live for the most part in isolation in single families to this day, as do the Rock Veddahs of Ceylon. The Yahgans of Tierra del Fuego are slightly less isolated, and live in small groups of three or four families, without any regular clan organisation. In the case of the Veddahs, we are told that in the wet season " small groups of families will resort to some hillock which is the centre of two or three hunting-grounds, and sometimes two or three families will reside together for a time in one cave " (Hobhouse: *Morals in Evolution*, 1906, I, p. 43). But this clan or " warg " has but slight organisation, and there is scarcely any organised common life outside the family, which is in effect an isolated group.

We may believe, therefore, that the Family is founded on instincts so deep-rooted that they gave rise to habits which continued to exist as rules of custom or institutions after Man had become a thoroughly gregarious being.

The extension of the small family unit into a large social group may have taken place in two ways. In the

first place, new elements such as other family groups or single individuals may have united with the small family group from without; this is adhesion. In the second place, the children, instead of separating from the parents, may have remained with them and increased the group by forming new families themselves; this is cohesion (Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* Vol. II, p. 196).

It is probable that the latter was the normal mode of extension. When gregariousness, owing to increased food supply, became possible and advantageous to Man, he would feel inclined to remain with those with whom he was living even after the family had fulfilled its original object—the preservation of the offspring—and he would be impelled to do so by a tendency which would gradually develop, i.e., the gregarious " instinct." By this terms is meant " an animal's proneness to live together with other members of its own species, apart from parental, conjugal, and filial attachment " (*op. cit.*, p. 197). The members of the herd are at ease in each other's company. They suffer when separated, they rejoice when re-united, and by actual living together this feeling is individualised; that is, individuals feel great pleasure in the presence of certain other particular individuals. The pleasure with which one individual looks upon another is increased by the community of interest, for not only have they enjoyments in common but they have the same enemies to resist and the same difficulties to overcome. Hence, acts which are beneficial to the individual are at the same time beneficial to its companions, and the distinction between them as individuals loses much of its importance (*ibid.*).

But the members of the group do not merely desire to live together; they do not merely take pleasure in each other's company. The gregarious instinct—using this term to denote an innate tendency—develops in Man into a truly social instinct which implies something more than mere desire to live in company with others;

it is characterised also by a tendency towards some kind of co-operation.

The social instinct is certainly universal among the existing races of Man, though it cannot be assumed that this has been the case from the beginning. But, as we have seen, the isolation of the families is not complete, even among the lowest savages. Persons of the same stock inhabit the same district, hold friendly relations with one another, and unite for purposes of defence. When the younger branches of the family are obliged to disperse in search of food, some of them remain in the neighbourhood of the parent family and never lose the idea of belonging to one and the same social group (Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 199). However weak the ties among these hunting races, there is even among them some kind of co-operation within the larger circle of people, and there arises a larger social unit than the Family. The Tribe and the Clan appear in Man's history.

Kinship was the first bond of social union. Among even the peoples in the lowest stage of Society, the idea of father, mother and children as a cohesive group is strongly developed. From the family group developed the group known as the Clan, and the Clan is found in primitive society to-day. It may be a kind of enlarged family made up of the man and wife, their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren living under the control of the common progenitor; this is known as the patriarchal clan. Here the child inherits his name and status from his father—the *patrilineal* system—and the government is under the control of the male. Under the *matrilineal* system children are named by their mother's clan-name and not their father's; and succession and inheritance also go through the mother. It appears that the system of tracing descent through the mother may have arisen from the doubt which might always be entertained as to the paternity of a child, whereas there was no doubt as to its mother. Moreover, primitive peoples probably had no knowledge of the

equal part played by the male and female in the function of reproduction. In some societies it was thought that the child was conceived without any co-operation on the part of the father, and that it was the influence of a spirit that created it.

It is uncertain whether the patrilineal or the matrilineal system of descent is the more common, and it is uncertain which of the two is the more primitive. By many writers it is believed that the patrilineal system of descent has developed out of the matrilineal system, but there is not sufficient evidence to justify this conclusion. There are a large number of savage peoples who exhibit no trace of the matrilineal system, and among them are many in the lowest stages of development; there is no evidence that these have passed through a matrilineal stage.

Professor Tylor has shown that many peoples among whom the husband lives with the wife's family and does not take his wife to his own community have the matrilineal system, whereas the full matrilineal system never appears among peoples whose exclusive custom it is for the husband to take his wife to his own house. Where the husband takes his wife to his own community the children may be considered in many cases to belong to the mother's clan, but in such cases the clan tie is weak and often the common name is the only link. Another remarkable fact is that where among the same people the two customs occur simultaneously—i.e. where the husband sometimes takes his wife to his own home and sometimes goes to live with his wife's family—the children are considered as members of the father's clan. There is therefore some close connection between the matrilineal system of descent and the custom of the husband's going to live with his wife's family. In other words, the system of descent is in some way connected with the local relationship, with the fact of living together in the same community.[1]

[1] Cf. Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, Ch. V

Section 2.—The Study of Marriage as a Social Institution

We have noted that in all probability there has been no stage in the social history of Mankind where marriage has not existed, and that human marriage as it is to-day has its roots in the remote past of our race. Westermarck defines marriage in his *History of Human Marriage* (1894) as being a "more or less durable connection between male and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring." As Westermarck himself recognises, however, in his *Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation,* as a social institution marriage has a different meaning. It is a union regulated by custom or law. It may last for a longer or shorter time, and has no definite reference to the birth of offspring.

The functions of the male in marriage are not restricted to sexual and procreative activity. An abundance of facts relating to peoples in all parts of the world and in all stages of civilisation shows that his duties include those of supporting and protecting the wife and children. That is why it is necessary to consider marriage and the Family together, instead of studying them separately. We may consider a family as an association and marriage as the institution established for the regulation of the relationship between the partners of the various families in a society. In this case the abstract term, the Family, may be used as an abstract generalisation of the individuals living in families, together with the system of regulated social relationships that exist between them.

We have already noted that the assumption that the human race originally lived in a state of promiscuity lacks all foundation in fact; equally lacking in foundation is the assumption that the earliest form of marriage was group-marriage, i.e. a form of union between a certain group of men and a certain group of women. Group-marriage has nowhere been proved to occur

except in connection with polyandry (the union of one woman with several men), though there are peoples with a kind of sex communion in which several men have the right of intercourse with several women. But here none of the women is properly married to more than one of the men, marriage implying living together, with economic interests in common, and the men having paternal rights over the children borne by her. Dr. Westermarck doubts whether unlimited sexual freedom between intermarrying groups has ever been proved to exist even among a single people.

The world-wide prevalence of the Family has been affirmed by Professor Malinowski and other sociologists; it is plain that we are dealing with a form of association whose roots go back to the pre-human stage. It preceded the Clan and outlived the Clan, though Dr. Müller-Lyer in his book, *The Family* (1912—English translation 1931), asserts that the Clan came before the Family, that Mankind was originally gregarious and social in nature, and that prehistoric man lived in hordes or herds.

It is not intended to enter in this work into the controversies centring round the problem of the origin of marriage. We shall proceed from the accepted fact of marriage to examine the rules relating to this institution which have been laid down by Society.

The sanctions relating to marriage which have been laid down by Society have reference to:

(1) the selection of partners;
(2) the modes of contracting marriage;
(3) the form of marriage;
(4) the duration of marriage;
(5) the relations between the partners;
(6) the relations between the parents and the children.

1. *Rules relating to the selection of partners*

Universally prevalent is the prohibition of marriage between mother and son and father and daughter.

Unions between brother and sister of the same parents are also abhorred, the only exceptions being concerned with persons of royal birth, as in the case of the ancient Egyptians. In other cases, the degree of kinship within which marriage is prohibited varies among different races. Those rules which forbid the members of a particular group to marry anyone who is a member of the group are rules of *exogamy,* or *exogamous rules,* while those rules which prohibit a marriage to a person who is not a member of the group are rules of *endogamy,* or *endogamous rules.* Endogamy and exogamy may occur side by side among the same people, for the prohibitions may extend to different groups within a community; the rules of the Australian aborigines have reached a high degree of complexity.

Among the theories which have sought to account for the existence of exogamy is one put forward by Dr. Westermarck, who says that aversion to sexual intercourse normally exists between persons who have lived together since childhood, and such persons are usually of near kin; hence the feeling of aversion displays itself in custom and law in the rules against incest. This theory is borne out by the fact that exogamous rules regulate not only people related by blood but also those in which the kinship is not real but imagined; they bear the same name. In savage societies the bearing of the same name constitutes a mystic tie between those bearing it in common: kinship is traced by means of a system of names, and the name comes to be conceived as identical with blood relationship. A man's " totem," for example, may be determined by quite arbitrary considerations, and prohibition of marriage between persons of the same totem may have no real reference to kinship.

The fact of aversion has been explained with reference to the alleged injuriousness of close inbreeding; aversion is an instinct acquired and developed in the processes of struggle for existence and natural selection. It has not yet been determined to what extent inbreeding

is injurious to human beings, but it is held by some writers that the practice is detrimental to the species in the case of savage societies.

Havelock Ellis cannot accept the assumption of an instinct of aversion to incest, and Dr. Frazer is of the opinion that the rules of exogamy were deliberately instituted for the purpose of preventing sexual intercourse between near relatives.

The rules of endogamy are as various as those of exogamy. They appear to have been due in the first place to the antipathy felt by people towards those of a different race or nation or class or religion. In general, the endogamous rules have become less strict in civilisation, but the effect of religious bars is still strong. Fashion or prejudice still determine endogamous limits; Sir Henry Maine has observed that in France, marriages between a person belonging to the *noblesse* and one belonging to the *bourgeoisie,* though not unknown, are "wonderfully rare." (Quoted by Westermarck, *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation,* 1936, p. 84).

2. *Rules relating to the modes of contracting marriage*

Marriage by capture still occurs among some savage peoples of to-day, e.g., Tierra del Fuego and the Malay Archipelago, but, says Dr. Westermarck, "among no people is it known to have been the usual or normal mode of contracting a marriage   it is chiefly practised either as an incident of war or as a method of procuring a wife when it is difficult or inconvenient to get one in the ordinary manner" (*A Short History of Marriage,* 1926, p. 113).

The usual method of contracting marriage amongst most of the lower races of to-day is by purchase. Among some Australian tribes a kinswoman is given in exchange for the bride. A commoner custom is purchase by service; in *Genesis* it is related that Jacob served seven years for Rachel. But the commonest method is

purchase by means of a consideration paid to the bride's father or other relative. In many cases the bride price is given to the bride as a dowry.

The practice of marriage by purchase was gradually abandoned as civilisation developed; it became a mere survival. The custom of providing a dowry for the bride developed into quite a strong custom; it still holds in Latin countries, but in other parts of the world it is falling out of use. It is regarded by some people, indeed, as a kind of purchase-price for a husband, and thus the practice of dotation has become distasteful to sensitive minds.

3. *Rules relating to the forms of marriage*

It is necessary to obtain a clear understanding of the terms used in connection with this study. The word *monogamy* refers to the marriage of one man with one woman; *polygyny* refers to the marriage of one man with several women, and *polyandry* to the marriage of several men with one woman. *Polygamy* is the general word for marriage with more than one spouse.

Among Mankind, monogamy and polygyny are the most frequent forms of marriage, though polyandry also occurs, as well as a form of group-marriage practised in connection with polyandry. Polygyny has not occurred on a large scale among most of the lower peoples; on the contrary, many of the lower races strictly prohibit polygyny. But it was frequent among pastoral peoples. A frequent cause of polygyny is an excess of marriageable women, while monogamy is frequently due to a comparative scarcity of them. Dr. Westermarck regards an excess of females as being only an indirect cause of polygyny; the direct cause is the man's desire to possess more than one wife, and the reasons for this desire are the periodical continence required by monogamy, the attraction exercised by female youth and beauty, men's taste for variety, and the desire for offspring, wealth and authority. The last reason is an

important one where wives and children increase a man's power and wealth by their labours, and where the desire for the perpetuation of the ancestral name is a very strong one.

The practice of polygyny in the higher grades of culture is due not only to the economic usefulness of wives; the unequal distribution of wealth which results from economic progress makes it possible for the richer men to acquire more wives than the poorer. The effect of social influence or authority is similar. The old men among some Australian tribes, for example, are addicted to polygyny. But in general, class distinctions are rare among the lowest tribes and among them polygyny is rare.

Among the forces that make for monogamy are the numerical equality of sexes, the absence of disparity in wealth or rank, female jealousy or rivalry, the increasing regard for a woman's feelings that comes with development of civilisation, and an absorbing passion for one person—in the latter case, however, the attachment may be temporary.

4. *Rules relating to the duration of marriage*

Among some of the lowest-grade peoples, lifelong union is practically universal, but among many other uncivilised races marriage is of short duration and divorce a frequent occurrence, as it is, for example, among the North American Indians. The respective rights of the partners vary to a wide extent; among some tribes the husband is able to dissolve the union on the slightest pretext and the wife possesses a similar right in most of these tribes; among others, marriage can be dissolved only by mutual consent. Adultery on the part of the wife is the most generally recognised ground for divorce.

Among the peoples of higher culture a similar variation has occurred and still occurs. Under the original Roman laws, the wife was under the power or *manus*

of her husband, who could dissolve the marriage at will, though the specifically patrician marriage by *confarreatio* was nearly indissoluble. By the time of Cicero, "free" marriage—giving the right to either party of divorce at will or by mutual agreement—had superseded the *manus,* though where the wife remained under the power of her father, she could be separated from her husband against the wishes of both by the exercise of the father's *potestas.* By the later years of the Republic women had begun to attain the legal level of man, and during the Empire divorce was frequent among the upper classes.

But under the influence of Christianity the position of women began to suffer. The Emperor Constantine restricted the rights of the wife and fixed grounds for divorce (A.D. 331). After the dissolution of the Empire, Canon Law replaced the liberal laws of the old Roman Empire, and the relations between partners to a marriage were subject to the Roman Catholic doctrine that marriage was a sacrament, and indissoluble. In practice, however, the Roman Church allowed annulment on account of canonical impediment, e.g., an existing relationship, and this relationship might be "spiritual," such as the fact of a man's having stood godfather to his wife. The result was that it was comparatively easy to discover some ground for declaring almost any marriage invalid.

The Reformation attacked the Catholic view of marriage as a sacrament. But in 1547 the Council of Trent re-established Canon Law, and when England separated from the Roman Church in 1540, the rule of the Canon Law in regard to marriage was allowed to remain, though with restricted authority. Not until 1857 was divorce obtainable otherwise than by Act of Parliament. It was not until 1923 that men and women in England were given equality in regard to the grounds for divorce.

At the present time the grounds for divorce differ widely throughout the Western world. The laws of

most Protestant countries allow divorce on the ground of desertion. Where divorce is permitted in Europe and America, the two spouses usually possess equal rights, though in some countries an offence additional to adultery on the part of the husband is necessary to establish a wife's claim. The Soviet law granted divorce on the application of either of the partners.

5. *The relations between the partners*

The customs referred to in this section relate mainly to the status of women.

Among the simpler peoples the status of women is generally low, though there is some variation. The consolidation of the Family under the paternal system is most marked in the pastoral peoples, and in pastoral societies the position of women is lower than in the case of hunting and agricultural societies. Her economic value is low. Woman is most esteemed among monogamous peoples. Dr. Westermarck says in *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation* (p. 186):

> "Even in the savage world a married woman often occupies a respected and influential position, and the relations between man and wife may be of a very tender character. As I have shown elsewhere, this is said to be the case among many uncivilised peoples who are strictly or almost exclusively monogamous; and I can at least affirm that I am not aware of a single instance in which any such people is reported to treat its women badly."

In ancient republican Rome the *Paterfamilias,* the head of the household, possessed absolute power over his wife as he did over his children and slaves. But we have noted how the institution of *manus* disappeared and that by the time of Cicero free marriage superseded the other forms. By the time of the late Empire the sexes had reached a state of equality which was not seen again in history until the twentieth century.

Under Christianity the position of women declined. Lecky, in his *History of European Morals* (Vol. II, p. 339), writes: [1]

"In addition to the personal restrictions which grew necessarily out of the Catholic doctrines concerning divorce and concerning the subordination of the weaker sex, we find numerous and stringent enactments which rendered it impossible for women to succeed to any considerable amount of property, and which almost reduced them to the alternative of marriage or a nunnery. The complete inferiority of the sex was continually maintained by the law; and that generous public opinion, which in Rome had frequently revolted against the injustice done to girls in depriving them of the greater part of the inheritance of their fathers, totally disappeared. Wherever the Canon Law has been the basis of legislation, we find laws of succession sacrificing the interests of daughters and wives, and a state of public opinion which has been formed and regulated by these laws; nor was any serious attempt made to abolish them till the close of the last [2] century."

The ideal of the Patriarchal Family lived on after the downfall of the Roman Empire, and throughout the Middle Ages in Europe until modern times. In England a married woman had no rights in law over her children who had been taken away from her by her husband until 1839, when she could obtain an order of the Court allowing her to visit them occasionally. Until 1886 a husband, having the sole guardianship of the children during his life, could by will appoint as guardian after his death someone other than the mother. Not until 1926 did the mother obtain equal rights as regards guardianship of her children.

Of recent years the speed of reform in connection with the status of women has been rapid in Western civilisation. Physical ill-usage is legal ground for divorce or separation in nearly all countries, and the husband proved at fault has to contribute to his wife's support.

[1] Quoted by Müller-Lyer in *The Family*, pp. 234-5.
[2] i.e. the eighteenth century.

6. *Relations between parents and children*

Although there are peoples who reckon kinship through the females only (matrilineal system of descent), it does not always follow that the children are in the power of the head of their mother's family or of their maternal uncle. Among most savages of to-day children are, theoretically at least, under the control of the father, though he may share his power with the mother.

The extent of the father's power varies considerably. Infanticide has been practised by semi-civilised as well as civilised races, while some of the lowest savages regard this practice with horror. Indeed, the killing of children has always to be done at the earliest moment, for even among savage peoples parental love is apt to triumph over custom if the infant is allowed to live a little while, and peoples addicted to infanticide often treat their children, once allowed to live, with great fondness.

Bastardy or deformity may be the reason for infanticide among uncivilised races; in ancient Rome and Greece the exposure of sickly or deformed children was approved of. This practice was denounced by the early Christian Church—though, says Westermarck, the Christians "became all the more cruel to the unfortunate mother, who, perhaps in a fit of despair, had put to death her new-born child" (*Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* Vol. I, p. 412).

In some cases the father's authority over his daughter continues after her marriage. In ancient Rome even the grown-up son and his children were subject to the authority of the father of the house, and in the form of marriage known as *conventio in manum,* a married daughter remained in the power of her father or tutor.

Among many tribes great respect is shown to old age, but sometimes when the old people get so old or worn as to be an encumbrance, they are abandoned or killed by their children. This custom is common among

nomadic tribes; and where there is a belief in a future life, the act is in some cases regarded as one of kindness by both parents and children.

The parental power of the archaic type declined in Europe. The Censors of the Roman Republic checked the abuses of the *patria potestas,* and the Emperors further restricted it. Obedience to parents was enjoined by Christianity, modified by the consideration that the relationship between parent and child was eclipsed by that between God and man.

Parental authority and filial duty were ideas which survived in Latin countries through the Middle Ages and even to modern times, as in modern France. But among Teutonic countries the grown-up child is recognised in custom and law as independent; the extreme view of filial independence is seen under the Nazi system, children being encouraged even to betray their parents to the secret police.

The decline of parental authority is due not only to the disappearance of the worship of the dead and of the beliefs in the *mana* of aged persons, but to the eclipsing of the power of the head of the family by that of the State. The early form of the State strengthened the power of the Family at the expense of that of the Clan, but its later development had the opposite effect. The State could not tolerate the power of the *paterfamilias.*

In modern times life has become national rather than familial. " It has been observed," says Westermarck, " that in England and America, where political life is most highly developed, children's respect for their parents is at a particularly low ebb " (*op. cit.,* Vol I, p. 628).

The replacement of the " domestic " system by the factory system in industry has been a contributory cause of the tendency. Moreover, families have become smaller, and the State has taken over much of the education of children. During the nineteenth century the old ideas of parental rights and filial duty have been replaced by the idea of parental responsibility to

the State as the focus of loyalty. Whether the tendency of the State to control family life will continue depends upon the direction which the form of the State will take in future years.

SECTION 3.—MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN THE MODERN WESTERN WORLD

Many socialist thinkers, from Plato onwards, have believed that the dissolution of the Family was at hand, that children would be taken care of by the State, and that marriage would become a trial-and-error affair, easily dissolved at will. In recent times the view of the approaching disintegration of family life has been put forward by various writers, who point to the decrease in the birth-rate and the increase in the divorce-rate as evidence of the break-up of the old family system.

It is true that the traditional form of marriage, indissoluble and patriarchal, has become obsolete in the modern Western world, and that marriage is felt to be more and more a private affair between two individuals. The trend appears to be one towards a "free union," with the State taking a greater responsibility in the education and care of the children.

There are certain new factors which have to be taken into account in estimating the position of marriage and the Family in the modern Western world. The growth of large-scale industrial organisation—a stage never reached by any of the ancient civilisations—has resulted in the extension of industrial and professional activity to women. Women have attained economic independence and therefore personal independence; marriage is no longer the only career or even the best career open to them. Again, the changes in the marriage and divorce laws have further tended to equalise the position between the sexes.

All these changes have been accompanied by and have been no doubt influenced by the rapidly-declining

prestige and influence of organised religion. The attitude towards sex and sexual relations adopted by the Christian Church was one which tended to debase the position of women in Society. Woman was regarded as the fount of sin, and marriage was regarded as a concession to man's carnal desires; it was better to marry than to burn, but it was better still to remain celibate. But the abhorrence towards sex and sexual relations is not generally held in the modern world, even among those who frequent churches. The Church to-day has to face the alternatives of either relinquishing its extreme ascetic attitude towards sexual problems or suffering further loss of prestige and influence as the younger generation matures in a modern world in which the relations between the sexes are discussed frankly in books and magazines available to all, and knowledge comes to the aid of discussion.

An important factor influencing the development of the Family institution in the modern world is the decline in the birth-rate. Since about the last decades of the nineteenth century the birth-rate has fallen more or less rapidly in all European countries, except Russia, and the fertility of British stock in the Dominions has fallen as rapidly as that in the Mother Country. A forecast of the future position is to be found in the studies of Dr. Enid Charles (*The Twilight of Parenthood*); she found that, if fertility and mortality in England and Wales remained at the 1933 level, a maximum population of 40,885 millions would be reached in 1943; by 2035 the population would be 19,969 millions. If fertility and mortality continued to fall as suggested by the ten years preceding 1935, the population would fall as low as 4,426 millions in 2035.

Alarm has been expressed at the incidence of low birth-rates before in history—at the time of the late Roman Republic, for example. But the new factor which has made the problem an acute one for the modern world is the spread of knowledge of contraceptive devices. The main cause of the decline of fertility

in the modern Western world is the deliberate interference with the function of procreation, chiefly by contraception but also by abortion. Small families are becoming the rule in modern Western civilisation, while many married couples have no children at all.

Both the decreasing size of the family group and the tendency of many people to marry late are due not only to the desire to avoid the trials and troubles of family life, but also to the economic difficulties of the modern world, to the desire for social advancement and social security, and to a reluctance to enter into family life or to have children or to increase their number unless it is reasonably certain that adequate provision can be made for them and that it is possible to give them a fair chance in a modern world which demands so much in the way of mental and physical equipment —this is the antithesis of the "selfish" attitude of which such people are so often accused.

The latter consideration may lead to the reflection that far from tending to annihilate the Family as we know it, forces in the modern world are in fact tending towards its strengthening. Increasing divorce-rates, as Dr. Westermarck points out in *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation,* do not indicate the ruin of the marriage institution; divorce may be the saviour rather than the enemy of marriage, for divorce serves merely to make an end to unions that are far better ended and which are a disgrace to the name of marriage. In England, he points out, almost 60 per cent. of divorcees remarry, and in the United States of America, according to a rough estimate, about 50 per cent. Divorce, then, is often the means to the substitution of a happy marriage for an unhappy one.

As Dr. Westermarck suggests, the basis of marriage and the Family lies in conjugal and parental sentiments. In Russia where the experiment was made of substituting the Family by the State, the results were discouraging to the extremists. In America, the trend of opinion is that the home, even if it is but a foster

home, is superior to the large institution as a training-ground for the young. The White House Conference on Child Health and Protection reported unfavourably on institutional as opposed to family care for the child.

"Many facts thus support the general belief that there is no adequate substitute for the beneficial influence which parents as a rule exercise upon their children, that the love of the parents towards the child is one of the most essential features if the child's moral and emotional development is to proceed harmoniously. In these circumstances I can find no reason to suppose that it could be in the interests of the State in the future to break up the family" (Westermarck, *op. cit.*, pp. 163–4).

Though it is probable that in the future divorce will be freer and that the institution of marriage will undergo some changes consequent upon changes in the moral evaluation of sexual acts, it remains true that the Family itself is founded upon biological facts. The public emotions of moral approval and disapproval which regulate to some extent sexual behaviour in the community will no doubt undergo some modification as the result of a process of enlightenment brought about by education of and experience by the community as a whole. But the biological fact of the dependence of the helpless young upon the mother, the necessity for their protection by the father—using the word "protection" in its widest sense to include the care and devotion which an impersonal State cannot provide—these factors will necessitate the continuance of the Family as we know it to-day and as men and women will always know it. Parents will continue to love their children and children will continue to love their parents, and this bond is recognised by all who have experienced it to be too precious to cast lightly away.

The Family is not based upon marriage, which is a form of union subject to a variety of influences capable

of changing its character within a generation. Rather is marriage founded upon the Family, an institution based upon feelings which, finding their roots in the very nature of Man's being, are likely to survive as long as children are born of parents.

Chapter VII

THE STATE

SECTION 1.—WHAT IS THE STATE?

The question as to what constitutes a State is in itself a difficult one. The United States of America comprise only one State and yet there are many self-governing units within its framework. The same remark applies also to the British Commonwealth of Nations.

What we are here concerned with is not so much the legal purpose of the State, as with seeing its significance in the general social life of Mankind, and from that point of view it may be placed along with the Family as being one of the three institutions which are formed not for one special narrow purpose but which take account of the full nature of Man.

Most associations are formed for some specific purpose, though they may be dissolved when that purpose is fulfilled. But human life can never be carried on without some form of family association, even though it may be different in many respects from the family association as it exists to-day; there must be something which fulfils that necessary human purpose of caring for individuals in their young and helpless stage of development. To that extent the family group is permanent.

There is a sense in which the same remark is true for the State. This was expressed in Aristotle's dictum that Man is a political animal, though the term "political" did not convey the same meaning to Aristotle as it does to us, nor did the word "State" mean the same to him as it does to us. He was thinking of the kind of State with which he was most familiar—that is, the self-governing City State. We may make our meaning clearer by saying that man is a civic animal,

using the word "civic" to mean "naturally belonging to a regulated group." It means more than "gregarious." A citizen not only lives in a group but belongs

Fig. 8.—The Political Stages of Society in Western Civilisation



to it in the sense that he willingly subjects himself to the laws of the group, which he has himself helped consciously to frame.

The State may be regarded as being, at least in

theory, an organisation which is designed to enable the members of a community to realise in the best way their aim to live the good life. It therefore possesses some authority which is recognised as sovereign. To some extent this is true of almost any group; even in an animal herd there is some leader which guides the group, and in primitive human communities there is the chief. But in a more developed State the sovereign is much more complex. It is generally some form of government which is recognised as having the sovereign power and to which the citizens naturally give obedience. In a highly democratic State the sovereign-power may be the citizens, organised in a particular way.

Section 2.—Conceptions of the Nature of the State

From the conception of the State as Power or Justice, men had reached a conception of the State based on contract which held from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The idea behind this theory was that people contracted with one another to create the State and endow it with power to command. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) argued that this power was irrevocable and unlimited; the State was absolute sovereign. John Locke (1632–1704) denied this irrevocability and unlimitedness. Last in the trio of social-contract philosophers, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) substituted a "general will" as sovereign, but the State emerges, nevertheless, as omnicompetent and indestructible.

The fundamental objection against the social-contract theory is the fact that there has been no question of deliberate collective consent. The State has grown up and has been created out of necessity—it is an instrument designed for a purpose, not a divine ordinance or some mystical creation of a "general will" or "social mind." The very fact that many law-abiding and intelligent citizens are protesting against the idea of its "sovereignty" is a damning challenge to the

idea of a social contract. On the basis of consent only, no state could possibly perform its functions—and in any case the consent, if any, is, by virtue of that protest, in part revoked. This is to say nothing of the vigorous dissent from the decisions of the State on the part of people who will have no interference with their personal, private lives—conscientious objectors to conscription in the armed forces of the State are a case in point. Nevertheless, the State itself eagerly fixed on the idea of sovereignty as defining its nature, and proclaimed its absolute control over men's lives and actions. The net result of the interplay of this idea of sovereignty with that of the national spirit has been the rise of several independent sovereign states, each insisting on its absolute control over the society it governs within its own territory, and each determined to uphold its independence and resisting any interference whatever with its sovereign power. The State has grown away from the individuals who set it up and claims an existence of its own, an entity which in some mystical way is presumed to be representative of the people and yet is their absolute and indivisible master. The logical conclusion of this attitude is seen in the Fascist and especially the Nazi State.

The idea of the general will connects closely with the conception of an "organism," with the idea that Society is a living thing. Being a living thing, it may be said to have vital tendencies and aims, and a vital will. It aims at the satisfaction of its desires and it wills particular things, just as an individual may be said to do. It is true that we cannot regard the individuals who compose Society as entirely separate entities, owing to the fact that we are vitally related to one another; and we cannot regard the actions of a society as being the sum of the actions of its individual members. We have to think of it as acting as a whole, and that may be expressed by saying that Society has a will. We often speak of the will of particular people and use other terms usually applied to individuals, such

as "conscience." Expressions of this kind involve the recognition that peoples, societies and nations are not simply a number of individuals, but that they are in a real sense a unity, and have what may be called "will," "conscience," "desire" and "purpose." We thus recognise the fact that the members of a community are parts of a co-operative whole, a whole which has a background of knowledge and experience available to each member of the community—thus we may reach a conception of "Knowledge" as knowledge possessed by the community as a whole, in contradistinction to the knowledge of a particular individual.

So it is with other aspects of our human life. Just as there is common knowledge, so there are common valuations; valuations which are held by the community in general, and which form part of the whole system of moral ideas in a society. We can, therefore, agree that there is a total of knowledge, of wills, and values and desires common to a society as a whole; and we have used the word "Mankind" in this book to denote the great human society which does possess a common background of physical and psychic features, aspirations for humanity as a whole, looking to the past for guidance and to the future for hope. Some writers, like Aldous Huxley in his *Ends and Means,* deride the use of such terms as "Society" as being meaningless abstractions; but however great our inability to define it, we cannot justly call this system of relationships, this background of common knowledge and power, a "meaningless abstraction."

Behind the knowledge and wills of individuals, and behind the valuations and desires of individuals, there is this background of what the society knows, wills, and values and desires. There is more in Society than there is in its individual members, and the individual members fall back upon that when their own particular insight and knowledge fail.

But it is easy to fall into errors in dealing with the conception of a "general will" or "group mind." We

may readily agree that the individual does not exist in isolation, and that he has a background of knowledge and experience which is possessed by his society as a whole. But, as we have seen also, this is a very different thing from saying that Society is a kind of supermind, that it is a mystical being separate from the individuals comprising a community and yet integrated from them. We cannot point to any general will in the form of a general approbation of the particular laws promulgated by a government of a state. The basis of the State lies not so much in any definite contract or approval of the laws, but rather in the general recognition by all the members of the group that they are citizens and that they belong to that particular group. They have grown up in the community and, without perhaps realising it, they have grown up in the citizenship of the community; and unless they specifically renounce that citizenship, it is generally understood that they accept the sovereignty of the State to which they belong.

The power of coercion is an inevitable characteristic of the organised State, because there can be no effective sovereignty unless there is some force by which the sovereignty is supported. It is wrong, however, to speak as if force were the essence of sovereignty; the essence of sovereignty lies in the recognition of a particular government, and, so far as the ordinary life of the State is concerned, one might postulate that life could be carried on without any organisation of force and simply by the general recognition on the part of all the citizens that this was the right form of government and that its behests were to be carried out. No force would be effective if there were not some such recognition by the citizens. The police can carry out their work effectively only if the people give support to the exercise of the force they employ. So far as internal affairs are concerned, the State rests primarily on the acceptance of the Government by the governed.

In the case of some associations, the force of the State may be enlisted to preserve their independence

and integrity. This would appear to be true of states also. Certainly in the world as it exists to-day there is hardly any sovereign state which can rely upon its own force as a sufficient means of defence against possible dangers; it depends upon alliances with other states. Such alliances depend upon some community of interest with other states. Some people look to the subordination of the sovereignty of national states to the authority of a world-state, in order to preserve the structure of civilisation from the destruction that would ensue from wars conducted by states armed with modern weapons of offence.

More definitely, the ends for which a State exists are:

(1) Protection of the citizen, whether external or internal, against either the attacks of other states or of individuals within the State.

(2) Justice. The establishment of laws which are just to various citizens within the State.

Both these ends require the use of force. But the State is primarily an institution aiming at protection and justice, and uses force merely to carry out these ends.

There is also a third end which may be regarded as a fundamental aim of the State, namely:

(3) Education, which means civic education, aiming at the development of a child into a citizen.

Of course, the individual is more than a citizen; he has interests other than the political interests, which are, or should be, directed to the problem of government only that the life of all the individual members of the community may be rendered more rich, more full, more free. To this end he should receive civic education, though such an education is only a part of the wider education which must be directed to the development of the individual life as a whole.

In essence, it may be stated, the main end of the State is Justice, a conception which, in its relation to the State, we must now examine.

Section 3.—The State and Justice

We may now discuss the relation between justice as provided by the State and the true justice which may be considered to be just and moral. It is possible to draw a distinction between these two conceptions, for

Fig. 9.—Classification of the Functions of the State



laws are necessarily general, applying to the community as a whole, and in particular cases are not always just.

It is true that often the administration of law rather than its content is at fault, but a distinction can be drawn beween the rights to which citizens are entitled by form of law, and rights which may be considered to be theirs by natural right. The "natural rights"

of individuals were formerly thought by some philosophers to be those which human beings in a "state of nature" would possess, but the student will realise readily enough that this expression possesses very little meaning, for, as we have seen, Man is a social being, and such natural rights as he may be considered to possess can be only those which have their basis in the fact of his social nature. His rights are complementary to his responsibilities and duties towards his fellow-members of his community. In law the right of a person implies an obligation on the part of others to abstain from interfering with that right. But since Man is a social being, it can be said that there is a moral obligation upon the owner of a right to use that right to the best advantage from the point of view of the community. If the moral obligation conflicts in any way with the legal right of an individual, it must be considered seriously whether there is not something wrong with the law which confers that right upon that individual.

The problem of justice in relation to the legal system imposed by a state is thus seen to be one of no small magnitude. This problem did not present the same difficulty to Plato as it does to us. Plato thought he had solved the problem of Justice by allocating each person to a place in the State in which he was able to perform the greatest service to the community. Justice was the allocation of the citizen of his Republic to a definite function; people were educated to become workers, warriors or rulers. The citizen had certain rights and duties, and the State saw to it that he received the rights and performed the duties. This was all very well for his small City State, but the State would have a tremendous task in front of it if it attempted to administer such a machinery in the complex world of to-day. But the true criticism of Plato's scheme is that it does not recognise the fact that the State exists for the individual and not the individual for the State.

This is not to say, of course, that the individual's right is always of greater importance than the right of the community as a whole. We are faced with the problem of how far the individual is to be supported by the State when his desires, or even his interests, conflict with those of the community. In a perfect world, perhaps, the problem would not arise, for then the desires and will of every perfect citizen would coincide with the desires and will of the perfect State. The true function of the laws of the State is thus seen to be the difficult one of holding the balance between the interests of the individual and those of the community.

We thus arrive again at our fundamental problem of what constitutes the best life for human beings; and the problem of the relation of the State to justice, one debated by generations of philosophers, can, it seems, be resolved only in the hard and bitter school of human experience, human thought, human endeavour. The problem is a fascinating one, for it is one which is fundamental in human Society. It is true that it arises from the imperfect nature of human beings, and presumably will always be with us, but the tendency of Philosophy is to clear away the misconceptions and prejudices that cloud the real implications of the problem. It will be made a little easier of solution with the destruction of the injustices resulting from the unequal lack of opportunity among the members of a community, of the licence given to greed and lust for power, and of the inherent defects of an inequitable social system.

Section 4.—The State in the Modern Western World

As the conception of the State has taken root in the mind of Mankind, there has become attached to the idea of the State a certain quality of sacredness in the minds of many people, as usually happens in the case of these associations endowed with considerable power over the lives and minds of men. Dr. McDougall's explanation

of social phenomena with reference to certain primary instincts, though perhaps an over-simplification of social progress, appears to have a certain application in this connection.[1] One of his fundamental "instincts" is the instinct of self-abasement with its corresponding emotion of subjection, and it most certainly appears that, at least as far as the State and the Church are concerned, this instinct is much in evidence. The term "instinct" in Social Psychology has been used to denote a certain innate specific tendency of the mind, common to all members of a species, which has been evolved in the process of adaptation to environment.

The line of least resistance in social life is to accept what one has been led to believe by the influence of tradition and environment. The propaganda of the State, designed consciously or unconsciously to maintain its power or prestige, has resulted in a general acceptance of that power or prestige, and it has been helped by the fact that the State has not been suddenly created by a conference of intellectuals but has evolved slowly in accordance with the needs and necessities of the Community. The unique coercive power of the State, taken up by it because of the necessity of maintaining law and order, has resulted in a subordination of all other associations; the State has been conceived as being practically synonymous with Community, and the organs of Community have come to be regarded as the organs of the State. Instead of being regarded as an association among other associations, an instrument for the carrying out of the purposes of men, the State has taken to itself supreme authority, and the complexity of modern life has helped this process.

This position, however, has not been reached without a struggle. The guilds and various associations of the Middle Ages were recognised to be to some extent separated and independent of a central authority; it was the growth of the national spirit which settled that conflict. But a powerful rival to the State was the

[1] *Introduction to Social Psychology.*

Church, and men were torn by conflicting allegiances. There was the loyalty to their conception of organised religion which was the result of long centuries of religious teaching and tradition, acting on the primitive instinct of self-abasement to the idea of an all-powerful Deity, together with the fear of that dim, unknown world of the spirit which has been so much exploited by the priesthood and the officials of organised religion, and the loyalty to a central authority so necessary for the furtherance of their material purposes. The resulting compromise has already been noted.

The awakening of the Western community to the realisation of the true function of the great association, the State, and therefore to the need for delimitation of the power which it has seized, is seen in the increasing flow of protest against the usurpation of power and function by the all-embracing State. In theory, the control of the affairs of Great Britain is in the hands of Parliament. In practice, such are the complexity and magnitude of the problems of government, that a Minister is practically powerless against his permanent officials. Ministers are empowered to issue "Orders" having the force of law. For example, in 1927 forty-three Acts were passed; twenty-six of these empowered the Minister to issue Orders having the force of law, and 1,349 sets of Orders or Regulations were issued by the Departments. In the Rating and Valuation Act of 1925, not only was the Minister given power to issue Orders, but he was also empowered to do any other thing which appeared to him necessary or expedient for the purpose in view, "and any such Order may modify the provisions of this Act so far as may appear to the Minister necessary or expedient for carrying the Order into effect." Similar clauses give the Minister power to settle disputed points.

The result of this tendency is that Departmental measures take the place of law and that the country is run by the higher officials of the Permanent Civil Service. Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice, in his

book, *The New Despotism*, dealt at length with the problem of this usurpation of legislation. It is obvious that the tendency of this class of higher permanent officials will be to promulgate measures which will tend to the maintenance of its position of pre-eminence in the life of British society. "It may be taken as a general rule that the character of any particular state will be, broadly speaking, a function of the economic system which obtains in the society it controls" (Laski: *An Introduction to Politics*, p. 21).

This breaking of bounds by the State in the matter of function is due to the universal acceptance of the theory of Sovereignty, now beginning to be assailed because of its mischievous consequences.

The Sovereign State, with its striving for prestige and control over the earth, and with its uneasy relations with other states equally striving for prestige and control, has been a spectre dogging the footsteps of Man and haunting his life for centuries. Men cannot live their lives in complete happiness if there is a prospect in the future that all their hopes and dreams will be shattered and blasted because of the conflicts of sovereign states.

So ferocious has modern war become that the need for some means of enforcing an international law is imperative. There is in existence a body of international customs and agreements which limit the activities of states in the normal business of life—otherwise there could be no commerce or trade or intercourse of any kind between the subjects of different states, but there is no over-riding authority which can exclude war and compel states to settle their differences by arbitration or agreement. The League of Nations of President Wilson all but completely foundered on the rock of national sovereignty, and efforts to endow the League with authority are doomed to failure so long as states cling to their sovereignty. There is only one solution—the surrender of some part of that sovereignty to an over-riding authority and the formation of an inter-

national police force. The police perform an essential function in any community; but for the restraining influence of the police, the best of us might give way to our selfishness or passion. It is probable that for hundreds of years to come the rate of development of the human race in general will be so slow as to necessitate some form of police force as a means of keeping order. This method has been tried within national boundaries and found so excellent in comparison with a condition of anarchy that its application to the international sphere is indicated to Mankind as the best way out of its difficulties. It is evident that the development of an international community, an international law, can proceed only by the continuous restriction of the rights of individual states, just as in the same way, arguing from a true analogy, can the development of a community proceed only by the restriction of those rights of the individual which conflict with the good of the community as a whole.

What, then, is the State? It has become clear that the State is not the Community. Quite apart from the question of crime, individuals find themselves in conflict with the State; and again, very early in its history, the State found itself at issue with the Church, and at length was forced to retire before an onslaught which was the first great resistance to its claim of absolutism. It has to-day to struggle increasingly against individuals and associations as those individuals and associations become increasingly aware of the implications of that claim of absolutism. And increasingly does it become evident that only when the State realises that its claim to omnipotence reduces its value to Community will it be able to take its true place in Society and function as an association, an organ of Community; though it be the greatest of them all, yet it is still an association among other associations. It would appear that the true nature of the modern State is, or ought to be, that indicated in Professor MacIver's definition (Pt. I, Ch. IV, Sect. 2). And to the State must apply in greatest

measure the fundamental law of humanity, that he who would be greatest among men must be the servant of all. The State is Service, not Power. It is an association created by men to perform the functions of government, and to that end it is endowed with the power of making and enforcing the law.

It follows that if the political system is such that the State represents the interest of the few rather than of the majority, the character of this association must be reshaped so that it may perform its true function as the servant of the community. Professor Laski, in his *Introduction to Politics,* puts forward several propositions, the main purpose of which is to show that the State is the creation of the dominant class in a society, and that a great weakness has been its conception of the individual essentially as the owner of property. As the education of the individual in social matters progresses, and with the slow but definite levelling of classes that is taking place to-day, it is probable that the State will fall more and more surely into its true place in Society as an association for the purposes of providing order and protection, the general control and co-ordination of matters affecting the health and resources of the community, and the supervision of the educational and cultural development of the individuals of the community. The greatest obstacle to the realisation of this result is the worship of the State as something sacrosanct. The tendency to regard as sacred anything which is old and well-established in the community has been responsible for much lack of progress.

Another factor contributing to the preservation of the *status quo* is the profound apathy shown by the great mass of people to social and political questions. It is not too much to say that the time has come when everybody will have to know something about Politics, and be prepared to talk about Politics and act because of Politics.

Great Britain has happily avoided the bloody

struggles which have resulted elsewhere from a conflict between State and Community, nor does the general character of the people indicate that such a struggle will ever take place. Nevertheless, by its insidious gathering of power into its own hands, the sovereign State can restrict by slow degrees the liberties and rights of the individual. It seems evident that the resistance to that process is coming and must come from other associations rather than from men individually. It is when those associations, endeavouring to fulfil the purposes for which they were created, find that because of the lust for power of the major association those interests can be but inadequately fulfilled, that the State is bound either to relinquish some of its claims to power or to resort to arms. The latter alternative was taken in the case of the French Revolution and failed; it has succeeded in the case of modern Italy and Germany. In England the struggle was fought without revolution, when the interests of the community conflicted with those of a dominant class in respect of factory legislation, of trade-union combination, of capital punishment for offences against property. Of late years, with the coming of more democratic government, the sphere of conflict has shifted from the plane of class conflict more towards the plane of conflict between associations and the State itself in respect of their respective powers. In a sense, it has become more intellectual because it cannot be fought without knowledge of Social Theory and a working knowledge of Sociology. The gap which separates the study of elementary Economics and Social and Political Theory from the next step of the study of Society itself as a scientific subject is becoming less wide. Only when every adult man and woman is able to exercise due control over the associations and institutions of Society can social development proceed with any degree of effectiveness. Such control is dependent upon an adequate knowledge of the principles underlying the structure of Society and the will and ability to make use of that knowledge.

Chapter VIII

THE CHURCH

SECTION 1.—THE NATURE OF EARLY BELIEFS

Before we can consider the Church as an institution, it is necessary first of all to examine the springs from which the Church had its origins; we have to examine the nature of the religious attitude itself. It is necessary in dealing with the origin and structure of the Church to distinguish between the ecclesiastical and the religious influence; the ecclesiastical influence is the influence of religion as exercised by an organised Church.

The origins of organised religion lie in the remote past, and we cannot understand the nature of the ecclesiastical influence as it affects men to-day without a knowledge of the systems of beliefs which have operated in early Society. Such a knowledge is necessary because in so many aspects the religious beliefs and practices of to-day have their counterparts in the religious life of early and primitive man. Indeed, in many respects some modern religious systems, especially in the Western world, are merely extensions rather than developments of early systems—the ordinary man is so often a follower of the great religious teachers in name only; his understanding of and ability to cope with the demands of the great religious teachers are hampered and limited by the dead weight of a savage and superstitious past.

The study of the influence of early magical and religious beliefs and practices on social institutions is a fascinating one. There is often no obvious link between cause and effect. Social institutions which prevail in our own midst, and which we have been used to interpret by reference to our own system of ideas, may be found to have been influenced by and some-

Fig. 10.—The Religious Beliefs of Savages



times to have originated in ideas which belong to an entirely different level of culture and which ceased to exist long ago. This does not necessarily imply that such an institution itself has no longer a place in the modern world; perhaps the institution did not spring from mere superstition alone, and if it did, it may, in course of time, have come to serve a really useful purpose, and become justifiable on rational grounds.

There are instances, however, in which an institution continues to exist simply through sheer inertia, and the motives which are now adduced in support of it are but attempts to defend a useless survival. But the influences which magical and religious beliefs and practices have exercised on secular social institutions and relationships are much too varied to be treated in detail in this work. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a general consideration only.

One problem with which we must concern ourselves refers to the differences which exist between magic and religion. Magic and religion have certain features in common; both have reference to something which appears uncanny and mysterious, that is, supernatural, and which therefore calls forth an emotion of awe. Men generally distinguish between two classes of phenomena. With some phenomena they are familiar and in consequence these are ascribed to natural causes; other phenomena seem to them unfamiliar and mysterious and are therefore looked upon as supernatural or springing from supernatural causes. This distinction is seen to be discerned at the lowest stages of culture known to us, as well as at higher stages. In the life of a savage, the natural and supernatural are often confused and no definite line of demarcation is drawn by him, but it appears that he notices the difference between events of common occurrence and other events which fill him with a feeling of mysterious awe (Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* Vol. II, Ch. XLVII).

The mysterious power of *mana* that is supposed to

reside in various objects is met with in one form or another throughout the savage world. Savage peoples are apt to attribute *mana* to anything which is extraordinary or even unusual—a river bubbling up from the ground, a high mountain, an isolated rock or a peculiarly large tree: such objects are looked upon by savages with superstitious respect.

The superstitious dread of unusual objects is not altogether dead, even among civilised peoples. In England, for example, there are grotesque landmarks which have been ascribed to the work of the devil, and belief in the devil still lingers on in remote country districts.

The religion of our remote ancestors and that of the primitive peoples of to-day was founded on fear. The primitive Yahgans of Tierra del Fuego have no organisation of well-defined religious beliefs, but there is a dim conception of ghosts or phantoms from whom injury is feared. The Veddahs of Ceylon have some kind of belief in the efficacy of witchcraft for killing men and animals. The Mantras, an aboriginal race of the Malay Peninsula, find a spirit everywhere—in the air, on the land, in the trees and caves; and there is a belief in the transmigration of the souls of the dead into tigers which exact vengeance on those who have injured them in this life. In spite of the common supposition that the North American Indians worship the benevolent god known as the Great White Spirit, it appears that this is a belief in an anthropomorphic nature god. There is amongst them a belief in good and bad spirits —the bad are propitiated and the good neglected. The animistic religion of the North American Indians in general is non-moral. Animism, the belief in spirits, is found in full vigour among the tribes of Central Australia.

The human being is often considered as possessing a soul as well as a body; the body of a dead person, and dreams about the dead, inspire the savage survivors with fear and awe. The spirits of the dead are be-

lieved to influence the living by means of a mysterious influence; but we must not assume that the dead were the only original supernatural agencies in the eyes of primitive man, and there is no general agreement with Sir J. G. Frazer's theory that the worship of the dead is at the root of primitive religion.

The belief in the power of mysterious objects may be based upon an experience which seems to justify the belief. The unusual appearance of the object makes an impression upon the beholder; its very appearance predisposes him to believe that it possesses some mysterious powers. If, then, anything unusual happens in the neighbourhood of the strange-looking object, or occurs shortly after the witness sees it, he is inclined to attribute the event to the influence of the object. A small-pox epidemic broke out in Siberia some years ago, after a visit of a company of travellers with camels; the epidemic was attributed to the visit of these strangers (Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 592). Men often infer the existence of a supernatural cause from the occurrence of unusual events, though the supernatural agent itself is invisible. Death and disease are often ascribed to invisible supernatural agents who have taken up abode in the patient's body.

The primitive mind not only distinguishes between a natural and a supernatural agency, but conceives the natural object or supernatural agency as the possessor of mechanical energy which discharges itself without the aid of any volitional activity. This is the case with the supernatural force attributed to a tabooed object, mere contact with which conveys a mysterious contagion without the agency of a spirit.

Section 2.—Magic and Religion

The distinction between mechanical energy and a supernatural mind and supernatural beings endowed with a will to which is attributed miraculous gifts is one which lies at the base of the difference between

religion and magic. Dr. Westermarck defines religion as "a belief in and a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being on whom man feels himself dependent and to whose will he makes an appeal in his worship" (*Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. II, p. 584). In worship there is an appeal to a supernatural being. On the other hand, supernatural mechanical power is applied in magic. He who performs a purely magical act utilises such mechanical natural power without making an appeal to a supernatural being.

The difference between religion and magic may be briefly stated: In religion man attempts to influence supernatural agents by natural means such as prayers, sacrificial gifts or other methods which appeal to their will. In magic man attempts to influence either natural or supernatural objects or persons by supernatural means—i.e. magical energy, the effect of which is quite mechanical.

The word "religion" in its Latin form did not have the same meaning as we now attribute to it. "Religion" is derived from *re*, back, and *ligare*, meaning to tie or bind. One interpretation of the meaning of the word is that a man was "tied by his god." But the connection between the two words allows for another interpretation—that "it was not the man who was tied by the god, but the god who was tied by the man" (Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 584). The Romans were addicted more to magic than to religion. They wanted to rule their gods rather than be ruled by them.

Men, then, make use of magic not only in relation to their fellow-men but also in relation to their gods. "Magical and religious elements are often almost inseparably intermingled in one and the same act" (*op. cit.*, p. 586); and the magical means of coercing a god are often similar to the chief forms of religious worship. A prayer in the proper sense is an appeal to a god. But a prayer may also be a magical act intending to coerce the invoked

being. The genuine prayer may assume a magical character, because it is addressed to a god, and the prayer becomes imbued with supernatural energy owing to the holiness of the being to whom it is addressed; the constraining force of the prayer may be used even against the god himself. Ancient Assyrian incantations often end with an appeal to the will of the god, but they were also magical instruments which the power of the god could not resist.

Like prayer, sacrifice also may become a magical act. A sacrifice is generally a gift offered to a supernatural being. It is based on the idea that the supernatural being has human needs, human appetites. Sacrifices may also be offered for the purpose of transferring curses and coercing supernatural beings, so that sacrifice, like prayer, may be a magical act as well as a religious act.

Religion and magic are not only closely connected with each other in cult, in prayer, and sacrifice, but also in moral injunctions. This is well illustrated by the Ten Commandments. "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain, for the Lord will not hold him guiltless who taketh his name in vain" (*Exodus* xx, 7). Why was God anxious that His name should not be taken in vain? According to primitive ideas a god's name is part of his personality; therefore the holiness of a god may be polluted if his name is mentioned in profane conversation. This is one reason for the commandment in question, but there is also another reason: there is something uncanny in mentioning the name of a supernatural being. Many savages are afraid of pronouncing the names of their gods.

Among Christians to-day there is a common disinclination to use the word "God." The Englishman, for example, says "Goodness" instead of "God." Conversely, the man who prides himself on his freedom from superstition may make use of the expression "Good God," just as he would deliberately walk under a ladder. But where the act is deliberate, it is evidence

of defiance rather than of complete freedom from superstition.

Even the use of a name itself is still held to possess some magic significance. A child thinks he is giving away or lending something precious when he tells another his name, and, among other people dependent on public favour, opera singers and film stars choose their stage names carefully.

Thus religion and magic are in various ways mixed up together. So intimate is often the connection between the two, that the same term may sometimes have to be used for both in speaking of the characteristics of the religion of a certain people, or of one of the great religions of the world, like Christianity or Mohammedanism. We may actually disregard the distinction between religion and magic by including under the term "religion" such magical elements as may be mingled with the strictly religious beliefs and practices, for in the practice of religions there are often magical elements. In Mohammedanism the holiness of the words of the Koran are supposed to possess benign magical virtue—quite impersonal supernatural force. According to the early Christian ideas, the state of sin was washed away by magical procedure; the rite of baptism was practised by the early Christian Church and is still practised. Thus we come to another definition of religion as something concrete. A religion may be defined as a system of beliefs and rules of behaviour which have reference to man's relation to one or several supernatural beings whom he calls his god or gods. This system may include also magical elements.

Every supernatural being is not a god. A god is a supernatural being who is an object of a more or less permanent cult. There are always established relationships between men and their gods.

Religion is essentially a social phenomenon in so far as it presupposes a community of men. The relations between men and their gods are communal rather than individual. We must, of course, appreciate that an

individual may have his personal religion differing from the religion of the general community; but, in general, religion is communal rather than individual in character.

Accepting Dr. Westermarck's definition, religion is a belief in and a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being on whom man feels himself dependent, and to whose will he makes an appeal in his worship. Magic, however, utilises mechanical power, and he who performs a purely magical act utilises such power without making an appeal to the will of a supernatural being. In religion man attempts to influence supernatural beings by natural means such as prayers, sacrificial gifts or other means acting upon their will. In magic he attempts to influence either natural or supernatural objects or persons by magical energy.

These conceptions of magic and religion are not adopted by all sociologists. On the contrary, there have been many different conceptions, and we cannot in this work consider all the rival theories. We must mention, however, two different conceptions of magic and religion, namely, Dr. Frazer's and Dr. Durkheim's; we must consider the work of the former because his *Golden Bough* is the greatest work on magic ever written, and the work of Dr. Durkheim because he is the leader of a special school of social anthropology.

By "religion" Dr. Frazer understands "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life."[1] This conception differs somewhat from the preceding definition in two points: Dr. Frazer does not agree that the foundation of religion lies in the feeling of awe; and, further, he looks upon divine beings as essentially beneficent supernatural beings who, for the benefit of man, interfere with the ordinary course of Nature.

Professor Westermarck has shown in his *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* that the gods of un-

[1] *The Golden Bough* (1922), p. 50.

civilised peoples are often marvellous beings, and that sacrifice and other acts of worship have frequently been made with the object of averting misfortunes. The religious consciousness of man becomes associated with the blessings he enjoys; the god is gradually regarded as partly malevolent and partly benevolent. Moreover, a god who is by nature harmless or good may by proper worship be induced to assist man in his struggle against evil spirits.

Men have, therefore, selected their gods according to their usefulness. The savage, once his god has failed him, will throw away his fetish and select a new one. The conception of gods more able and willing to meet the wants of the believers is a sign of religious evolution. Among peoples of higher culture the gods are on the whole benevolent to Mankind, but we cannot, like Dr. Frazer, regard this benevolence as a characteristic of gods in general. There is this essential agreement between Dr. Frazer's definition and that of Professor Westermarck—that religion always involves a belief and a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being or beings. But, according to Dr. Frazer, magic deals with impersonal forces and hence aims at coercion and restraint and not conciliation, as does religion. Essentially, there is no mystery in the whole procedure of magic; magic is regarded as a kind of natural science—though, of course, it is an error into which the primitive falls, a misapplication of the association of ideas.

Two kinds of magic have been distinguished by Dr. Frazer. Homœopathic or imitative magic is founded on the association of ideas of similarity—like produces like. For example, water may be poured on the ground in order to induce rain. Contagious or sympathetic magic is founded on the idea of contiguity—a man hopes to injure an enemy by burning a lock of his hair, or a nail-paring.

Dr. Frazer's theory ignores the mysterious character of the magical force applied in the magical practice, and for this reason he does not admit the close connection

which exists between magic and religion. They have both reference to something mysterious or supernatural, and this explains why magic passes into religion and religion into magic. Magic changes into religion by the great discovery of the inefficacy of magic as such.

We find magic and religion side by side among civilised and uncivilised peoples. There is a tendency for anthropologists to regard the Australian aborigines as the representatives of the age of magic and as practising the most primitive form of religion. But in all probability the beliefs and practices of no single people may be regarded as a type for the analysis of all races. The propitiation of spirits is very prevalent among savages, and the practices may be considered to be more religious than magical.

Professor Durkheim considers that there is a resemblance between magic and religion and that the objects of both belong to the sacred phenomena. All things belong either to the world of the profane or to the world of the sacred; but nothing belongs to these two worlds at once. The sacred and the profane have always been in opposition to one another. The difference between these two worlds seems really to be the difference between the familiar or natural and the mysterious or supernatural, and this difference is very wide. Magic stands for all malevolent and anti-social ways for exploiting the unseen, while religion stands for such ways of dealing with the sacred as are supposed to further the common welfare. Thus, says Durkheim, the difference between magic and religion must not lie in the difference between the use made of impersonal supernatural force and the attitude towards supernatural beings. According to the French school of sociologists, the difference between magic and religion lies in the function they fulfil. In religion the function is social; in magic it is anti-social. Magic includes all bad ways and religion all good ways of dealing with the sacred or supernatural; it gives the meaning of "witchcraft" to the term "magic." This view is accepted by Dr.

Marett, who says: "Magic I take to include all bad ways, and religion all good ways of dealing with the supernormal—bad and good of course, not as we may happen to judge them, but as the society concerned judges them" (*Anthropology*, pp. 209 *sq*.).

On this point Dr. Westermarck (*Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*) writes: "But this use of the terms is neither in agreement with traditional usage nor, in my opinion, suitable for the purpose of scientific classification. Besides black magic, or witchcraft, there is also white magic; even a medieval theologian like Albertus Magnus asserts that 'magical science is not evil, since through knowledge of it evil can be avoided and good attained.' The French distinction between magic and religion implies that a prayer to a god for the destruction of an enemy must be classified as religion if it is offered in a cause which is considered just by the community, but as magic if it is disapproved of. .

"It should be added, however, that the definition of religion which I have given in the text has reference only to religion in the abstract, not to the various religions. In the popular sense of the word, *a* religion may include many practices which are what I have called magical" (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 753).

Dr. Westermarck suggests as a definition of a religion: "By a religion is generally understood a system of beliefs, and rules of behaviour which have reference to men's relations to one or several supernatural beings whom they call their god or gods, that is, supernatural beings who are the objects of a regular cult and between whom and their worshippers there are established and permanent relationships" (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 753).

The curse and the blessing. An important influence has been exercised on social relationships by the phenomena known as the curse and the blessing. A curse is an evil wish expressed in words or actions, while a blessing is a good wish expressed in words or actions.

The true curse is not an appeal to the will of a superior being, but a mechanical act, the curse itself being charged with baneful energy. A blessing also acts mechanically; it will be remembered that Jacob took away the blessing of his father Isaac from his brother Esau by means of a trick (*Genesis*, Ch. 27).

Originally, curses and blessings were magical phenomena, but they afterwards developed into prayers, the name of God being introduced into them. This was because the name of a supernatural being is holy and charged with supernatural energy and this energy gives power to the curse or blessing. With the deepening of the religious sentiment, however, it came to be believed that a mighty and righteous God could not be a mere tool in the hands of a mortal being.

The belief in the power of the Evil Eye is akin to the belief in the transmission of baneful energy by mechanical means.

The belief in the power of curses and blessings has increased the power of parents over children; the curse of a parent is sometimes believed to be more powerful than that of a saint, who derives his power from close contact with the god, the source of *mana*. Westermarck (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 622) writes: "The ancient Hebrews believed that parents, and especially a father, could by their blessings or curses determine the fate of their children; indeed, we have reason to assume that the reward which in the fifth commandment is held out to respectful children was originally a result of parental blessings. We still meet with the original idea in *Ecclesiasticus* (iii. 8, 9), where it is said: 'Honour thy father and mother both in word and deed, that a blessing may come upon thee from them. For the blessing of the father establisheth the houses of children; but the curse of the mother rooteth out foundations.'" The notion that parents' blessings beget prosperity and that curses bring ruin was widespread in Ancient Greece. The fulfilment of a curse or blessing came to be looked upon as an act of divine justice.

One reason why parents are supposed to possess power in curses and blessing is because of the mystery of old age and nearness of death. The capacity for giving effect to curses and blessings is supposed to increase with the advance of old age. According to old Teutonic ideas, the curse of a dying person was the strongest of all curses. (Lovers of opera will recall that in *Faust,* which was founded upon an old German legend, the dying Valentine curses his sister Marguerite, to her intense horror.) Superiority of social position is also supposed to influence the efficacy of the curse. It is important to remember that the father among the ancient nations was often vested with priestly functions, and his curses and blessings would be efficacious to an exceptional degree.

The belief in the power of curses and blessings has influenced also the practice of charity. The religious laws of the ancient Hebrews constantly stress the desirability of almsgiving. In *Ecclesiasticus* vii. 32, 33, we read, " Stretch thine hand unto the poor, that thy blessing may be perfected. A gift hath grace in the sight of every man living."

By refusing to succour the poor a person exposed himself to the effect of magical power of curses brought down on his head by the poor seeker of alms. There is, too, a connection between almsgiving and sacrifice. Among the early Christians, open liberal charity was the ideal mode of conduct; the ideal Christian was one who gave all he had to the poor. But it was considered by the almsgivers that the discharge of this duty was more profitable to the giver than to the receiver, for his reward was eternal life. Many times is the thought expressed that almsgiving is a good investment, whose interest is the purchase of Heaven.

The position of the stranger in primitive society strikingly illustrates the belief in the power of blessings and curses. Ordinarily regarded as an enemy, the stranger who came as a guest was often given extraordinary privileges, extending even to the possession of

Fig. 11.—The Development of the Ecclesiastical Influence in Western Civilisation



the host's wife. Custom required that hospitality be shown to a stranger, even if an enemy, though this hospitality might extend only to a limited period. The Iroquois regarded hospitality to a stranger as a duty approved by the Great Spirit.

Though it is probable that even in the savage breast pity is aroused by the helpless condition of a stranger, hospitality is based often on egotistic considerations. The host often expects a present in return, and the stranger is expected at least to provide a blessing. In St. Paul's *Epistle to the Hebrews* (xiii, 2) occurs the passage: "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares."

SECTION 3.—THE ECCLESIASTICAL INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

It is now necessary to consider the part played by organised religion in social development—the ecclesiastical influence. In our present discussion we are to consider Christianity as taught by the Church; that is, organised Christianity as it has existed and still exists as the Church.

The Catholic Church and Feudalism were the two great institutions of the Middle Ages. During the period when the Roman Empire was declining, the Christian Church was rapidly gaining in power and authority. In the fourth century, it was recognised as a legal religion by Constantine, and afterwards it was recognised as the official religion of the Empire.

The causes which enabled the Church to attain its power are discussed in Chapter XV of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* and his account is generally accepted even by those who do not take his rationalistic view of religion.

A convenient summary of these causes may be made as follows:

(1) *Intellectual.* Christianity at that time supplied a

much more rational and intelligible explanation of the universe than any other system.

(2) *Moral.* The Roman religions were non-ethical and had nothing to do with conduct. The ethics of the Oriental religions were low and tainted with sensuality. From the point of view of the virtues it inculcated, Christianity was superior to the systems of paganism which prevailed at that time. Christianity alone cultivated the virtue of sympathy and help for the oppressed. The moral standard of Christianity appealed to the Western world.

(3) *Religious.* Christianity satisfied the religious sense of the individual as other systems of the time did not. The two great doctrines of Christianity which appealed strongly at that time were the doctrine of redemption from sin, i.e. the Atonement, and the doctrine of Immortality.

(4) *Organisation and Administration.* The Christian Church derived from the Roman Empire some of its wonderful abilities in organisation and government, and the Church soon became a self-governing autonomous association with its priests, its bishops, archbishops and administrative machinery, one very similar to the Roman Empire itself; and since it was inspired with great enthusiasm it showed itself to possess a stronger organisation even than that of the Empire. When the two rival systems came into conflict in the third century, it was the Empire that had to yield to the power of this new and vigorous corporation.

These four causes operating together established the Church's complete ascendancy, so that in the fourth century Christianity became the official religion in the Roman world. At that time the Papacy had not attained its present important position. In the seventh century the five great patriarchates, or seats of metropolitan bishops, were those of Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, Alexandria and Constantinople. These, the great apostolic Sees, enjoyed a pre-eminence in the Christian world because of their old traditions and

old associations. Christian creed during the first centuries was not put into writing, but each of these great apostolic Sees had its own tradition, and handed down from one bishop to another as part of its sacred tradition the doctrines adopted by its founder. The Roman tradition claiming descent from the chief of the Apostles—St. Peter—claimed the greatest reverence and influence.

Later came the Reformation, a movement in Europe in the sixteenth century which ended in the establishment of the Protestant Churches. The Reformation was directed primarily against the abuses which prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church, but the new critical spirit fostered by the Renaissance and the growing feeling of nationalism also played their part.

Although some of the worst abuses of the Roman Catholic Church were thus corrected, it cannot be said that fundamental changes in the spirit of an organised Church were made—old doctrines, superstitions, threats of hell-fire to the unbelieving, and intolerance still lived on in full strength, and we are still justified in speaking of the Church or the ecclesiastical influence in social life without distinguishing to a fundamental degree between Catholic and Protestant.

It is hardly necessary to note that the Catholic Church exerted the utmost of its power to fight all forces making for freedom of thought in the individual. By threat of everlasting punishment for unbelievers, it retained its hold over the ignorant and attempted to crush the intelligent and courageous with secular might. The dreaded Inquisition was a force which had greater social effects than is generally realised—it was an agent making for survival of the unfittest. In Spain the Inquisition deprived the country of its best minds, and a similar result was achieved by the enforcement of celibacy on the Catholic priesthood. Celibacy did not prevent promiscuous intercourse on the part of many of the priests—indeed, throughout the Middle Ages their incontinence was a byword—but

it did prevent the founding of families by the many learned and refined men who were undoubtedly to be found among the ranks of the clergy.

The records of history compel us to conclude that in many ways the Church has been continually an enemy of progress, and particularly of intellectual progress. It has always been a supporter of faith rather than of knowledge. It has made doubt of its doctrines a sin and has exalted credulity above reason. The Church, until quite recently, has been the great enemy of Science. The storm of protest on the part of the Church which followed the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* and the *Descent of Man* is typical of the Church's attitude towards scientific discoveries. Especially has the Church disliked the scientific method as now applied to the study of religion itself.

The characteristic attitude of the Church throughout the greater part of its history has been an aversion to the social and intellectual development of Mankind—an aversion compounded of dislike of change for its own sake and fear lest men's minds be freed from the bonds of superstition which constituted the main source of the Church's power. The study of anæsthetics is now regarded as a humane one, but formerly it was looked upon by many leaders in the Church as the discovery of means by which the will of God could be opposed, and the use of chloroform was denounced from the pulpits.

What was at one time severely condemned by the Church is now common practice and is universally applied. E.g., when the main streets of London were first lit with gas in 1810, many clergy described gas as profane and contrary to God's law.

The Church was opposed even to bathing, and personal cleanliness was regarded as of small importance.

Of the most widely prevalent misconception regarding the intervening period between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages, Dr. Müller-Lyer in his book, *The Family*, p. 214, writes:

A widespread and erroneous impression still prevails among our contemporaries to the effect that the Middle Ages were the organic sequence of Classical Civilisation, and that under the influence of organised Christianity a level of culture and ethics was attained far superior to the finest moral achievements of Antiquity.

"This is entirely incorrect. After the fall of Rome, new races, largely of Teutonic blood, became prominent, and these were still in the stage of barbarism and had far to go before they attained the ethical cultural level of the antique world at its best. It took about a millennium and a half before any real advance was achieved, and higher human manifestations than those of the apex of classical civilisations can be recorded. On the technical and industrial side especially, Classical Antiquity was not *excelled* until about the end of the eighteenth century."

Especially in the doctrines relating to the fundamental institution of Society, the Family, did the Church exercise a baneful influence whose effects continue to this day. Organised Christianity was unfavourable to the position of women. The wife was bound irrevocably to her lord and master. The Fall of Man was attributed to the evil nature of the woman. In particular, sexual intercourse was regarded as unclean and marriage was regarded as a concession to men in order to avoid fornication. Under feudal Christianity and Canon Law (which superseded the enlightened Roman law at the dissolution of the Roman Empire), the position of women declined, as we have noted.

Westermarck in his *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* writes:

Already the latest Roman law, so far as it is touched by the Constitutions of the Christian Emperors, bears some marks of a reaction against the liberal doctrines of the great Antonine juriconsults, who assumed the equality of the sexes as a principle of their code of equity. And this tendency was in a formidable degree supported by Teutonic custom and law. Among the Teutons a husband's authority over his wife was the same as a father's over his unmarried daughter. This power, which under certain circumstances give the husband a right to kill, sell

or repudiate his wife, undoubtedly contained much more than the Church could approve of, and so far she has helped to ameliorate the condition of married women in Teutonic countries. But at the same time the Church is largely responsible for those heavy disabilities with regard to personal liberty, as well as with regard to property, from which they have suffered up to recent times. The systems, says Sir Henry Maine, 'which are least indulgent to married women are invariably those which have followed the Canon Law exclusively, or those which, from the lateness of their contact with European civilisation, have never had their archaisms weeded out.'" (Vol. I, pp. 653–4.)

Against divorce the Church resolutely set its face, and seemed prepared to tolerate the depths of misery and degradation of unhappy partners rather than budge a fraction from her view of the indissolubility of marriage.

With regard to the other major problems of social life the influence of organised Christianity has been equally unhappy.

It is true that Christianity in Europe brought a higher regard for human life than had been felt before. Early Christianity condemned homicide as a heinous crime. But the organised Church departed from this fundamental attitude in this as in so many other of the teachings of Christ. War against the infidel was justified by the early Church, and the latter transformed itself into a military power. "Very often," says Westermarck (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 352):

"Religious zeal was a mere pretext for wars which in reality were caused by avarice or desire for power. The aim of the Church was to be the master of the earth rather than the servant of heaven. She preached crusades not only against infidels and heretics, but against any disobedient prince who opposed her boundless pretensions. And she encouraged war when rich spoils were to be expected from the victor, as a thankoffering to God for the victory He had granted, or as an atonement for the excesses which had been committed."

We hear an echo of this attitude—which is, in the last resort, analysable into the thesis that might is right —in time of war, when the Deity is called upon by both sides to further their respective causes.

From the beginning, too, Christianity recognised slavery; though the Church encouraged masters to show humanity to their slaves and enfranchisement of a fellow-Christian was regarded as a meritorious act (it must be noted, however, that the Church took care to prevent the liberation of her own slaves), the gradual disappearance of slavery in Europe during the latter half of the Middle Ages must be traced to its transformation into serfdom, which came into being because of the necessity for slaves to have a fixed residence on the master's estate in order to till the land; the lord could not oversee his villeins scattered over a wide area and felt obliged to offer them a reward as an inducement to them to apply themselves diligently to cultivation, so that they came to acquire property. Serfdom itself contains the seeds of eventual liberty.

As for the pursuit of scientific knowledge, once again must a heavy charge be added to our indictment of Christianity. The knowledge of Truth was regarded as a necessary requirement of salvation, but it was religious truth. Knowledge not useful to salvation was despised; science was regarded not only as valueless but as sinful. Once again we quote Westermarck: "So also every mental disposition which is essential to scientific research was for centuries stigmatised as offensive to the Almighty; it was a sin to doubt the opinions which had been instilled in childhood before they had been examined, to notice any objection to those opinions, to resolve to follow the light of evidence wherever it might lead." A footnote reads: "As late as the middle of the seventeenth century a powerful party was rising in England who said that all learning was unfavourable to religion, and that it was sufficient for everyone to be acquainted with his mother-tongue alone. The Duke de Saint Simon, who in 1721

and 1722 was the French ambassador in Madrid, states that in Spain science was a crime, and ignorance and stupidity the chief virtues" (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 133).

It might reasonably be expected that a community content to believe and think exactly as its Church dictates and without questioning its authority would be inevitably non-progressive. The history of the European nations afford ample proof that this is the case.

The power of the ecclesiastical influence has grown less in modern times, and the influence of the organised churches on the life of Society is slight as compared with what it has been in the past. But the effects of ecclesiasticism in the past still linger on. The struggle to free Mankind from the mental fetters so insidiously forged by the Church is seen in such modern movements as the attempt to get back to a more sympathetic divorce law. From the more deadening retraints, and in particular the forcing of individuals to profess certain creeds unacceptable to their conscience and intelligence, Mankind in modern Western civilisation is already free, although in our own day we are witnesses of a large-scale attempt on the part of two European states, Germany and Italy, to force upon their subjects what amounts to a religious belief—namely, a belief in the State or "People" as Deity. There appears to have been a similar attempt made in the early period of Russian Communism, but Russia has moved rapidly and characteristically towards democracy since those days.

CONCLUSION

We have arrived at what we hope is a description of the associational and institutional structure of Society fairly closely approximating to the truth, as far as the human mind is capable of apprehending truth. It remains to discuss the place of the individual in Society, to discuss out how he fits into the structure and what use he is making of the great associations which men have created to fulfil their purposes.

The ideas of a greater "soul" or "community mind" of the Hegelian school of Bernard Bosanquet suggest that the welfare of Society can be obtained apart from the welfare of its members, that, indeed, there is some kind of opposition between the interests of Society and those of the individual. But Society exists only for the Community; it is the individuals that make up a community, and the relations between individuals in a community that constitute its society. Society could not exist apart from the individuals whose relationships constitute it.

Individuals could perhaps exist apart from Society; but they do not, because it is only by co-operation and division of labour that Man can hope to obtain that material control over Nature that will enable him to develop his potentialities in the physical world, and it is only by mental and psychical intercourse with his fellows and by respect and affection and love for his friends that he can hope to secure that co-operation and obtain that companionship without which life would be a dreary business for most of us. Mutual respect and affection among men give them the "heart" to do things. And, more than the promise of mutual aid towards physical achievement, they give that reverence for individuality which is perhaps what is meant by the "love" preached by the Church. In-

dividuality is defined by MacIver (*Elements of Social Science*, p. 152) as "the active sense of self-hood, the sense of the inner responsibility for conduct which alone can make men free; it is great or small according to the strength and breadth of intrinsic purpose."

The development of individuality does not entail a conflict between an individual and Society, as Society evolves; rather do these developments proceed not only side by side but interdependently. Sociality is the quality corresponding to socialisation, the process by which human beings establish wider relationships with one another, more fully realise the meaning of Society and act in a manner which is the outcome of their sense of responsibility to one another. In just the same relationship stands individuality to individualisation, which cannot be better described than by again quoting Professor MacIver's words: "Individualisation is the process by which men become more autonomous or more self-determining, in which they advance beyond mere imitativeness or acceptance of standards which come to them with only an outer sanction, in which they become less bound by tradition and custom in the regulation of their lives, less submissive to authority and dictation in matters of thought and opinion, recognising that each is a unique focus of being and can achieve the ends of his life only as these grow clear in his own consciousness and become the objects of his own will" (*op. cit.*, p. 152).

It is essential for the student to note that these terms have nothing in common with *socialism* and *individualism*. These latter refer to theories, ways of thinking about things, opinions. Sociality and individuality are qualities and socialisation and individualisation are processes. Socialism and individualism are naturally opposed to one another, but for the development of the human personality it is essential that individuality and sociality should advance together as complementary processes in the individual's development. The personality of a man is, to the social scientist, that marriage of

individuality and sociality which expresses itself in freedom of thought and outlook, reverence for self, and respect for others and for Society, and that desire for the realisation of happiness for all men and a longing to do one's part in this realisation which is the inevitable consummation of this union.

But there is yet a core of individuality that Society does not touch. Essentially and irrevocably, every one of us is an individual; each of us has his own private thoughts, dreams, desires. Each of us is planning his own individual plans for happiness. That this happiness can be obtained only in co-operation with others does not destroy the fact that it is only, after all, one's own happiness that each of us has to attain. Rather does this demonstrate the interdependence in a civilised community of individuality and sociality. Man does not exist for Society. It is but a half-truth to say that conversely Society does not exist for Man. It is better to regard individualisation and socialisation as interdependent processes. One does not go without the other. This is the fundamental law of Sociology, that socialisation and individualisation advance together. But what of the individual? If he finds his life crippled, confined and hampered by the facts of Society, the arrangements that result from the living together of men in Society, which is in the wrong, the individual or Society? Arguing from one angle, the fact that by allowing every man to pursue his own way and desires and interests without regard to those of others would result in a state of anarchy, gives rise to the reflection that men are not angels and that it is best for Society to limit the activities of individuals for the good of the whole until human nature is so improved as to justify the lifting of all restriction. But this is to assume that men are fundamentally bad, selfish, mean and narrow-minded, and that any improvement must come from without themselves or by virtue of some Divine Grace which will make men good. It does not take cognisance of the fact that the structure of Society may

be faulty in places—that it may not give men the opportunity so to develop that restriction becomes less and less necessary; the social environment may stand in need of repair or modification. In point of fact, the social structure does change; economic conditions to-day are not what they were fifty years ago. Political changes occur, sometimes slowly and in the course of economic change and of change in ways of thinking and living, as in the case of the United Kingdom and of the British Empire. If there is any fundamental unhappiness and unrest in the lives of men, one must look for a cause, therefore, not only in the character of men and women but also in the conditions of their environment—their physical, economic, political, social and psychological environment.

Men react on their environment and their environment reacts on men. The world of human beings is not a beehive. The Society is not the end of existence but the means of living together, a system. Community is not God; it is a group of individuals. That is why it is so futile to speak of Society as the enemy of the individual; it would be more justifiable to regard the beehive as the enemy of the bee—the bee gets so little out of life. Man's inhibitions and repressions and complexes, his ignorance and prejudices, his fears and conflicts, his intolerance, and superstitions, are his enemies; he has subdued physical Nature far more effectively than he has learnt to subdue these.

The guiding of men and women towards a realisation of the potentialities of Mankind is perhaps one of the true functions of religion, and so far as this aim can be pursued by group effort it is the function of the Church to lead the group in this aim.

In spite of the criticism that has been directed in the foregoing pages against some of the practices of the Church, it is evident that the Church has a function in the Community. The decay of the Church to-day is not due to the fact that there is no place for it in modern social life, but to its avoidance of its true func-

tions and to the retention of its policy of endeavouring to enslave men to traditional practices and to the profession of beliefs that no intelligent man finds he can hold together with his self-respect. The function of the Church is to serve personality, not command it. Its function is to bring men to the knowledge of their own possibilities, to show how men may best work together in this world to produce the maximum happiness. This is a spiritual matter—in essence, it is the proclaiming of the brotherhood of Man, and that was the main burden of the teaching of Christ, as, indeed, it has been of all the great religious teachers of Mankind. It is this which should make the minister of religion the brother-in-arms of the sociologist.

But the Church as it stands cannot go on. There can be no utter destruction of an institution which is essential for the development of Man's spiritual life, but there can and must be reconstruction. The Church's true function is not so much to be concerned with doctrines, points of belief, as with a way of life and thought. With the new mental horizons that are opening out before Mankind we are witnessing a great institution in process of being transformed. The old Church, with its insistence upon creeds and dogmas, its drive towards the imprisonment of men's minds by petty acts of "worship" and the forbidding of all contact with ideas and research which might serve to dissipate its power, is dying.

It is now for the Church to take up all that the material and the social sciences can offer her and proclaim the possibilities that lie before Mankind—the conquest of war, of slums, of disease, of poverty, of the fear of death. As to what happens after death, neither the Church nor anyone else can tell us the ultimate form of being of the individual. For all its hundreds of years of preaching, the Church must necessarily be silent on this point. Christ himself was vague on the subject—he gave promise of a greater fulfilment of Man's life in images and metaphors which have been

translated into hard facts by the eager seekers of a comfortable existence after death, but which must remain enigmas to the thinker. In any case we have enough with which to concern ourselves during this life, and Christ concentrated on the application of his teaching to this life. The Church to some extent turned away from Christ and concentrated its powers on trying to persuade men that eternal life was the reward of goodness and of obeying its commandments. But young as it is, the human race is getting past that childish stage of being good for the sake of reward. Or, at least, there are many thousands of individuals who have reached such a maturity. The irony of the situation is that they are so often the agnostics and "free-thinkers" so frequently accused of nameless sins and vices by the faithful.

It will be seen that the essential function of the Church is one of education, once its organisation has been so rearranged that this education can be proceeded with. It is an education in moral values, without reference to any kind of propaganda for the purpose of subordinating the interests of the individual to those of any association or class, and as free as possible from the superstitions and taboos that clouded the lives and haunted the minds of our forefathers. There is a wide range and a great depth of enthusiasm available in Mankind for direction along lines that will help to make this world a brighter and happier place to live in; and when pain, suffering, distress, jealousies, hatreds and fears have been minimised in men's daily lives by the application of the principles of social science and those precepts which were taught so simply and so effectively by Christ, then Man may be able to address himself to the deeper spiritual problems of the riddles of the Universe and the nature of the Deity with better prospects of success than he can hope for at present. For although Religion must be intensely the personal affair of the individual in so far as spiritual progress is

achieved only in the heart of the individual himself, men, who are the children of the Author of the Universe, live in communities, and can reach their great development only through social progress, through intercourse with one another, through co-operation in thought and deed. And just as any single community can reach its greatest development only through the harmonisation of the associations and the interests that begat those associations, so that it is a true Society, not a loose collection of small communities with sometimes conflicting and opposing and sometimes co-operative elements, so the whole world of Mankind can reach its greatest development only when it is one large Community, with features diverse and multifarious enough within its structure but knit into one harmonious whole through the operation of the twin qualities of individuality and sociality. It is the function of the Church to bring this Community into being, to supply those spiritual factors which are necessary that Man should be convinced that life is worth while for its own sake and for the possibilities of individual happiness and efficiency in its widest sense that a life worth while can give. It should so fire him with the spirit and joy of creation that Mankind, as much in the individual as in the whole body of Mankind in general, can, in Mr. H. G. Wells's fine phrase, "stand upon this earth as upon a footstool, and stretch out its realm amidst the stars."

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ANIMISM.—"The attribution of a living soul to inanimate objects and natural phenomena."—O.E.D.

ANTHROPOLOGY.—The science (as distinguished from the philosophy) of Man, its field being limited to explanation in terms of origin. The " natural history " of Man.

ASSOCIATION.—A group formed for the collective pursuit of a social interest. " Any organisation deliberately formed for the collective pursuit of some interest or set of interests which the members of it share " (MacIver).

CASTE.—A section of a large community with a definite rule of exogamy in relation to other similar sections, with usually an occupational basis. Not always easily distinguishable from the tribe, even in India.

CLAN.—An exogamous division of a tribe, all the members of which are held to be related to one another, and bound together by a common tie, which may be a belief in common descent from some ancestor, real or mythical; or common possession of a totem; or it may be of some other kind. An obvious tie is the common habitation of a village or district, but in such a case there is little doubt that the real tie has been of some other kind. In some cases clans are grouped in Phratries (*q.v.*).

COMMUNITY.—A number of persons whose social relationships form a society.

" Any whole area of social life " (MacIver).

" A group of social beings leading a common life, including all the infinite variety and complexity of relations which result from that common life or constitute it " (Ginsberg).

COMPARATIVE METHOD.—The method of comparing features common to two or more groups, with the

object of discovering by induction (reasoning from particular cases to general conclusions) whether such features have originated under identical conditions.

CONCUBINAGE.—Supplementary unions by which a man has one or more supplementary partners (concubines).

CULT.—A more or less organised body of rites.

CUSTOM.—Traditional practice in a community.

" The accepted ways in accordance with which members of a group perform familiar acts, eat and drink, dress and play, and generally behave themselves " (MacIver).

" A form of voluntary action that has developed in a national or tribal community " (Wundt).

" Sanctioned usage " (Ginsberg).

ENDOGAMY.—A set of rules forbidding the members of a particular group to marry anyone who is not a member of that group.

ETHNOGRAPHY.—The study of human races with special reference to geographical distribution.

ETHNOLOGY.—The study of the distribution and development of human races with particular reference to problems of descent.

EUGENICS.—" The science of the agencies under social control which may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations " (Galton).

EXOGAMY.—A set of rules by which members of a particular group are forbidden to marry anyone who is a member of that group.

FAMILY.—As an association, it is a group consisting of parents and children, including all children (adopted or other), by law and custom as descendants of the person, whether father or mother, through whom descent is traced.

FOLKLORE.—The study of *survivals* (*q.v.*), especially of those preserved by means of oral tradition.

GENETICS.—The study of heredity and variations in types of organisms related by descent.

GROUP-MARRIAGE.—A form of marriage in which all

the men of a definite social group are the husbands of all the women of another social group. No such form of marriage is known to exist at present.

KIN AND KINSHIP.—These terms refer to relationship, real or conventional, which can be demonstrated genealogically (*v. Family*).

KINDRED.—This term may be used for a group of persons related by blood (i.e., where the descent can be demonstrated genealogically, and is not mythical, as is often the case with the clan). Occasionally the clan and the kindred coincide. When living under one roof the kindred may be called the *Undivided Household.*

INSTITUTION.—A mode of social unity.

" Established and recognised forms of relationships between social beings " (MacIver).

" Definite and sanctioned forms or modes of relationship between social beings in respect to one another or to some external object " (Ginsberg).

LAWS.—Rules formulated and approved by the community in general to protect the rights of the individuals within the community.

" Social regulations enacted and enforced by some constituted authority " (MacIver).

LEVIRATE.—The custom whereby a man marries his (usually elder) brother's widow; *v.* SORORATE.

MAGIC.—The application of supernatural mechanical power.

Contagious or *sympathetic* magic is founded on the idea of contiguity.

Homœopathic or *imitative* magic is founded on the idea of similarity.

MARRIAGE.—Westermarck: (1) " A more or less durable connection between male and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring " (*History of Human Marriage*).

(2) " A relationship of one or more men to one or more women that is recognised by custom or law, and involves certain rights and duties both in the case of the parties entering the union and in the case of the chil-

dren born of it" (*The Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation*).

MARRIAGE, *Cross-Cousin*.—Marriage between children of a brother and sister; that is, one in which a man marries the daughter either of his mother's brother, or of his father's sister.

MATRIARCHATE.—"Mother-rule," a form of social organisation in which mother-right (*q.v.*) prevails.

MATRILINEAL DESCENT.—Descent reckoned through the mother.

MATRILOCAL MARRIAGE.—A marriage in which the husband lives, temporarily or permanently, with the group of his wife. The system is

MATRIPOTESTAL so far as the children are under the legal control of her people and herself (Marett).

MONOGAMY.—The marriage of one man with one woman.

MONOGYNY.—Mating with one female.

MONOLATRY.—The worship of one deity (but not implying a disbelief in others).

MOTHER-RIGHT.—This term may be used to describe a state of society characterised by the presence of two or all of the three conditions—Matrilineal Descent, Matrilocal Marriage, and the Matripotestal Family.

PATRILINEAL DESCENT.—Descent reckoned through the father.

PATRILOCAL MARRIAGE.—A marriage in which the wife lives, temporarily or permanently, with the husband's group. The system is PATRIPOTESTAL so far as the children are under the legal control of the father.

PHRATRY.—An exogamous division of a tribe, which may be subdivided into clans or classes (though it may sometimes happen that, owing to the disappearance of clans, a phratry may have only one clan). When there are only two divisions in a tribe, they may be called MOIETIES. Non-exogamous divisions in a tribe are usually found to be based on the principle of locality, and in that case may be called *Local Divisions*.

POLYANDRY.—A union of one woman with two or

more men. When these husbands are brothers this kind of union is called *Adelphic Polyandry.*

POLYANDRY, *Disparate.*—Polyandry in which one or more of the husbands has a position superior to that of the others.

POLYGAMY.—A generic term including polygyny and polyandry.

POLYGYNY.—A union of one man with two or more women.

POLYGYNY, *Disparate.*—Polygyny in which one or more of the wives has a position superior to that of the others.

RELIGION.—Westermarck: (1) A belief in and a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being on whom man feels himself dependent and to whose will he makes an appeal in his worship" (*Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*).

(2) " By a religion is generally understood a system of beliefs and rules of behaviour which have reference to man's relations to one or several supernatural beings who are the objects of a regular cult and between whom and their worshippers there are established and permanent relationships" (*op. cit.*).

RITE.—A customary practice of a magico-religious character. A rite may consist of a number of ritual acts.

SACRED.—Set apart (i.e. from the "profane") by reason of the possession of supernatural power inherent or derived.

SACRIFICE.—A magico-religious rite, the essence of which is that something is destroyed. An offering to propitiate a supernatural being. It may be regarded as a communion-feast.

SOCIALITY.—Consciousness of belonging to and willing participation in the life of a society.

SOCIETY.—The system of regulated social relationships set up by a group of persons living as a community.

"The whole system of social relationships" (MacIver).

All the institutions taken together, or the whole associational structure" (Ginsberg).

SOCIOLOGY.—The science dealing with the relations between human beings living in societies.

SORORATE.—The custom of marrying a deceased wife's sister; *v.* LEVIRATE.

SOUL; GHOST; SPIRIT.—It is usual to limit the meaning of *soul* to the separable immaterial personality of the living man or other being; *ghost* to the same thing after death; *spirit* to a soul-like being which has never been associated with a human or animal body. All are essentially of the same type, representing a personality independent of a body, usually possessing an apparitional form of its own.

STATE.—An institution for the government of a community.

"An association which, acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated the universal external conditions of social order" (MacIver).

SURVIVAL.—A decadent element of culture; that is, one that has in a large measure ceased to be a present part of the prevailing type of culture. Such elements often occur as stories, customs, songs and ritual.

TABOO (*or* TABU).—A prohibition resting on a magico-religious sanction, as distinguished from legal prohibitions (maintained by authority) and customary prohibitions (resting simply on social disapproval).

TOTEMISM, "as applying to the clan, is the system whereby a subdivision of a tribe identifies itself with an animal—or plant—species, using its name and claiming to be in mystic touch with it" (Marett).

TRIBE.—A group of a simple kind, nomadic or settled in a more or less definite locality, speaking a common dialect, with a rude form of government, and capable of uniting for common action, as in warfare. It may be regarded as a localised community.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following books are recommended for further study of the groundwork of Sociology. The list is not intended to be complete, but to serve as a guide to the most helpful books to the student who is beginning sociological study, and to the general reader who requires to know the fundamentals of Social and Political Theory. In the works listed and in others dealing with the same subjects, the students will find many references which will enable him to pursue further any particular branch of study.

The Elements of Sociological Theory

For the elements of the subject the student cannot do better than read R. M. MacIver's *The Elements of Social Science* (Methuen) and G. D. H. Cole's *Social Theory* (Methuen). Both these works are exceedingly well written and comprehensible.

More advanced works are M. Ginsberg's *Studies in Sociology* (Methuen), L. T. Hobhouse's *Social Development* (Allen & Unwin) and *The Elements of Social Justice* (Allen & Unwin), and the following works by MacIver:

Community (Macmillan); *Society: Its Structure and Changes* (Macmillan), and *Society: A Text-book of Sociology* (Farrar & Rinehart Inc., N.Y.).

The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples, by L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg (Chapman & Hall), is an excellent example of the application of the comparative method in sociological study.

For the study of Anthropology in general, the reader should study Sir E. B. Tylor's *Anthropology* (Macmillan), an inexpensive edition of which is published in two volumes in the Thinker's Library by Watts & Co. This Library contains many fascinating volumes of interest to the general reader. R. R. Marett's *Anthropology* is published by Thornton Butterworth Ltd. (This firm has now been taken over by Messrs. Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd.)

H. G. Wells's *Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind* (Heinemann) applies social theory to the conditions of the modern world. His *Outline of History* (Cassell) is, of course, a comprehensive introduction to the study of Mankind and world history.

Political Theory

H. Laski's *Introduction to Politics* (Allen & Unwin) and *A Grammar of Politics* (Allen & Unwin) are useful works on Political Theory. *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (Milford) explains its object by its title; Laski's *Liberty and the Modern State* is available in the Pelican Series published by Penguin Books Limited.

The Modern State, by R. M. MacIver (Oxford University Press), is another recommended work by this able sociologist.

Marriage and the Family

Dr. E. Westermarck's works are, of course, recognised as standard works on this subject. His *History of Human Marriage* (Macmillan) is the standard work, while *A Short History of Marriage* (Macmillan) is a good introduction to the study; his *Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation* is a recent work. F. Müller-Lyer has written a stimulating and provocative study, *The Family* (Allen & Unwin).

Comparative Religion and Morals

R. R. Marett's *The Threshold of Religion* (Methuen) is a very interesting work, as is also Carveth Reed's *Man and his Superstitions* (Cambridge University Press). R. Thouless has written an *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (Cambridge University Press).

Sir James Frazer's monumental work, *The Golden Bough* (Macmillan), is universally famous; it is a work of fine scholarship and learning.

The student who wishes to pursue the study of comparative religion and morals is recommended to read Dr. E. Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (Macmillan) and L. T. Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution* (Allen & Unwin).

Social Psychology

An Introduction to Social Psychology (Methuen), by Wm. McDougall, has become a standard work. M. Ginsberg deals with the subject from the standpoint of the sociologist in *The Psychology of Society* (Methuen). *Psychology, a Study of Mental Life* (Methuen), by R. S. Woodworth, is well known as a general work, while the scope of his *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* (Methuen) is indicated by its title.

Philosophy

C. E. M. Joad's *Guide to Philosophy* (Gollancz) is a good introductory work, as is also Bertrand Russell's *Problems of Philosophy* (Thornton Butterworth). W. Durant's *The Story of Philosophy* (Ernest Benn, Ltd.) has received a warm welcome in this country as well as in America, and has been translated into many languages.

INDEX

Adhesion, 138
African bushmen, 83
— pygmies, 83
Andamanese, 83
Animism, 176, 203
Anthropology, 25, 51, 53, 55, 202, 209
Anthropology (Marett), 184, 209
Anthropology (Tylor), 209
Apaches, 83
Apostolic Sees, 187, 189, 190
Aristotle, 81, 157
Association, definition of, 26–27, 203
Assyria, Ancient, 179
Attitudes, 40, 89
Australian aborigines, 83, 143, 144, 146, 176, 183

Baptism, 27, 180
Belgium, 95
Berr, 53
Biology, 43, 55
— relation to Sociology, 56 *sq.*
Birth-rate, 63, 153
Blessing, 184–186
Blood feud, 117, 118, 120
Bosanquet, B., 94, 196
Buffon, G., 58, 60, 61
Bury, Prof., 53

Canon Law, 147, 149, 192
Canute, King, 122
Caste, definition of, 203
Celibacy, 190
Charity, 186
Charles, Dr. Enid, 153
China, 16, 30
Christ, Jesus, 113, 193, 200, 201
Christianity, 112, 113, 179, 180, 187
— and charity, 186
— and marriage, 147, 187, 192, 193
— and position of women, 147, 153, 192 *sq.*
— and power of parents, 151
— and punishment, 122
Church, 25, 27, 28, 40, 60, 86, 87, 88, 105, 106, 110, 113, 114, 167, 187
— and Community, 199 *sq.*
— and infanticide, 150
— and State, 167–168
— organisation of, 188 *sq.*
— origin of, 113, 173 *sq.*
— Protestant, 190
— Roman Catholic, 106, 147, 189 *sq.*
Cicero, 147, 148
Citizen Faces War, The (Donington), 44
City-State, 17, 81, 157, 158, 165
Civics, 34
Clan, 17, 108, 117, 137, 139, 140, 142
— definition of, 203
— relation to State, 151
Classes, social, 86, 87, 102–103, 114
Cohesion, 138
Cole, G. D. H., 209
Community, definition of, 21, 22, 90, 100, 105, 199, 203
— relation to State, 167, 170
Community (MacIver), 40, 85, 209
Comparative method, 107, 203
Compensation for wrongs, 118
Comte, Auguste, 23
Concubinage, definition of, 204
Confarreatio, 147
Confucius, 126
Conscientious objectors, 160
Constantine, Emperor, 147, 188
Contemporary Schools of Psychology (Woodworth), 211
Contraception, 153, 154
Conventio in manum, 150
Council of Trent, 147
Criminal Justice Bill (1938), 130–132
Criminology, 25, 51, 53
Crowd, psychology of, 93
Cult, definition of, 204; 207 (v. *Religion*, 2)
Curse, 184–186

Custom, 105, 109, 117, 141, 188, 197
— and law, 109, 119
— definition of, 27, 28, 204

Darwin, Charles, 58, 59, 61, 62, 191
Dawson of Penn, Lord, 62
Dead, worship of the, 176–177
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, The (Gibbon), 188
Des Sociétés Animales (Espinas), 92
Descent of Man, The (Darwin), 58, 65, 66, 191
Diderot, 60
Divorce, 146, 147–148, 154, 193, 195
Domestic system in industry, 77, 151
Donington, Robert and Barbara, 44
Dowry, 134, 145
Durant, W., 211
Durkheim, 92, 181, 183

Ecclesiasticus, 185, 186
Economica, 37, 89
Economics, 32–34, 43, 47–48, 50, 51, 172
Education, 163, 164, 171
Egyptians, Ancient, 111, 143
Elements of Social Justice, The (Hobhouse), 209
Elements of Social Science, The (MacIver), 20, 23, 27, 28, 85, 100, 117, 197, 209
Elizabeth, Queen, 109
Ellis, Havelock, 144
Emotion, 89, 119
Emotions, moral, 123, 155
Endogamy, 134, 143, 204
Ends and Means (Huxley, Aldous), 161
Environment, 96 *sq.*, 100, 116
Epistle to the Hebrews, 188
Eskimos, 83
Espinas, 92
Ethics, 25, 43, 46, 47, 50, 69
Ethnography, 204
Ethnology, 51, 204
Eugenics, 51, 204
Evil Eye, 185
Exodus, 179
Exogamy, 118, 120, 134, 143, 203 (v. *Clan*), 204, 206 (v. *Phratry*)

Factory system in industry, 77, 151
Family, The, 25, 76, 78, 89, 104–105, 108–109, 141, 152, 154
— and the Church, 187, 192 *sq.*
— and the State, 151, 152
— basis of, 155–157
— definition of, 141, 204
— origin of, 133 *sq.*
— the Patriarchal, 17, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152
Family The (Müller-Lyer), 142, 149 (footnote), 191, 210
Fascism, 122, 160; *v.* also *Italy*
Faust (Gounod), 186
Feudal system, 17, 81, 158, 188, 192
Folklore, 204
Forfeiture Act (1870), 131
Frazer, Sir James, 111, 144, 177, 181, 182, 210
— — definition of religion, 181
French Revolution, 172
Freud, Sigmund, 118 (footnote)
Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation, The (Westermarck), 141, 144, 148, 154, 206, 210

Galton, F., 51, 204 (v. *Eugenics*)
General Will, Theory of the, 93, 159, 161
Genesis, 144, 185
Genetics, 204
Geology, 59
Germany, 34, 45, 94, 96, 114, 122, 160, 172, 195
Ghost, definition of, 208
Gibbon, Edward, 188
Ginsberg, M., 21, 23, 26, 28, 37, 47, 49, 53, 74, 89, 104, 109, 116, 120, 205, 209, 210
— — definition of Association, 26
— — — of Community, 21, 203
— — — of Custom, 28, 204
— — — of Institution, 28
— — — of Society, 208
— — — of Sociology, 23, 208
— — — of Tradition, 95
— — on "Root Interests," 104
— — on scope of Sociology, 47
— — on Social Philosophy, 74
Gods, primitive, 111–113
— holiness of, 179
— and religion, 180
Golden Bough, The (Frazer), 181, 210

Gomme, 80
Grammar of Politics, A (Laski), 210
Gratitude, 125
Great Britain, 34, 45, 114, 168, 171, 199
Greeks, 59, 81, 82, 111, 112, 150, 158, 185
Group Mind, Theory of the, 92 *sq.*, 161
Group-marriage, 141–142, 145
— definition of, 204
Guide to Philosophy (Joad), 211

Hammurabi, Code of, 117
Hebrews, 112, 122, 185, 186
Hegel, 23, 196
Heisgeir, 80
Henry VIII, King, 109, 114
Herbert, Sydney, 95
Hewart, Lord, 168
Hindoos, 80
History, 34
— relation to Sociology, 52 *sq.*
History of European Morals (Lecky), 149
History of Human Marriage, The (Westermarck), 135, 136, 137, 140 (footnote), 141, 205, 210
Hobbes, Thomas, 23, 159
Hobhouse, L. T., 79, 109, 116, 118, 120, 137, 209, 210
— —on "Root Interests," 88, 104
Hospitality, 188
Huxley, Aldous, 161

Incest, 118, 142–143
India, 105, 126, 203 (v. *Caste*)
Indians, North American, 79, 80–81, 83, 108–109, 116, 176
Individualisation, 197, 198
Individuality, 197, 198
Industrial Revolution, 99, 115
Infanticide, 150
Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics, Theory of, 58, 61
Inquisition, The, 190
Instinct, 89, 166–167
— gregarious, 138–139
Institution, definition of, 27, 107, 205
"Interests" (MacIver), 40, 85, 86, 87 *sq.*, 89, 103, 104
"Interests, Root" (Hobhouse), 88–89
Introduction to Politics, An (Laski), 110, 169, 171, 209
Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, An (Thouless), 210
Introduction to Social Psychology, An (McDougall), 167, 211
Iroquois, 81, 188
Italy, 34, 45, 122, 160, 172, 195

Japan, 16, 82, 121
Joad, C. E. M., 211
Justice, and the State, 163–166
— primitive, 117, 118–119, 120

Kant, 126
Kindred, 205
Kinship, 139, 143, 205
Koran, 180

Lamarck, 58, 61
Laski, H., 110, 210
— — definition of the State, 110
— — on character of the State, 169, 171
Law, and custom, 109, 118
— and "natural rights," 165
— definition of, 117, 205
— sociological, 43–44, 46, 198
League of Nations, 72, 169
Lecky, 149
Levirate, 205
Liberty and the Modern State (Laski), 210
Linguistics, 55
Linnæus, 58, 60
Local Divisions, 206 (v. *Phratry*)
Locke, John, 23, 159
Lucretius, 58, 60
Lyell, Sir George, 58, 61, 62

Machiavelli, 23
MacIver, R. M., 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 40, 85, 170, 209, 210
— — definition of Association, 25, 85, 203
— — — of Community, 21, 203
— — — of Custom, 28, 204
— — — of Individualisation, 197
— — — of Individuality, 197
— — — of Institution, 27, 205
— — — of Laws, 117, 205
— — — of Society, 20, 207
— — — of the State, 110, 208
— — — of Traditions, 95

MacIver, R. M., on "Interests," 86, 87, 102, 104
— — on the social environment, 100
Mackenzie, Professor, 93
Maine, Sir Henry, 144, 193
Malay Archipelago, 144, 176
Malinowski, Professor, 142
Man and his Superstitions (Reed), 210
Mana, 151, 174, 175–176, 185
Mantras, 176
Manus marriage, 146–147, 148
Marett, R. R., 184, 206, 210
— — classification of Anthropology, 55
— — definition of Totemism, 208
Marriage, 27, 40, 106, 118, 133 *sq.*, 152
— and Christianity, 147, 187, 192, 193
— as a social institution, 141 *sq.*
— by capture, 134, 144
— by consent, 134
— by purchase, 134, 144
— cross-cousin, 206
— definition of, 141, 205
— duration of, 146–148
— forms of, 134, 145
— group-, 141–142, 145, 204
— rules relating to, 134, 142 *sq.*
— matrilocal, 206
— matripotestal, 206
— patrilocal, 206
— patripotestal, 206
— relations between partners of, 148–149
Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples, The (Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg), 109, 116, 120, 209
Matriarchate, 206
Matrilineal system, 139–140, 150, 206
McDougall, W., 92, 93, 166–167, 211
Mexico, 82
Middle Ages, 83, 88, 109, 121, 167, 188, 190, 191, 192, 194
Modern State, The (MacIver), 110, 210
Modes of contracting marriage, 134, 144–145
Mohammedanism, 180
Moieties, 206 (v. *Phratry*)
Monogamy, 28, 133
— causes of, 145–146
— definition of, 145, 206
Monogyny, 206
Monolatry, 206
Monotheism, 112
Montesquieu, 122
Moral Emotions, Westermarck's theory of the, 123 *sq.*
Morals in Evolution (Hobhouse), 118, 137, 210
Mother-right, 206
Mother-rule, 206 (v. *Matriarchate*)
Motivations, 40, 89
Muller, H. J., 56
Müller-Lyer, F., 142, 149 (footnote), 191, 210
Munnecke, 135

Names, significance of, 179–180
Nation, 84, 109
— definition of, 95
Nationalism, 190
Nationality (Herbert, Sydney), 95
"Natural rights," 164–165
Natural Selection, Theory of, 58, 62, 124, 143
Nazi System, 52, 94, 96, 114, 122, 151, 160, 172, 195
Neolithic Man, 83
New Despotism, The (Hewart, Lord), 169

Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, The (Westermarck), 105, 121, 123, 138, 139, 150, 151, 178, 181, 192, 193, 194–195, 207, 210
Origin of Species, The (Darwin), 58, 59, 62, 65, 191
Out of the Night (Muller, H. J.), 56
Outline of History, The (Wells, H. G.), 54, 210

Papacy, The, 189
Parental care, 135, 136
Parents, power of, 150–152, 185–186
Patria potestas, 147, 148, 151
Patriarchate, 17, 147, 148, 149, 151
Patrilineal system, 139–140, 206
Peru, 82, 121, 122
Philosophy, 46, 68, 166
— Social, 67 *sq.*
Phratry, 203 (*v. Clan*), 206
Physiology, 14, 15

Plato, 23, 152, 165
Politics, 51, 171
Polyandry, 142
— Adelphic, 207
— and Group-marriage, 141–142, 145
— definition of, 145, 206
— Disparate, 207
Polygamy, 133
— definition of, 145, 207
Polygyny, 134
— causes of, 145–146
— definition of, 143, 207
Prayer, 178–179
Principles of Geology, The (Lyell), 61, 62
Problems of Philosophy (Russell), 211
Promiscuity, Theory of, 133, 141
Propaganda, 201
Psychology, 14, 16, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 56
— Social, 40, 49–50, 167
Psychology, A Study of Mental Life (Woodworth), 211
Psychology of Society, The (Ginsberg), 21, 26, 28, 95, 210
Punishment, 119 *sq.*, 130–132
— and religion, 122
— and social utility, 121, 128–130
— capital, 121
— Theories of, 119 *sq.*, 128

Rating and Valuation Act (1925), 168
Reed, Carveth, 210
Reformation, The, 147, 190
Religion, and magic, 176 *sq.*
— and punishment, 122
— comparative, 111, 210
— decline of influence of organised, 152–153
— definition of, 180, 181, 207
— primitive, 111 *sq.*
Religion of the Semites, The (Robertson Smith), 118 (footnote)
Renaissance, The, 190
Republic, The (Plato), 23
Resentment, Moral, 124
Retaliation, 118
Rite, 180, 204 (v. *Cult*)
— definition of, 207
Roman Catholic Church, 106, 147; v. also *Church* and *Christianity*
Romans, 82, 111, 112, 122, 153, 158
— and Christianity, 188 *sq.*, 192
— and *patria potestas*, 147, 148
— and religion, 178
— infanticide among, 150
— marriage rules of, 146–147
— status of women under, 147, 148, 149
Rousseau, J. J., 23, 159
Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám, 68
Russell, Bertrand, 211
Russia, 88, 114, 148, 153, 154, 195
— "mir," 80

Sacrifice, 179, 207
St. Paul, 188
St. Peter, 190
Sée, 53
Sees, Apostolic, 187, 189, 190
Selection of partners, 142–144
Sentiment, 89
Short History of Marriage, A (Westermarck), 144, 210
Simmel, 37
Sioux, 83
Slavery, 194
Slavs, 120
Smith, Adam, 125, 128
Smith, Robertson, 118 (footnote)
Social-contract, Theory of the, 159
Socialisation, 197, 198
Socialism, 197
Sociality, 22, 65, 99, 108, 197, 207
Social Development (Hobhouse), 88, 209
Social sciences, 41–42, 47 *sq.*
Social Theory (Cole), 209
Society, definition of, 16, 20, 90, 105, 207, 208.
Society: A Textbook of Sociology (MacIver), 209
Society: Its Structure and Changes (MacIver), 103, 209
Sociology, as a science, 18–19, 24–25, 44–47
— definition of, 23
— relation to Biology, 56 *sq.*
— relation to History, 52 *sq.*
— relation to Social Philosophy, 69 *sq.*
— scope of, 37 *sq.*, 41 *sq.*
Sombart, 53
Sororate, 208
Soul, definition of, 208

Spain, 190, 195
Spencer, Herbert, 91
Spirits, 111, 140, 176
— definition of, 208
State, The, 27, 84, 86, 87, 94, 105, 106, 109, 110, 114, 116, 118, 151–2
— and care of children, 151–2
— and the Church, 114, 167–168, 170, 189
— and Clan, 151
— and Community, 167, 170
— and the Family, 151, 155
— and justice, 163, 164–166
— definition of, 110, 208
— Laski on, 110, 169
— nature of, 27, 109, 116, 158 *sq.*
Steinmetz, 79
Story of Philosophy, The (Durant), 211
Stranger in primitive Society, 186–187
Studies in Sociology (Ginsberg), 23, 47, 49, 53, 74, 104, 209
Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (Laski), 210
Suggestibility, 93, 100
Survival of the fittest, 66
Survivals, 79, 175, 204 (v. *Folklore*)
— definition of, 208
Switzerland, 95

Taboo (or Tabu), 113, 177, 201
— definition of, 208
Technology, 55
Tendencies, sociological, 43–46, 107
Teutons, 81, 82, 151, 158, 186, 192, 193
Theory of Moral Sentiments, The (Smith, Adam), 125
Threshold of Religion, The (Marett), 210
Tierra del Fuego, 78, 137, 144, 176
Totemism, 79, 81, 108–109, 143, 203 (v. *Clan*)
— definition of, 208
Totem and Taboo (Freud), 118 (footnote)
Trade Unions, 115, 172
Tradition, 197
— definition of, 95
Transmutation of Species, Theory of the, 60, 61
Tribe, 17, 139
— definition of, 208
Troeltsch, 53

Twilight of Parenthood, The (Charles, Enid), 153
Tylor, Sir E. B., [illegible], 209

Undivided Household, 205 (v. *Kindred*)
United States of America, 154, 157

Veddahs, 76, 78, 79, 83, 116, 137, 176
Vierkandt, 38
Village community, 80, 158
Village Community, The (Gomme), 80
Vinogradoff, 53
Volz, 135

Wallace, Alfred Russel, 58, 62
Weber, Max, 39–40
Wells, H. G., 54, 202, 210
Westermarck, Edward, 144, 150, 151, 192, 210
— — definition of marriage, 141, 205
— — — of religion, 178, 184, 207
— — on the Christian Church, 192, 193, 194–195
— — on custom, 105
— — on divorce, 154
— — on exogamy, 143
— — on the Family, 133 *sq.*, 142, 144, 154–155
— — on gods, 181–182
— — on magic and religion, 175, 177, 184
— — on the moral ideas, 123 *sq.*
— — on polygyny, 145
— — on punishment, 121, 127, 128
— — on the status of women, 148
Western Society, definition of, 29–30
Wheeler, G. C., 109, 116, 120, 209
White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, 155
Wiese, von, 38
Wilson, President, 169
Women, status of, 146–147, 148–149, 152
Woodworth, R. S., 211
Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind, The (Wells, H. G.), 210
Worship of the dead, 176–177
Wundt, definition of custom, 204

Yahgans, 78, 79, 83, 137, 176

Zoology, 55